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The present study investigates the nature of markets and market development in 
China.  It is made up of an introduction, conclusion, and five additional chapters.  
Each of the chapters focuses on some aspect of markets, institutions, and/or the 
interactions of the two as they relate to China, with most dealing principally with the 
development of markets in a specific part of China, Yiwu, Zhejiang Province.  The 
author invested nearly three years of his life in Yiwu, developing relationships, 
carrying out interviews, and investigating the nature of market-related change in this 
part of China.  In addition, he also had the opportunity to visit a number of other 
marketplaces throughout the nation.  The works in the volume are the outcome of 
both his experiences and resulting research, and display the key roles of institutions, 
identities, particular individuals, and markets, themselves, in defining development. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
MARKET CHINA:  AN HISTORICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
OF A CHINESE MARKETPLACE AND ITS MARKET ENVIRONMENT  
 
In a general sense, the works in this volume relate to markets, their development and 
character (in an institutional sense).  More specifically, the papers here all deal with 
the nature of emerging markets in China (and the manner by which these markets are 
emerging).  Their focus is on processes of “market transition” (Nee 1989; 1996), 
wherein a nation moves from an economic system predicated on planning to one 
associated with markets.  Such a shift involves many transformations.  And, while 
there has been much research relating to the outcomes of these changes, there has been 
comparatively less investigation of the specific processes (apart from politically 
oriented ones) by which the outcomes have emerged.  There thus exists a need for 
more research regarding the processes of market change.  A particular lack of focus 
has been associated with the manner by which markets arise and develop.  This has 
been a problem in research on transition processes generally, leading, in the words of 
one prominent transition scholar, to a situation in which “the mechanisms giving rise 
to transformative economic development are not yet well understood” (Nee 2009:4).  
My goal in undertaking the various works in this volume was to try and remedy this 
deficiency.  I put stress on the formation and development processes of markets, 
especially in terms of how they relate to institutions and institutional change.  This 
introductory essay serves as a prologue to the volume’s five distinct (but related) 
chapters, each of which deals with a particular aspect of markets, institutions and 
institutional change.  It is organized in accordance with four main themes:  markets; 
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the institutions that characterize them; the manner by which markets (and their 
relevant institutions) arise, change and develop; and how these issues all relate to the 
market transition situation of China (including how this transition process began and 
its subsequent nature).  The essay specifies and discusses various conceptualizations 
of markets, one of which is a social organization approach that the various works 
within this volume rely upon.  In addition, it also provides a summary of the papers 
making up the larger study.  The purpose of this introduction then is to provide a 
foundation of understanding in preparation for the other essays to follow.  It begins 
with a discussion of markets. 
 
MARKETS 
Markets involve processes of (at least mostly) free choice, predicated on price-based 
decision-making (though, of course, other influences, such as differing levels of 
knowledge among involved actors, advertising, actors’ likes and dislikes, their 
conceptions of risk, various social influences, etc., all play roles as well).  Markets 
are important if for no other reason than because they serve as the context of most 
business, economic, and even organizational action.  Given that there is growing  
“concern that many of the accounts which centre on process and practice tend to 
downplay the importance of the broader settings in which action takes place” (Mutch, 
Delbridge, and Ventresca 2006:608), an enhanced understanding of markets is of 
importance.  A logical starting point to start off this analysis is to define what 
“markets” are.  Such a task is easier said than done, however.  This is because, in 
many works, particularly business and economic ones, the word market is often used, 
but seldom explicitly defined.  Related research instead generally assumes the 
existence of implicit market understandings.  This has been an ongoing problem.  In 
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fact, a Nobel Prize recipient in economics, “George Stigler found it ‘a source of 
embarrassment that so little attention has been paid to the theory of markets’” (quoted 
in McMillan 2002:8).  But, even when the word market is defined, its meaning 
differs depending on various factors.  One factor is the background of the individual 
who is doing the defining.  For example, economists generally refer to markets in one 
way, while sociologists, and many other social scientists do so in another.  A 
consensus on the term is therefore frequently absent.  As one author writes, “the 
word ‘market’ is…equivocal” (Braudel 1992:223).  To understand what markets 
mean necessitates therefore a review of some frequently encountered definitions of the 
term.   
The roots of the word market can be traced to the Latin term mercātus meaning 
“to trade.”  In its earliest form, market referred specifically to “A public gathering 
held for buying and selling merchandise” (Pickett 2000:1071).  That is, it meant a 
marketplace, or a limited field of exchange.  Such market forms can be traced back to 
the earliest of human history, as far back as the seventieth century BC (Rothenberg 
1992:6).  Marketplaces have continued to play a prominent role throughout the world 
ever since.  Many authors have analyzed the function of marketplaces, with the 
French author-scholar, Fernand Braudel (1992), undertaking some of the most well 
known analyses.  Marketplaces, while certainly socially impacting, have also often 
been portrayed as having various maladies, the most prominent of which are poorly 
diffused knowledge and information.  In such markets, involved actors have tended 
to be cliquish and isolated from others outside their own realm, with the markets 
generally encompassing little large-scale interaction (networks of relations with other 
similar markets) and/or information exchange.  In reference to a marketplace located 
in Africa and referred to as a bazaar, Clifford Geertz (1979:124-125) wrote:   
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…in the bazaar information is generally poor, scarce, maldistributed, 
inefficiently communicated, and intensely valued.  Neither the rich 
concreteness or reliable knowledge that the ritualized character of 
nonmarket economies makes possible, nor the elaborate mechanisms for 
information generation and transfer upon which industrial ones depend, are 
found in the bazaar…The level of ignorance about everything from 
product quality and going prices to market possibilities and production 
costs is very high, and a great deal of the way in which the bazaar is 
organized and functions (and within it, the ways its various sorts of 
participants behave) can be interpreted as either an attempt to reduce such 
ignorance for someone, increase it for someone, or defend someone against 
it…The search for information one lacks and the protection of information 
one has is the name of the game. 
 
Because of their frequent lack of ties to the outside, marketplaces as markets have also 
generally been limited in their overall social impacts.  A better understanding of the 
influence of markets on overall society thus requires a consideration of other 
conceptualizations. 
A second common representation of market is one linked to the notion of the 
market as a mechanism.  This is the market commonly referred to in economics.  It 
has, in fact, been said that the “one mechanism that economists relate most of their 
analyses to—their master mechanism, so to speak—is the market” (Hedström and 
Swedberg 1998:3).  Mechanisms define the relationship between two entities, and 
scholars posit another of their functions is to provide explanatory insight regarding the 
connections and linkages between the two (Hedström and Swedberg 1998:7-11).  
Markets, at least within economics, are a mechanism (or process) in the sense that they 
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explicate the relationship between the supply of and demand for various items, such as 
commodities, finished goods, and/or services.  That is, they function to explain the 
relationship between supply and demand.  A key factor in this conceptualized role is 
the role of prices as the mediator of existing relations.  In fact, within economics, 
markets and prices are oftentimes viewed as analogous entities.  As a result, the 
environment of exchange has been considered to be unimportant (only prices are 
important).  Such a notion dates back to the time of Adam Smith, and has been a 
prominent perspective within classical and neo-classical economic portrayals ever 
since.  This view of markets as a type of mechanism also assumes markets to be 
naturally arising entities, with this emergence based on the human “propensity to 
truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another” (Smith 1952:6).  Under such a 
formulation, “institutional effects are neglected and rendered as a part of the 
mysterious force of the laissez-faire economy” (Lie 1991:226).  The market-as-
mechanism view assumes an impersonalized exchange relationship, held in place by 
certain prescribed forces (Lubasz 1992:39), these forces being Smith’s “invisible 
hand,” or the relationship between supply and demand, predicated both on the actions 
of free agents,1 who act in pursuit of their own rationally determined individual 
interests (leading supposedly to increasingly efficient systems), as well as on 
tendencies related to the (assumed to be) natural advancement of the division of labor, 
a process understood to result in the promotion of exchange.  A market is signaled, 
according to neo-classical economics, when, for a specified product and geographic 
area, prices of the product change in unison, and move towards an equilibrium, the 
point at which supply equals demand (Lie 1997:342; Braudel 1992:227). 
However, there are problems with such a characterization as well.   For one 
                                                
1 According to Nobel winning economist, Milton Friedman, “The central feature of the market 
organization of economic activity is that it prevents one person from interfering with another in respect 
of most of his activities” (1962:14). 
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thing, it “bypasses questions of how buyers and sellers get together” (McMillan 
2002:8), assuming that this process occurs naturally.  The question of who is 
involved in exchange is therefore not important; with market-involved actors 
conceptualized as anonymous and independent.  The approach also does not answer 
how exchange relations are maintained and contracts enforced, but instead supposes 
that these processes occur naturally.  In addition, it leaves out the “interactive, 
mutually constitutive relationship between markets as economic process and markets 
as social institutions,” ignoring the idea that “the social institutions and organizational 
patterns that constitute the marketplace are not merely emergent properties of an 
abstract market mechanism” (Bestor 1998:154).  Also overlooked is the possibility of 
variations and points of uniqueness among different markets.  Rather, most 
economists assume markets to be of a positivistic form, the same in meaning and 
function regardless of context and/or participants.  They likewise tend to ignore the 
idea that modes of exchange are “central to reproducing particular patterns of 
relationships, and co-ordinating social identities, functions and actions, that is, the 
notion that the exchange of goods, services, information and other social forms links 
people up in culturally specific ways” (Slater and Tonkiss 2001:8), which limit actors 
as to their forms of action.  This helps to keep existing systems in place, and 
constrains macro-level change.  Another weakness of most economic 
conceptualizations concerns the taken-for-granted motivations of involved actors.  
Questions have arisen regarding how rational and ego-driven those participating in 
economic activity actually are (Kahneman and Tversky 2000).  Lastly, scholars have 
ignored the manner by which markets arise.  The assumption has been, as in the 
words of Oliver Williamson, that “In the beginning there were markets” (1975:20).  
In fact, “[little] consideration has been made of where new markets come from and 
how existing markets affect the origins, stability, and transformations of other 
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markets” (Fligstein 2001:14). 
One reason for this situation relates not only to how markets are depicted in 
economics, where, as already noted, for the sake of calculative convenience, market 
exchanges “involve only prices and quantities” (Simon 1991:40), but it has also 
resulted from a prominent view commonly found within many of the other social 
sciences, particularly anthropology and sociology.  This view emerged, in part, out of 
the work of Karl Polanyi, work that has enjoyed “a substantial reputation amongst 
historians and scholars of other social sciences [apart from economics]” (North 
1977:706).  One aspect of Polanyi’s work posited that a significant realm of 
economic activity, a realm Polanyi identified as characterized by economic action 
associated with the mechanisms of reciprocity and/or redistribution, is embedded in 
networks of social relations and enmeshed in institutions (Polanyi 1957:148).  
Polanyi also stressed that, unlike forms of economy identified primarily with 
reciprocity and redistribution, the modern market economy is “an economic system 
controlled, regulated, and directed by markets alone; order in the production and 
distribution of goods is entrusted to this self-regulating mechanism” (Polanyi 
1957:68).  In making such a declaration, Polanyi defined the market an independent 
entity, and left economics’ “core concept of the market unchallenged.  Despite his 
embeddedness thesis, market exchange remains a disembedded concept” (Lie 
1991:219).  Polanyi’s views have had major impacts in the sense that, until recently, 
most social scientists have tended to ignore economic-exchange forms of action, 
leaving such matters to be monopolized by economists.  Recently, however, 
Polanyi’s views regarding modern markets have begun to be debated.  A realization 
has arisen that strong inter-linkages exist between social and economic factors.  In 
turn, interest among social scientists, apart from those just in economics, concerning 
things economic has grown considerably. 
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A catalyst for this change was a 1985 paper by Mark Granovetter.  In this work, 
Granovetter raised questions regarding various notions that were acting to minimize 
the importance of social relations in modern economies.  He wrote of economics’ 
tendency to place little focus on the idea of human interaction as an influencer of 
economic outcomes, believing this to be inappropriate.  But, Granovetter also 
asserted that the idea, as frequently found in the non-economic social sciences, of an 
overly deterministic social environment is also in error.  Regarding these differing 
propensities he asserted that the “Under- and oversocialized accounts are 
paradoxically similar in their neglect of ongoing structures of social relations” 
(Granovetter 1985:481).  He posited that both types of accounts have depicted actors 
as atomized entities (Granovetter 1985:485).  He called for a greater focus on the 
nature of economic relations among social actors, insisting that there be an extension 
of Polanyi’s concept of embeddedness.  Granovetter declared the additional need for 
the application of embeddedness to situations associated with modern markets, 
insisting that, “a sophisticated account of economic action must consider its 
embeddedness in [social] structures” (Granovetter 1985:481).  This need exists, 
Granovetter believed, due to the fact that the actions of actors in market economies are 
“embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social relations” (Granovetter 1985:487).  
Various scholars, particularly in sociology and business, have, as a result, heeded 
Granovetter’s calls for change.  In turn, structural approaches have tended to 
“[dominate] the debate on markets” (Swedberg 1994:267). 
There have been criticisms of the embeddedness approach, however.  It has 
been asserted that, though the conceptualization improves upon the idea of markets as 
being strictly dependent upon mechanisms of price and efficiency, other factors need 
to be considered as well.  According to one set of authors: 
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…the embeddedness approach—as currently configured—continues to be 
a partial explanation.  In pursuing a role- and relation-based 
understanding of market arrangements, embeddedness scholarship treats 
markets as structurally determined and implicitly outside the realm of 
meaning, interpretation, and individual agency…Markets conceptually 
remain reified empirical objects, external to social actors who constitute 
them, rather than being conceived of as reified abstractions that represent 
intersubjective states of mind and meaning, reproduced through ongoing 
social participation and social investment.  In order for participants to 
come together and meaningfully interact, they must share at least a sense 
of purpose, if not a syntax of intersubjective essentials (Biggart and 
Beamish 2003:450). 
 
A more directly stated meaning of this is that embeddedness approaches tend to 
overlook the culture and history of markets.  They also de-emphasize the role that 
social interaction plays in shaping and influencing the nature of markets.  While 
society is not all determining, market actors, in their interactions with others, certainly 
are influenced by and influence society in ways that are not merely structural.  These 
influences also impact markets.  For example, allocations of power help determine 
how action will take place, as do existing beliefs.  These are not purely structural 
factors.  The meanings and forms (apart from structure alone) of interactive action 
are important and deserve consideration as well.   
The idea of markets as social organizations, a third definitional approach, and 
the approach principally applied in this volume, incorporates these views.  Such an 
organizational perspective has a relatively long history and assents to the importance 
of structural concepts.  But, while networks are an important aspect of this approach, 
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the approach bolsters the structural (embeddedness) perspective of markets by 
including other factors as well, for example elements associated with organizational 
history, ideology, culture and values (Blau and Scott 1962:4)—the institutional side of 
markets.  It does away with the idea of markets as a positivistic form, embracing the 
notion of market diversity.  It takes markets as social constructions, both in the sense 
that differing markets possess unique forms of social interaction, as well as from the 
perspective that they encompass unique forms of social reality (Berger and 
Luckmannn 1966).  The approach assumes individual differences:  “Markets are 
social constructions that reflect the unique political-cultural constructions of their 
firms and nations” (Fligstein 2001:97).  Linked to this is the idea that an 
understanding of market systems necessitates the inclusion of a focus on socially 
based institutions (more about institutions will be said later).  
Characterizing markets as a form of social organization implies that markets are 
a “kind of cooperation among men that is conscious, deliberate, purposeful” (Barnard, 
1968 [1938]:4).  This differs from the economic conception of markets that assumes 
involved actors are independent and directed solely towards their own economic 
interests, constantly shifting allegiances based strictly on price-based considerations.  
Under such a conceptualization there exists little need to consider issues of context or 
meaning.  Also unlike economic conceptualizations, which treat markets as one 
endpoint of a continuum between markets and hierarchy, the conceptualization of 
markets as social organizations does away with the sharp distinction between 
hierarchies and markets, a distinction that is inherent in the work of transaction cost 
economists, such as Oliver Williamson.  Rather than sharply distinguishing between 
markets and hierarchies, relevant scholars assume that markets include aspects of 
hierarchy within them (Perrow 1986:255).  This implies that factors such as authority 
relations, structural considerations, the identities of involved actors, issues of 
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temporality, values, etc., must be accounted for and explained.  Additionally, in 
contrast to economic approaches, which suppose that efficiency considerations are the 
sole determinant of market development, conceptualizations emphasizing the social 
organizational perspective view market changes as being linked to various causes, of 
which efficiency is but one.  Some other factors of focus are the need for reduction in 
uncertainty and the desire for stability.  As part of such an approach, “The central 
idea is the emergence of the market as an identity” (White 2002:22-23), wherein a 
sense of organizational order is achieved that provides market actors with a sense of 
predictability and assurance.  Such identities are socially constructed, dependent on 
existing institutional frameworks.  Historical considerations are critical to this 
approach, since the emergence of market order is not instantaneous, but rather occurs 
over time, dependent on factors associated with history, experience and path 
dependence.  In this sense, markets, like other organizations, exist when “there is a 
probability that certain persons will act in such a way as to carry out the order 
governing the [market]” (Weber 1978:49).  The Weberian approach applied here 
“incorporates economic and cultural factors and allows for historical diversity” 
(Hamilton and Biggart 1988:S75).  It also emphasizes factors associated with 
authority, authority that is primarily top-down rather than bottom-up, while likewise 
including a discussion of political factors and the role of the modern state in impacting 
change. 
But, even in applying such an approach one must be careful.  One reason for 
such care relates to market definition.  Although theories of industrial organization 
often assume otherwise (Swedberg 1994:261), markets are not the same as industry 
(Brooks 1995:536).  Also, although Marx asserted that the scale and framework of 
production determines the nature of markets, something that has acted to influence 
some to emphasize production over other aspect of market doings (White 1981), in 
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fact markets are not determined just by a group of producers engaged in the 
manufacture of a similar product.  Markets include and are impacted by a diverse 
array of participants, not only producers, but also buyers, sellers, input suppliers, as 
well as those overseeing and influenced by market-related activities:  government 
officials, the courts, unions, the media, and the general public.  Markets differ by 
geographic area and by involved actors, and by the degrees of involvement of these 
actors.  Even within nations, markets are multiple in their forms and characters.  
Such assertions imply that the boundaries of markets are important, as are the manner 
in which activities are organized and managed within market boundaries.  This is 
particularly the case for newly arising markets, especially when research exists 
showing that an organization’s beginnings have ongoing influences on the nature of 
action in and regarding that organization over time (Stinchcombe 1965).  Along 
similar lines, we may assume that the manner by which a market develops will have 
ongoing impacts on how action within the market’s boundaries takes place in the 
market’s future.  Periods of market transition are thus particularly critical periods of 
change and deserve greater attention, particularly from the standpoint of emerging 
market organization.   
 
INSTITUTIONS AND MARKETS 
But how markets develop and operate depends on various factors, including, as 
previously mentioned, existing institutional frameworks, the degrees to which 
institutional frameworks change, and the manner by which this change occurs.  What 
are institutions?  To help answer this question, let’s start off with some examples. 
Prominent institutions include language, money, social norms, laws, logics, and 
religions.  It is necessary to start off with such examples because institutions, like 
markets, are also often defined in differing ways, and their meanings are not always 
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clear.  For example, Nobel winning economist, Douglass North, has defined 
institutions as, “the rules of the game in a society or, more formally…the humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interaction” (1990:3).  North, however, asserts 
an intentionality to the emergence of institutions that is not always present in other 
definitions.  An alternate definition, for example, posits that institutions are “systems 
of established and prevalent social rules that structure social interactions” (Hodgson 
2006:2), with no mention made of deliberate action.  North’s approach also stresses 
the notion that institutions constrain and limit behavior, but ignores the fact that 
institutions also encourage and facilitate various forms of action as well.  Institutions 
are not simply limiting, but can also have action-promoting effects, too.  Thus, 
perhaps another, more sociological approach to the definition of institutions is better 
for the purposes here.  It refers to institutions as “cognitive [how reality is framed], 
normative [focusing on values and norms], and regulative [the constraint or regulation 
of behavior] structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social 
behavior” (Scott 1995:xiii).  As such, institutions are entities acting to structure and 
define human action, doing so in at least three different ways.  This depiction, 
offering insight regarding the action influencing aspects of institutions, and also 
emphasizing the heterogeneity of institutions in different areas, can also be found in 
another, similar definition, which defines institutions as:  “shared rules, which can be 
laws or collective understandings, held in place by custom, explicit agreement, or tacit 
agreement” (Fligstein 1996:658). 
Markets are themselves one type of institution, and encompass cognitive 
characters (i.e., institutional logics), normative frameworks, and various regulative 
features that distinguish them from other economic forms of exchange and/or action, 
such as planning or autarky.  These features also differentiate markets from one 
another.  At the same time, nested within any market, and acting to influence it from 
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within, are other institutions.  The assertion made here is that each market 
encompasses its own unique institutional forms and conceptualizations, which are 
dependent on the existing institutional environment the market faces.  As Krippner 
(2001:785) notes, “congealed into every market exchange is a history of struggle and 
contestation that has produced actors with certain understandings of themselves and 
the world that predispose them to exchange under a certain set of social rules and not 
another”, and the unique aspects of a particular market not only differentiates that 
market from other markets, but also help, within the market, itself, to structure, based 
on what actions the market allows and disallows, inter-actor relations, both at the 
individual and organizational levels. 
 
MARKET DEVELOPMENT AND INSTITUTIONAL ESTABLISHMENT AND 
CHANGE 
Unlike the idealized markets of neoclassical economics that assume perfect 
information and fully knowledgeable actors, significant uncertainty tends to 
characterize markets, particularly during the market startup process.  This is due to 
the fact that early on in their development markets generally possess few standards, 
and diffusion of information within them is poor.  Differentiation among buyers and 
sellers, and their products, has also not taken place.  In addition, expectations, 
including assessments of what is valuable and what is not, have not yet had time to 
form.  Within this context, market affairs are quite wild.  But, changes, predicated 
on the development of an overall order, occur over time.  These changes take place 
via various processes, including:  institutional entrepreneurship; government 
intervention; isomorphic tendencies (wherein actors and behaviors, via rationalization 
and standardization, become similar to one another in appearance); and the formation 
of stable market relations, pushed forward via experience and the diffusion of 
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knowledge.  These latter processes are often dependent on the development of 
network structures. 
 
MARKET TRANSITION AND CHINA 
One way in which markets arise is through a form of development known as market 
transition.  Market transition refers to the process by which an economy moves from 
a reliance on planning to a situation featuring forms of market control.  This involves 
institutional change, and the establishment of new institutional frameworks, both 
through policy changes and also based on the actions of institutional entrepreneurs.  
One change that occurs is that greater power over economic decision-making diffuses 
from the state to individual actors, giving market actors more control over their lives.  
Generally, this initially occurs through political means.  But, political processes are 
only a part of the story.  This is because once in possession of freedom market actors 
apply this freedom in ways that promote their own interests, taking advantage of their 
new powers to garner benefits for themselves.  A natural division of labor emerges, 
based on specialization, and driven forward by comparative advantage, and research 
has shown that within China such processes have benefitted economic actors 
comparatively more than political ones (Nee 1996).   
Discussions of China’s market transition have generally assumed the beginnings 
of relevant transition processes to be the year 1978.  This is because in December of 
that year, the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Chinese Communist Party Congress took 
place, and it was during this meeting that various changes occurred, ones focused on a 
reorientation of development strategy.  Researchers have asserted that it was these 
politically induced changes that catalyzed China’s market transition process.  In turn, 
research on market transition in China has focused overwhelmingly on the changes 
that occurred from 1978 on.  While history has been discussed, it has been framed in 
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terms of the post-1949, pre-1978 situation (Byrd 1991).  Little has been noted 
regarding China’s pre-1949 market situation (even though, prior to 1978, markets did 
exist in China).  Therefore, in this introductory essay, I will, in discussing China’s 
market transition situation, adhere to established convention and focus on the situation 
just preceding market transition, considering just post 1949/pre-1978 affairs.  I will 
also summarize the catalysts for change (the following chapters will attempt to 
provide insights regarding the actually processes of change).  At the same time, 
however, more needs to be known about China’s market traditions.  Thus, a 
subsequent chapter will delve into China’s pre-1949 market situations, as well as 
provide more insight regarding China’s current retail and production markets.   
 
THE 1949-1978 PLANNED ECONOMY SITUATION 
Following Liberation in 1949, China’s Communist party took power.  One of its first 
objectives was, by relying on the application of models borrowed from the Soviet 
Union, to re-make China into a planned economy.  The goal was to have power over 
economic coordination situated primarily in the state (a process that had actually 
already actually begun under the previous Republican rulers).  In its pursuit of this 
goal, China was successful, and, according to one scholar, at the start of reforms in 
1978 the nation “was undeniably a command economy” (Naughton 1995:38).   
What is meant by a command economy?  A command economy refers to an 
economic framework wherein the instructions of government officials, ones predicated 
on the logic and demands of national economic plans, largely determine patterns of 
allocation within the existing economic system.  In contrast to market economies, 
where the influence of (mostly) free prices largely determines patterns of allocation, in 
command economies the influence of prices is minimal.  A second requirement for 
the functioning of a command economy is that existing power-holders possess control 
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over a preponderance of society’s resources.  Frameworks must be put in place to 
allow for such outcomes to emerge.   
Something that needs to be emphasized, however, is that even though in any 
particular category there exist general similarities that help to define that category and 
characterize its members, there still generally are differences among a category’s 
members that act to distinguish these individuals from one another.  Such has 
certainly been the case with respect to the members of the command economy 
category.  During the time China was a part of this group, it possessed features that 
separated it from the other command economies of the world.  Its situation was 
certainly unlike that of the Soviet Union, with which scholars have frequently linked 
it.  In fact, it differed in a number of respects.  By highlighting these differences, 
greater understanding of China’s pre-transition conditions may be obtained.  This is 
the goal here.   
In terms of these differences, during its planning period, China’s economy was 
significantly weaker, and more decentralized than the economy of same-period Soviet 
Union.  Although following the 1949 communist victory, China’s new rulers did in 
fact set up a new state bureaucracy, which they hoped would achieve a unified 
leadership and unified administration (tongyi lingdao, tongyi guanli) situation, in 
reality, apart from the early period of communist rule, when Soviet planners helped 
China to formulate the nation’s planned systems, this never really occurred.  One 
reason for this was because China’s then-leader, Mao Zedong, had a strong bias 
against over-centralization, believing that it stifled peoples’ incentives (Qian and 
Weingast 1996:11).  As a result, in contrast to the Soviet Union, a significant degree 
of administrative decentralization generally existed in China.  This was a situation 
that frequently underwent change, however, largely because China’s leaders were 
ongoingly experimenting with differing decentralization levels, ever trying to achieve 
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a proper fit (Lyons 1990:40).  Two major instances of decentralization occurred in 
1958 and 1966, with the first later followed by re-centralization, and the second not.   
Because of decentralization tendencies, China’s local areas (those of provincial-
level standing and below) possessed control over significant financial and material 
resources.  Various policies, particularly those emerging during the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1976), encouraged China’s localities to pursue their own 
independent processes of industrialization, a kind of autarky.  To adhere to these 
policies, however, the areas needed to have resources available to them, and China’s 
central government allowed them the resources they required.  But, this resulted in 
the locales’ possessing the ability to resist central planning measures, while also 
providing the areas with opportunities to undertake self-benefitting actions not 
necessarily in line with the greater interests of China as a whole.  What resulted was 
a kind of central-state/locality dual structure.  In fact, according to one author, this 
led to a situation that engendered “the de facto development of local government 
property rights” (Naughton 1995:43), a situation that would come into play in the 
development of China’s town and village enterprises (TVEs) later on.  It was a 
situation that also resulted in problems of unconstrained investment at the local levels 
(Wong 1985:255).  These were sets of circumstances that were significantly different 
from those of other command economies, with which China has frequently been 
linked. 
Another difference between the China situation and that of other planned states 
was that the number of goods covered by the central plan in China was comparatively 
small.  In terms of what were then category I and category II goods, respectively 
defined as goods with country-wide unified distribution and subject to oversight by the 
State Planning Commission, and specialized goods distributed by those central 
ministries responsible for them, in 1981 there were only 837 categories of such goods 
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in China, as compared to 65,000 in the Soviet Union (Tidrick 1987:176; Byrd 
1991:105).  Another author states that the number of category I and category II goods 
in China at the time was even lower, citing figures of only 67 in 1981, and 210 in 1979 
(Wong 1985:259).  Whatever the case, there appears to have been significant 
differences, especially after 1965, between the number of goods subject to planning in 
the Soviet Union and the number in China.  But it should also be noted, however, 
that product categories in China were less specific than in the Soviet Union, with a 
number of related, but different, products lumped together into general groups.  On 
the one hand, this made the differences between China and the Soviet Union seem 
larger (significant differences still existed, however), and on the other hand it also 
meant that product accounting in China was more difficult to maintain.  This caused 
planning to be problematic, something that again, was different from other command 
economies, where forms of accounting tended to be relatively specific, and planning 
more precise. 
Yet another existing difference between China and other planned command 
economies was the degree of firm diversity that existed in China.  Normally, planned 
economies are simple in nature.  This is because, as can be inferred from above, the 
greater the level of complexity in an economy the more difficult planning and 
governance within the economy becomes.  By 1978, China’s economic situation, 
however, was relatively complex, and, in this sense, China was a relative outlier.  
Factors indicative of China’s complexity were the nation’s total number of firms, and 
the variety of these firms.  Although state-owned firms in 1978 represented 78% of 
the nation’s total industrial output, by that time there had already emerged significant 
numbers of commune and brigade enterprises (the precursors of the later town and 
village enterprises) in the country.  In fact, between 1970 and 1978, firm numbers in 
China increased from 195,000 to 348,000, with most of these increases occurring at 
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the local level (Wong 1985:262).  Such changes were largely the result of central 
government policies encouraging local self-sufficiency.  The size of China’s firms 
also tended to be small, with firms of over 500 workers accounting for only a little 
more than 40% of industrial output.  In contrast, during the same period, in the Soviet 
Union firms with over 1,000 workers constituted 74% of that nation’s industrial 
output, and 75% of its industrial work force (Naughton 1995:40).   
Though, like the situation of the Soviet Union, markets for industrial goods in 
China were not well developed, the degree of outside-the-plan economic interactions 
in China was more pronounced than that found in the Soviet Union (where a second 
economy also existed).  A considerable amount of bartering took place in China, and 
this “involved bargaining between producers and users or commercial intermediaries 
rather than a hierarchical formal planning process” (Byrd 1991:106).  Bargaining 
between entities for products occurred not only to satisfy actual user needs, but also as 
a means by which localities could make up for deficits in planning goals.  Much of 
this bargaining was, as in the Soviet Union (where firms relied on blat rather than 
guanxi), legal, but the Chinese situation also encouraged the illegal underreporting of 
production results by producers, who then used the gap between actual and reported 
amounts to provide for their area’s barter trade needs.  That is, producers illicitly 
stockpiled reserves with the explicit intention of involving themselves in the barter 
trade.  Though such trade differed from the processes of price-dependent markets, it 
still offered a taste of the supply-demand mechanisms by which markets functioned, 
providing a kind of foundation for actual, price-dependent market undertakings that 
later on came into being.  Again, this was substantially different from the situation 
found in the Soviet Union. 
One last difference that needs to be mentioned relates to the contrast between the 
levels of social wealth found in different command economies.  Although the Soviet 
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Union was not prosperous, it was far wealthier than China.  China was an 
overwhelmingly rural nation, with low levels of urbanization.  Agriculture played a 
much more important role in China as compared to the Soviet Union, where a greater 
focus was put on industry.  This resulted in China’s central government having far 
fewer resources upon which to rely than was the case in other command economies.  
To deal with this situation, the government set up strong demarcations between the 
urban and rural areas, limiting, through such mechanisms as the hukou policy (which 
disallowed rural residents from residing in the cities), contact between them (Cheng 
and Selden 1994).  The efforts of the central government focused primarily on the 
cities, leaving the rural areas largely independent.  This system, however, required 
the assistance and cooperation of lower level governments (particularly in the rural 
areas) to maintain social stability and order.  Apart from instances of major 
infractions to social conventions, China’s central government did not have the ability 
to involve itself in activities at the micro-level.  The result was that significant 
deviation from command economy standards existed in late 70s China, particularly in 
those ideologically more open areas in the south, closer to the coast, and/or away from 
central control in Beijing, for example places like Guangdong, Fujian and Zhejiang.  
In many of these areas, a significant grey economy existed (Chan and Unger 1982), 
and, even prior to the start of reforms in 1978, technically illegal, private business 
activity had already begun.   
In summation, what may be said regarding China’s command economy on the 
eve of market transition?  We can, as others have previously noted, say that China’s 
command economy differed substantially from other command economies of the time 
(Lyons 1990).  Existing differences were, as is outlined above, the result of a number 
of factors, with a couple of these being the decentralized nature of China’s economy, 
and the fact that the nation’s local governments were not simply bystanders in the 
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determination of their own futures, willing to adhere strictly to the commands of 
central leaders.  They were much more independent.  While China’s pre-1978 
economic system did encompass a centralized element, this was, when considered 
from a command-economy category-wide perspective, comparatively small, with 
much decision-making power decentralized to the lower realms.  Also, change in 
China was ongoing, encompassing processes of centralization/decentralization, 
experimentation, and political upheaval (e.g., Great Leap Forward, Cultural 
Revolution).  Even a limited degree of market activity, in the form of 30,000 rural 
periodic markets, existed as well (Naughton 1995:45).  This resulted in a number of 
problems:  an inability to clearly define the division of authority between the central 
state and lower levels of government; unclear policies; inefficient use of resources 
(including duplication and over-investment), which resulted in excessive waste, 
pervasive shortages, and poor quality goods;2 distinct urban and rural divisions; and, 
regionalist tendencies and protectionism.   
 
THE CATALYSTS FOR MARKET TRANSITION AND THE ROLE OF 
MARKETPLACES IN CHINA’S SUBSEQUENT MARKET DEVELOPMENT 
Overall, then, on the eve of market transition, China’s economic situation was not 
ideal.  It was, however, functional, and it “was certainly not an abject failure” 
(Naughton 1995:52).  In turn, various questions need to be asked.  Why did reforms, 
in the form of a complete institutional reorientation, occur when they did?  Why 
didn’t tweaks to the system simply take place, whereby the overall system remained 
largely the same?  These are questions not often asked.  Instead, the assumptions 
have been that the reforms were simply a natural outcome of existing context, and that 
                                                
2 Naughton notes that by the end of the 1970s inventories relating to industrial and material supply 
systems in China stood at 41% and 39% respectively.  This compared to similar figures in the Soviet 
Union of 19.5% and 22%, almost twice as much (1995:49). 
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achieved results were intentional.  Such a perspective can be seen in the following 
(see also Wedeman 2003:10): 
 
After the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, the main concern of 
China’s leadership was to overcome the disruption of the previous ten 
years, to resume rapid growth, and gradually to modernize the economy.  
It quickly became clear, however, that the ambitious investment plan and 
modernization program adopted in 1977 would strain China’s resources.  
They would also fail to correct the underlying inefficiencies and structural 
imbalances in China’s economy.  So in December 1987, the Third 
Plenary Session of the Eleventh Party Congress adopted a new program of 
“adjustment and reform” (Tidrick and Chen 1987:1). 
 
The sense one gets from this passage (and others like it) is that a switch was simply 
turned on and markets resulted.  There exists the feeling that China’s leaders 
suddenly decided that they wanted growth, and that this then led to the rise of markets.  
But, was this really the case?  Did China’s leaders simply decide one day to “set out 
to make the nation wealthy and powerful” (Perkins 1988:601)?  And, once they made 
this specific decision (assuming they did), was it really that easy and obvious for them 
to make a switch to markets?  Why were markets selected in the first place?  Why 
not just continue on in a fashion similar to the past?  In fact, at the time positive 
changes were already under way, and minimal change could have improved the 
existing situation greatly (Naughton 1995:61).  Simple changes could have been 
chosen over large-scale reform. 
But simple change was not the strategy selected, and many reasons have been 
cited as the cause of the radical reforms:  the experience of the Cultural Revolution, 
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which made the Chinese people accepting and desirous of reforms; international 
forces, pushing China to change; and, various others.  Still, these reasons alone 
cannot explain the results that occurred.  Reform is a difficult and complicated 
process, and the assumption of an intentionality with respect to the actions that 
occurred is questionable.  Deng Xiaoping, now considered to be the “architect” of 
reforms, admitted that he had never had any conception of the outcomes his actions 
might bring.  Likewise, the term “groping for stones to cross the river” has been 
frequently used to describe the nature of reform policy selection and implementation 
that China’s leaders implemented.  These elements do not imply the intentionality 
and strategic focus that researchers have asserted were extant.  Rather, they convey a 
sense of adhoc action and tentativeness.  What can be said, however, is that during 
times of difficulty decisions were made to implement change in the hopes of 
improving the situation.  These decisions, in turn, yielded positive results, which 
induced more change.  The fact that Deng was willing to follow a pragmatic course 
of action, stressing a “seek truth from facts” approach, which de-emphasized the 
dogmatic ideology of the past, was what made him notable.   
Actually, the innovations occurring at the Third Plenum were less ones of policy 
and more ones of focus and approach.  The Third Plenum signaled a reorientation 
away from investment in heavy industry to a focus on agriculture and consumption.  
Also arising during this meeting was a willingness among leaders to engage in united 
action, intended to benefit China.  Deng Xiaoping, along with the more conservative 
leader, Chen Yun, who, as early as 1956 had argued for implementation of a 
combination of planning and markets (Hsu 1985:441), together looked for ways to 
improve the existing situation.  In terms of possible forms of action, however, their 
available choices were few.  This is because initial post-Mao strategies intended to 
result in the quick and intensive development of heavy industry, which Deng 
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supported (Naughton 1995:62), had been unsuccessful, and new approaches needed to 
be found.  But, especially because of the failed, earlier attempts, which had used up 
existing resources, there existed limits on the amount of help the government could 
provide.  At the same time, Deng and his supporting cohort needed to differentiate 
their approaches from the policies of Hua Guofeng, Mao’s chosen successor, and 
Deng’s then competitor for power.  They could not simply follow in the tracks of 
Hua and expect to garner the backing from others they required.   
One way in which the Deng-Chen alliance succeeded was by portraying itself as 
an innovative force, acting to move China away from the Maoist past, one that had 
frustrated many in the nation.  Another key to the partnership’s success was a 
willingness to experiment, to try new things, and to allow those at the local level to 
take responsibility for action.  A third aspect was the realization that the cost of 
reform, in terms of the expenditure of resources, would need to be low.  The 
emphasis on large investments in heavy industry could not continue, and alternative 
means of growth would need to be found.  The decision was made to reorient China 
towards a greater focus on both agriculture and the consumption of consumer goods, 
processes that would require the willingness and involvement of the common people.  
The two processes would be tied together, and dependent on each other for their 
success.  Based on emerging outcomes, this new focus was another important 
triumph. 
Portrayals of the successes that have occurred, however, have tended to de-
emphasize the role of the Chinese people and their society.  The successes have 
instead generally been portrayed as a function of political action.  Such a view has 
been ongoing, and as Thomas Rawski wrote in 1999, about 20 years after the start of 
reforms:  “The evolution of China’s market economy [was] propelled by an unusual 
combination of modest, often hesitant, official policy initiatives and widespread, 
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partially co-ordinated experimentation” (149).  A major reason for such perspectives 
has been the assertion that China’s private businesses have developed under the 
direction of local governments.  The often referred to government founded and 
managed town and village enterprises (TVEs) are examples of this, and have been the 
subject of much Western research (Walder 1995; Oi 1999).  But, the set of such firms 
has only been a portion of the total number of organizations emerging in the post-
reform period, representing only a modest percentage of the market developments that 
have occurred.  In fact, many of the market-related changes that occurred were not so 
much a result of government direction, but were instead related to the actions of the 
common people.  Such changes arose in the rural areas, and with little direct 
government (either local or central) involvement (apart from the freedom to act).  
Rather, the processes that took place were ones wherein, as a result of improved 
agricultural outputs, the incomes of China’s peasants increased, in turn inducing an 
expansion in the demand for consumer items.  Rural-based industry, again frequently 
without the involvement of or any help from the polity, then expanded to meet the 
growing demands.  Marketplaces also formed, serving as distribution points for 
manufactured consumer items, helping to allocate products to traders, who then, in 
order to resell the products to end users, often relied on the periodic markets of 
China’s market past.  Political actions, impacted by the examples and policies set by 
Deng and Chen, provided the freedom needed for these changes to occur, but it was 
the people of China, its rural peasants, who served as the means by which China 
developed.  It was they, through their entrepreneurial actions, who initiated a 
preponderance of the market changes that occurred.  In many cases, it was only after 
the fact that policy adapted to the occurring changes, legitimizing market actors’ new 
forms of action.  It is the story of these rural market actors then that needs to be told.  
The papers within this volume start to tell this story, attempting at the same time to 
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explain the evolution of China’s market system.   
A primary focus of resulting narratives is the role of China’s marketplaces in the 
changes that have occurred.  The papers here emphasize how the marketplaces and 
their relevant new environments emerged, changed and became rationalized.  
Marketplaces have played a critical role in China’s development, but surprisingly, 
they have received little attention among scholars (at least apart from agriculturally 
directed markets).3  In Chinese academic literature, however, there has been a 
relatively high degree of focus on those specialized marketplaces that sell various 
manufactured consumables, some of which are small commodities (things like 
handicrafts, simple hardware items, and everyday use consumables (umbrellas, socks, 
underwear, writing implements, cosmetics, ceramics, bags, buttons, yarn, toys, 
watches, eye glasses, etc.)), textiles, and clothing.  The marketplaces and the 
production clusters, with which they are normally interconnected, have both been 
referred to as two of the most important and distinctive innovations occurring as part 
of China’s shift from planning to markets (Lu and Yu 2009:50).  Some examples of 
major specialized markets are:  Zhejiang’s Yiwu Small Commodities Market, Luqiao 
Textile Market, various markets in Wenzhou; Jiangsu’s Changshu Clothing Market; 
Shandong’s Linyi Small Commodities Market; various markets in Guangdong; 
Hebei’s Hankou Hanzhengjie Market; and, Sichuan’s Chengdu Hehuachi Small 
Commodities and Clothing Markets.  From the start, these markets functioned as 
outlets for products produced by the non-state sector economy, primarily private 
enterprises, but also including the part-private, part-public town and village 
enterprises.  Without the existence of these markets and the networks of exchange 
                                                
3 Some discussions of China’s rural agricultural markets are presented in China’s Rural Market 
Development in the Reform Era, by Him Chung (2004), Terry Sincular’s (1995) “Redefining State, Plan 
and Market,” and Andrew Watson’s (1988) “The Reform of Agricultural Marketing in China since 
1978.”  English language writings relating to China’s specialized markets selling manufactured 
consumer items, however, are virtually non-existent. 
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they facilitated, China’s private economy would have been severely constrained.  
The markets served to provide small and medium size producers (SMEs) a means to 
get their products to consumers in a cheap and efficient manner.  Although the 
trading networks created were primarily domestic ones, certain markets, particularly 
the Yiwu Small Commodities Market in Zhejiang, also acted as facilitators for SMEs 
to enter international markets.  The role of these marketplaces has been severely 
underappreciated. 
The works in this volume relate primarily to the Yiwu Small Commodities 
Market, China’s best-known specialized marketplace.  More about this marketplace 
will be said in the chapters to follow. 
 
THE PAPERS IN THIS VOLUME 
The volume of work here is made up of this introduction, a concluding chapter, and 
five additional essays.  The first essay provides an institutionally framed introduction 
to China’s markets, doing so from both the perspectives of history and current 
conditions.  Given that there has been a paucity of research written regarding China’s 
overall market character, such an introduction is important because it provides a 
foundation of understanding by which the other essays in the volume may be better 
comprehended.  With regard to this essay’s historical review of markets, in addition 
to offering a general historical overview of China’s previously existing market 
systems, it also focuses on three unique (as compared to markets found elsewhere) 
characteristics that typified China’s markets:  market structures that were 
characterized by and dependent on a system of periodic markets; a market agency 
situation predicated on distinct, geographically defined actor groups (the example of 
the Huizhou merchants is highlighted); and distinctive forms of production relations, 
distinguished by production clusters.  In terms of the essay’s focus on China’s 
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current market situation, the analysis focuses specifically on the state of China’s 
retailing and production situations, emphasizing the role marketplaces have played in 
each.  It is clear from the essay’s findings that significant degrees of continuity exist 
between past and present. 
The second essay sets itself the goal of showing the relevance of institutions to 
market change.  Its subject is institutional logics.  Applying discourse analysis to 
differing theorizations of change, it distinguishes between macro- and micro-level 
institutional logics to show how, even when faced with similar macro-level 
institutional logics (involving the change from planning to markets), areas with 
differing micro-level institutional logics, ones that were developed and in-place prior 
to the period of market transition, will, during market transition, develop in different 
fashions.  In fact, these dissimilar local institutional logics will have ongoing 
impacts.  This suggests the relevance of local contexts and their institutional 
characters to organizational outcomes. 
Markets are competitive realms.  Through competitive interactions, some actors 
succeed and others fail.  How certain actors attain success is still not well understood, 
however.  The third essay examines the means by which a market actor goes about 
positively differentiating itself from its competitors, thus attaining competitive 
advantage.  The focus of the essay is on a particular differentiating mechanism, firm 
celebrity.  Taking China’s most famous marketplace, the Yiwu Small Commodities 
Market, as its basis, the essay examines the means by which firm celebrity arises, and 
how other intangible assets, such as legitimacy, reputation and status, impact 
celebrity’s existence and development.  The essay adopts a historical, relationally 
framed approach to show how agency and structure act to influence the nature of 
celebrity emergence.  It also outlines the effective strategies used by Yiwu actors to 
distinguish their market from other competing markets, thus bringing the market 
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competitive advantage. 
The volume’s fourth chapter concerns the process of innovative change in a 
public organization.  The paper focuses on the Yiwu branch of China’s All-China 
Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU).  Over the last decade, this branch, the Yiwu 
General Trade Union (YGTU), underwent significant innovative change, and has since 
come to be known as an exemplar of innovation among Chinese public organizations.  
The essay seeks to answer four primary questions:  What organizational innovations 
took place; what actors and factors facilitated their occurrence; how were the 
innovations legitimized; and how are they being theorized and disseminated?  The 
paper concludes that the roots of the arising innovations were not, as most 
conceptualizations of change assert, associated with exogenous factors (e.g. jolts), but 
rather were endogenous in nature, a function of institutional entrepreneurship.  
Relying on the results of interviews, as well as on a review of relevant literature, the 
paper outlines the processes of organizational innovation involved. 
The fifth and final essay of the volume considers the manner by which processes 
of market rationalization take place.  Its subject is a set of firms acting as suppliers to 
the world’s largest retailer, Wal-Mart.  It examines the forces acting to 
institutionalize workplace standards for the treatment of workers, and investigates the 
nature by which these standards are institutionalized within this set of companies.   
The paper considers three change mechanisms:  agency, economic structure, and 
authority, and finds that foreign buyers have had less of an impact than one might 
expect, while newly emerging market structures have had the greatest impact.  
Authority mechanisms have also had an effect, though a comparatively smaller one. 
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  CHAPTER 1 
 
 
CATALYZING MARKETS IN CHINA:  THE ROLES OF PATH 
DEPENDENCE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY, AND INSTITUTIONAL 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN FOSTERING CONTEMPORARY MARKET 
FORMS 
 
China’s market transition has frequently been referred to in miracle-like terms.  
Many have noted the relative smoothness of the nation’s post-reform change.  
Something that has not received significant attention, however, is the path dependent 
nature of the changes that have occurred.  Linkages exist between pre-1949 forms, 
and those of the post-reform period.  But, how, after a 30-year association with anti-
market forms of planning (1949-1978), have these linkages been maintained?  The 
paper focuses on three organizationally related elements distinguishing China’s 
contemporary market system:  marketplaces as centers of commercial activity; 
cluster-like structures of production; and, market agency dominated by networks of 
businesspersons (with network membership predicated on geographic origin).  
Analysis shows that the three elements possess pre-1949 roots.  How during planning 
did linkages persist?  Also, how, in the post-1978 period, have the three path-
dependent factors re-achieved their former statures?  The paper posits that 
institutional diversity and institutional entrepreneurship have been critical to 
emerging outcomes. 
 
For any organization, the implementation of system change (i.e., the transition from 
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planning to markets) is generally a difficult and problematic undertaking.  
Adjustments to existing institutional frameworks are required.  But, institutions, by 
definition, are not easily changed.  Institutions are “shared rules, which can be laws 
or collective understandings, held in place by custom, explicit agreement, or tacit 
agreement” (Fligstein 1996: 658).  As such, institutions are predicated upon issues of 
legitimacy, or “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, 
values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995: 574).  The difficulty of system 
transition relates to the lack of legitimacy for new institutional forms.  Oftentimes, 
when transformations lack legitimacy, key actors (individuals or organizations with 
the power, resources, and potential to implement institutional change) tend to act in 
ways that make it difficult for institutional change to occur.  Assuming legitimacy 
exists, however, these same key actors can, in the role of institutional entrepreneurs 
(DiMaggio, 1988: 14), be decisive in assuring that change takes place smoothly and 
with little difficulty. 
How is this of relevance to recent transformations in China?  Here, the focus is 
on the sequence of major institutional reforms that began in December 1978.  The 
stated goal of these post-1978 reforms was economic growth.  Early on, the changes 
were meant to restructure the Chinese economy, shifting previously extant allocation 
systems away from planning to a reliance on market mechanisms.  Many nations 
have undergone similar modifications, processes frequently referred to as market 
transitions (Nee, 1996).  Process results, however, have been anything but easy.  In 
the case of China, the nation’s smooth encounter with market transition (Tiananmen 
not withstanding) has made it a bit of an anomaly.   
The relative ease with which market transformations have evolved in China has 
often been attributed to neo-classical or functional forms of explanation.  The 
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assumption has been that the transformations were simply the result of existing 
demands, extant conditions, unfilled needs, and/or the understood desire of involved 
actors to improve system efficiency and reduce transaction costs (Pierson, 2000).  
From such a perspective, China’s market transition has been a kind of natural 
convergence process whereby China’s institutional frameworks have simply come to 
match those of other successful market economies (Woo, 1999: 117).   Curiously, 
however, related research has essentially ignored both the pre-reform institutional 
structures of planning and the social elements involved in change.  It has supposed 
that macro-level adjustments alone were of import, with actors at the micro-level 
merely following along in the aftermath of policy decisions.  Micro-issues of agency 
have been severely neglected.   
This results in some questions.  One question relates to, how, after a 30-year 
institutional engagement with redistributive forms, did planning’s influences in China 
diminish as rapidly and as easily as they did, especially when at the start of reforms 
“well functioning markets of goods and factor inputs [at the national level] did not 
exist” (He, Wei and Pan, 2007: 605)?  If markets did not exist, how did they so easily 
appear?  Another question concerns how it was that the institutions characterizing the 
newly emerging, post-1978 markets ended up being so similar to institutions that had 
existed 30 or more years before, especially when, in theory, the differing environment 
should have resulted in the emergence of changed institutional forms (Stinchcombe, 
1965)?  More explanation is needed.  
This paper offers such explanation.  It begins with a review of various elements 
relevant to institutional theory, placing particular emphasis on how path dependence 
can play a role in the facilitation of institutional change.  Also emphasized are the 
roles of institutional diversity and institutional entrepreneurship.  The paper’s second 
section moves on to focus on the path dependent and institutionally diverse natures of 
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development in China, beginning with a consideration of China’s contemporary 
market situation.  It identifies the three unique institutions of China’s emerging 
markets:  marketplaces as centers of commercial activity; production organized in 
cluster-like structures; and, market agency predicated on networks of businesspersons 
(with network membership predicated on the similar geographic origins of network 
members).  Following this, the paper provides a historical overview of the nation’s 
pre-1949 market situation.  This summary indicates that prior to liberation in 1949 
there existed in China analogous, and very similar, counterparts to the three in-focus 
institutions.  The paper’s third section, relying on theory, Chinese-language journal 
articles, and insights derived from long-time fieldwork, focuses on how mechanisms 
associated with institutional entrepreneurship have impacted China’s market 
transition.  The purpose is to detail the impact of institutional entrepreneurship on 
China’s market transition process.  The conclusion summarizes the paper’s various 
findings. 
 
THEORY AND ASSERTIONS 
EXISTING VIEWS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
For institutionalists, the explanation of institutional change has often been a problem. 
Institutionalism has generally assumed a determinism that clashes with notions of 
change.  The supposition has been that, once institutions are in place, contextual 
environments act to inhibit further change, foster institutional continuity, and stabilize 
extant conditions.  Institutions have been viewed “as the source of stability and 
order” (Scott, 2001: 181).  But, in real life, change does occur.  How then has it 
been theorized? 
Apart from the functional and neo-classical perspectives mentioned above, 
wherein change is said to take place largely as a result of the perceived need to attain 
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economic benefits (i.e., lower costs and/or increased efficiency), another approach to 
institutional change has been to view it as incremental, but still ongoingly impacted (at 
least to some degree) by existing institutions.  This approach does not view change as 
being completely linear, but rather as occurring in a stepwise linear pattern, wherein 
seemingly massive changes sometimes seem to occur, but in fact overall logics (and 
consistency) are retained.  This perspective helps to explain how differing nations, in 
the face of the effects of similar globalist forces, respond in dissimilar ways to the 
same forces (Guler, Guillén and Macpherson, 2002), and why the diffusion of a 
particular practice will, across different locales, frequently exhibit differences in the 
way it occurs (Lounsbury, 2007).  Notions of path dependency are preserved. 
Another approach to institutional change has focused on how jolts, shocks, or 
points of significant disequilibrium impact existing systems  (Meyer, 1982; 
Romanelli and Tushman, 1994).  Research along these lines contends that 
institutional life is marked by periods of discontinuity, in the form of historical events, 
during which existing contexts undergo non-linear disruptions.  These result in 
significant structural change (Sewell, 1996).  Examples of such periods are 
regulatory adjustments, the advent of new destabilizing innovations, political and/or 
social turbulence, etc.  The belief is that in reaction to the collective uncertainty 
engendered by such transformations, attempts are made to move towards a new 
equilibrium, and this catalyzes massive alterations.  Quests for equilibrium 
attainment thus serve as the source of institutional adjustments.  Researchers view 
related transformations as abrupt (though actually couched within a sequence of long-
term activity), radical, and all encompassing.  This conception of change discounts 
the impacts of path dependence. 
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AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
Based on existing evidence, explanation of the institutional changes occurring in 
China cannot be completely explained by any of the various approaches detailed 
above.  While the success of recent Chinese reforms was certainly enhanced by the 
perceived functional needs associated with economic development, the occurrence and 
success of the reforms was not completely determined by policy changes or by a 
ubiquitous, existing sense that markets were the answer.  Other mechanisms were 
involved.  Transformations were also not stepwise or gradual.  Massive institutional 
adjustments occurred, and these resulted in a relatively rapid, as well as wide-scale 
minimization of planning influences.  Still, path dependency, in the sense of ties to 
the past, was extant.  How then to depict the changes?   
I focus on path dependence, institutional diversity, and institutional 
entrepreneurship to come up with an answer, coming to three assertions.  Assertion 
one contends that enacted institutional outcomes were path dependent.  This helped 
to further China’s market transition in that path dependency served as a mechanism by 
which legitimacy could quickly be attained.  This was of particular importance given 
that, at the start of reforms, and in many places in China, “There was great animosity 
towards businesspeople” (11/29/08 Hangzhou interview of former Zhejiang economic 
reporter).  By making those who potentially were to be impacted by markets aware 
that the proposed changes possessed a prior, domestic history, the modifications 
became ones that could be more easily accepted by reform-involved actors.  The 
proposed changes already possessed a certain level of legitimacy, and this eased the 
market transition process. 
The second assertion contends that the influence of planning in China was never 
total.  Following liberation in 1949, institutional diversity existed.  In turn, the paper 
places great emphasis on the notion that “even the most ‘settled’ paths are typically, if 
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not inevitably, littered with flotsam and jetsam—with elements or more or less 
developed systems of alternative industrial orders, abandoned or partially realized 
institutional projects and ‘paths not taken’” (Schneiberg, 2007: 48).  The paper 
considers the possibility that it was China’s existing “paths not taken,” that is market 
remnants that survived during the time of Mao (1949-1978), which served as the 
catalysts for post-reform development, thereby acting to simplify involved processes.  
Such a situation would also explain the linkage between contemporary and past forms:  
their roots are one in the same. 
Third, I assert that the market-embedded agency of comparatively small sets of 
local Chinese actors, who during the planned period continued to be involved in 
market activity, significantly influenced China’s market-transition processes.  These 
actors served as institutional entrepreneurs, or “individuals who somehow break with 
the rules and practices associated with the dominant institutional logic(s) [in this case 
planning] and thereby develop alternative rules and practices” (Battiliana, 2006: 657).  
It was they who helped catalyze markets via the diffusion of their market expertise and 
knowledge, applying action templates that they had retained during the planning 
period.  Once policy change occurred, they diffused these templates to others in 
society.  These groups of actors served in the role of teachers, inculcating, through 
their actions and direct teachings, others in market ways, and promoting market 
transition in the process. 
In the next section, I provide historical insight regarding elements of China’s 
past and contemporary market-forms.  The goal is to offer evidence of the path 
dependent and institutionally diverse natures of China’s recent, post-reform 
development.  
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THE PATH DEPENDENT AND INSTITUTIONALLY DIVERSE NATURES 
OF CHINA’S DEVELOPMENT:  AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF 
CONTEMPORARY AND PRE-LIBERATION MARKET FORMS 
CHINA’S CONTEMPORARY MARKET SITUATION 
Any system of allocation (i.e., planning or markets) is dependent on the institutions 
that frame it.  Issues of organization and agency are especially critical both to how 
the system will function and to the success it will achieve.  Here the focus is on the 
three related institutions of especial uniqueness to China’s market economy:  
marketplaces as centers of commercial activity; cluster-like structures of production; 
and, market agency dominated by networks of businesspersons (with network 
membership predicated on geographic origin).  The intent is to show that the three 
institutions have played key roles in China’s recent development.  
 
CONTEMPORARY CHINA’S UNIQUE MARKET ORGANIZATION—
MARKETPLACES AS INSTITUTIONS China’s contemporary market system is one 
that has, to a large degree, relied upon the development of marketplaces (in the sense 
of geographically specific, concentrated, large scale, focal points of exchange, with 
sellers situated in individual trading stalls) to emerge.  China now has in excess of 
4,000 of these marketplaces of a scale of at least 100 million RMB (around USD15 
million) in total annual sales that encompass in total more than 2.6 million stalls, and 
in 2007, the numbers of these marketplaces (of the scale indicated) increased by close 
to 20% (Song, Wang and Wang 2008: 3).  Though in the West, marketplaces early on 
were associated primarily with only the distribution of agricultural goods (Xu, 2008), 
in China, such marketplaces have been a key to the nation’s industrial development, 
helping in the distribution of consumer goods.  For nations in the midst of market 
transition, resolving the problem of distribution is generally a difficult one, especially 
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for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (Ding, 2006).  The marketplaces 
have thus been key elements in the development of China’s non-state dominated, 
market economy, facilitating the relations of actors who might not otherwise have 
interacted, and making buyers (and suppliers) knowledgeable about opportunities that 
they might not otherwise have been aware of.  Although the role of marketplaces in 
China’s development has been an important one, it is also one that has been severely 
under-researched, with a number of the nation’s marketplace specifics being 
completely overlooked.  For example, in contrast to the situation found in the 
industrialization processes of other more developed nations, during China’s recent 
development the role of the marketplaces in China over time has advanced rather than 
weakened (Xu, 2008: 59).  The origins of many of the marketplaces have also been 
rurally situated rather than arising out of the urban sector. 
The fact that China’s marketplaces generally posses rural roots has impacted 
their development in the sense that forms of growth bear direct ties to China’s system 
of rural periodic markets.  In addition, marketplace development initially took place 
not so much because of government actions or policies (in many rural areas 
governmental activities were comparatively constrained as compared to the urban 
situation), but rather through the efforts of the local people.  In fact, a frequently 
encountered opinion heard in China’s most famous marketplace locale, Yiwu, 
Zhejiang, is the following:  “the people lead, and the government follows” (10/28/08 
Yiwu interview).  Possessing such activist inclinations, those from Yiwu have 
become famous throughout China for their market development skills.  This role 
aligns with forms of market agency unique to China.  It is to a discussion of these 
contemporary and unique forms of agency that the paper turns to next. 
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CONTEMPORARY CHINA’S UNIQUE FORM OF MARKET AGENCY—
BUSINESS GROUP NETWORKS AS INSTITUTIONS Market agency relations in 
China have been distinguished by a reliance on distinct groups of activist 
entrepreneurs or what may be termed market facilitators.  Membership within these 
groups has been predicated on ties of geographic origin.  Following the 1978 
decisions to engender a greater reliance on markets, the involvement in market 
activities by these business groups emerged rapidly and on a wide scale.  Actors from 
Zhejiang, Guangdong, Fujian, Taiwan and Hong Kong are all now famous throughout 
China for their role in market promotion.  
Those from Wenzhou (Zhejiang) are one example.  Strong networks of member 
interactions have characterized this group and others like it.  These networks are ones 
premised on trust and personal relationships, and they have helped to resolve the 
problems inherent in developing markets, where information flows and social capital 
have yet to emerge in their needed forms.  With respect to the success of China’s 
marketplaces, for example, one recently interviewed Fujian businessperson intoned 
that “Any marketplace in China that hopes to be successful must include actors from 
three places:  Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong.  Without the involvement of 
persons from these three areas, the marketplace will fail.  Only they possess the 
networks of entrepreneurial and business knowledge needed to achieve marketplace 
success, and their presence is needed to provide participants from other areas the 
opportunity to learn” (2/26/09c Yiwu interview).  
 
CONTEMPORARY CHINA’S UNIQUE PRODUCTIONS STRUCTURES—
PRODUCTION CLUSTERS AS INSTITUTIONS The role of clusters—“geographic 
concentrations of interconnected companies and institutions in a particular field” 
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(Porter, 1998: 78)—has been significant with respect to the organization of production 
in China.  One paper notes that at the start of the 21st century, in Guangdong 
Province, alone, there were 122 different municipalities, each of which was dominated 
by a single-product industry (Bellandi and Di Tommaso, 2005: 713).  Similar 
situations exist in many other parts of China, in particular, Zhejiang Province, which is 
famous for the arrangement of its private, small and medium sized businesses into 
localized cluster forms.  These clusters are particularly evident with respect to the 
production of textiles, clothing, metal products, and plastic consumer goods (Sheng 
and Zheng, 2004: 10-11).  
 
CHINA’S MARKET PAST 
With regard to the three element of interest:  market organization, market agency and 
structures of production, how does China’s contemporary situation compare to that 
found in the past?  To answer this question, the paper starts out by providing a brief, 
and general, overview of the history of China’s pre-reform market system.  It then 
reviews the past backgrounds of the three, of-interest institutions:  marketplaces as a 
key element of market organization; market activity premised on the actions of 
specific business groups; and, production organized on the basis of clusters.  Did 
similarities exist?  The two sets are found to be highly similar, suggesting the 
relevance of path dependency to China’s contemporary market situation. 
 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF CHINA’S PRE-REFORM MARKET SYSTEM Market 
activity in China has a long history, extending for a period of over two thousand years, 
dating back to the Qin (BC 221-BC 206) and Han (BC 202-AD 220) dynastic periods 
(Xu, 1997: 21).  Even though China’s market pursuits have involved dissimilar 
periods of development (often organized cyclically), still long-distance, inter-regional 
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trade involving luxury items and essentials like salt was early on quite common 
throughout the nation.  It was with the emergence of the Song dynasty (960-1279) 
that commercial activity in China really began to expand in breadth, coming to include 
an expanded range of items, and targeting a much wider group of consumers, resulting 
in the formation of more nationally oriented market linkages.  Periodic markets (ji 
shi) also came into being, tendencies of autarky lessened, and "the number of rural 
households participating in the local marketing process increased" (Shiba, 1975: 43).  
In turn, the number of intermediate urban centers increased, as did existing levels of 
economic differentiation (Shiba, 1975: 43).  Markets also became more independent, 
and “By the twelfth century, markets had burgeoned outside city walls, where they 
stayed open all day and night without government interference” (Hansen, 1996: 2).   
Between the years 1300 and 1500 (during which time overseas commerce was 
banned, high taxes were imposed, infrastructures were poorly maintained, regime 
change occurred, and a lack of a monetarized economy was present) the emerging 
market framework experienced a downturn.  Its more modern rebirth can be traced 
back to around the middle of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) (Elvin, 1973: 203), a time 
when the importance of periodic, rural markets expanded greatly (Xu, 1997: 21).  
Over about the next 130 years, the foundations of China's economic situation for the 
next 400 years took shape,4 and from around the year 1500 on an era of vigorous 
growth began in the nation, stimulated by an ever increasing expansion of markets.  
During this period, competition increased and increasing levels of product 
specialization became evident.  A unique factor associated with the period was that 
“invention was almost entirely absent” (Elvin, 1973: 203), meaning that little 
technological innovation occurred in either agriculture (apart from the introduction of 
new seeds and plant varieties), or industry (Rankin, 1986: 6).  As William Rowe 
                                                
4 Correspondence with Yoshinobu Shiba, May 15, 2006. 
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(1984) discovered in his researches of 1796-1889 Hankow (Wuhan), even in the 
absence of the existence of technological innovation, trade was not only growing, but 
it was also becoming more and more intricate.  As China’s market structures evolved, 
however, the markets continued to have their own points of distinctiveness as 
compared to those of other places. 
 
CHINA’S MARKET ORGANIZATION FROM AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
While there has been ongoing debate about whether China’s market, particularly from 
the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) on, was a nationally based one, what scholars do not 
question is that its structure was hierarchical in nature.  Certain major Chinese cities 
sat at the top of this hierarchy, with each of these cities representing a different market 
region.  It was G. William Skinner (1964) who first developed this conceptualization, 
framing China’s imperial-period communities according to an eight-tiered, ascending 
hierarchy (minor markets, standard market towns, intermediate market towns, central 
markets, etc.), formulated on the basis of the range and amount of a city’s commercial 
activities.  Skinner also posited that early on there were nine primary trading regions 
in China (8 + 1 (Manchuria), with a total of six central cities (those cities at the top of 
the hierarchy).  Each of the trading regions was, at least to a certain degree, 
independent from the others.5   Regarding the level of this independence, however, 
there again has been significant debate, with even one of Skinners’ former students, 
Mark Elvin, asserting that “anyone who is tempted to think of the late traditional 
Chinese rural economy as…‘self-sufficient’, or ‘uncommercialized’ has only to look 
at this network [the linkages of market towns that began to arise in the seventeenth 
century] and its density to realize how inapplicable these terms are” (Elvin, 1973: 
                                                
5 Skinner believed that due to limitations associated with high transport costs the regions were virtually 
isolated (1977: 284-285). 
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269).   
The system connecting the nation’s various markets together, particularly at the 
lower levels, has, until at least recently, been that made up of periodic markets (ji shi).  
In the Ming Dynasty, periodic markets greatly expanded in scope, but lapsed 
somewhat during the inter-regnum, wartime period at the Qing’s start.  By the mid-
Qing, however, “the majority of China’s provinces and districts possessed a high 
density network of rural-area, periodic markets” (Xu, 1997: 24).  Growth of these 
markets continued throughout, such that by the end of the Qing (~1911), China had 
21,866 such markets (as compared to only 6,674 in the Ming Dynasty) (Xu, 1997: 24). 
The markets are referred to as periodic in the sense that they did not operate 
continuously, but only convened at specific times, generally only between two to five 
days of a 10-day period.  In one place a three-occurrence market might meet on days 
1-4-7 or 2-5-8 (that is, in the first case the 1st, 4th or 7th days of the 10 day span).  On 
the other days of the 10-day period, the market would travel to different nearby 
locations, convening on a similar, non-sequential, multi-day schedule. One common 
question that has arisen has been, why rely on the periodic market as opposed to a 
fixed market?  The answer is conveyed in the following passage: 
 
In essence, because the total amount of demand encompassed by the 
marketing area of any single rural market is insufficient to provide a profit 
level that enables the entrepreneur to survive.  By repositioning himself at 
periodic intervals, the entrepreneur can tap the demand of several 
marketing areas and thereby attain the survival threshold (Skinner, 1964: 
10).   
 
Although it was generally true that “Repression of rural marketing for 
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ideological reasons was the general trend during Mao’s era” (Chung, 2004: 30), based 
on fieldwork results, and in contrast to some portrayals (Rozelle Huang, and Benziger, 
2003: 91), apart from those times of severe political upheavals (i.e., the Great Leap 
Forward and early in the Great Cultural Revolution), for many areas the impact of 
Maoist policies on rural periodic markets was not enough to do away with the 
markets’ operations, and throughout the Mao period periodic markets continued to 
function.  This was certainly true in areas of Zhejiang, like Wenzhou and Jinhua 
(Yiwu), where, although comparatively constrained, market activities were ongoing, 
especially during the 1970s.  In fact, in the mid-1970s, the then Vice Premier of 
China’s State Council, Chen Yonggui, critically declared that, “if you want to see 
capitalism you should go to Wenzhou” (Li, 1997: 171).  Likewise, in Yiwu, 
throughout the planned period “all types of markets went on operating in line with 
their traditional breadth and scale, and new forms of business organization to a large 
degree coexisted with the private traders” (Bao and Wang, 2002: 5). 
 
CHINA’S PAST FORMS OF MARKET AGENCY China is a large country, its 
regions are quite distinct, with some areas possessing histories associated with 
commerce, and others not.  This has impacted the nature of development in China, 
resulting in a particularly diverse commercial environment characterized by a wide 
range of varying activity.  One element of historical noteworthiness is that the 
country’s development has been predicated on the agency of specific actor groups, 
defined by member geographic origins and cultural backgrounds.  The activities of 
these groups, which traditionally were grouped into nine (or in some cases ten) 
different factions (those of Shanxi, Shaanxi, Ningbo, Shandong, Guangdong, Fujian, 
Huizhou, Dongting, Jiangshi, and Longyou), have been crucial to economic workings 
in China.  To offer a better perspective of the groups, focus here is directed to one of 
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the groups, the Huizhou merchants.   
The homeland of the Huizhou merchants was a mountainous area of what is now 
southeast Anhui and northeast Jiangxi Provinces.  The Huizhou people’s involvement 
in business activity can be traced back to the Eastern Jin dynasty (317-420 AD) (Wu, 
2004: 44).  Like the home areas of the other nine or ten prominent business factions 
in Chinese history, the geographic character of the Huizhou merchant’s origins was 
characterized by high population levels and a constrained amount of livable terrain, 
land that was not only relatively infertile, but that was also in short supply (Pan, 2005: 
11).  Even though, early on, Huizhou’s population levels were already comparatively 
high, because the area came to be considered a comparative “utopia” during a period 
when there was much ongoing social unrest (some of which was large scale) 
elsewhere, substantial migration to the area continued, and Huizhou’s population 
experienced ongoing expansion, increasing from 36,000 in the year 464 to 1.452 
million by 1578 (Pan, 2005: 4-6; Fang, 2005: 416).   
The highpoint of the Huizhou merchant’s activities was a 300 year span 
extending from the middle of the Ming dynasty to a point during the reign of Dao 
Guang (1821-1851), of the Qing period.  During this time, Huizhou businesspeople 
were the most powerful commercial group in China, and their geographic range 
extended from the mouth of the Huai River in the East; Gansu, Yunnan, Guizhou, and 
Shaanxi in the west; Beijing, Liaoning and Shandong in the north; on to Fujian and 
Guangdong in the south.  They also participated in overseas trade, engaging in 
commerce with such countries as Japan, Portugal, and Southeast Asia (Xiao, 2005/6: 
57).  The early trade activities of the Huizhou merchants were centered on their home 
area, relying on water transport, in the form of a network of rivers and streams, to 
facilitate trade with places like Hangzhou, the capital of Zhejiang Province.  Traded 
products included various unprocessed products native to their region, articles like tea, 
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tong oil, kaolin (Huizhou traders supplied much of the clay used in production of the 
famous Jingde pottery) and lumber.  But, over time, the sphere of their dealings 
expanded, both in terms of product type and regional focus.  In addition, Huizhou 
merchants became heavily involved in pawn-broking and the lending of money (Pan, 
2005: 52).   
Networks of close relations characterized Huizhou businessperson relations, and 
credibility and trust were inherent aspects of their business activities.  They put great 
emphasis on the idea that “only via the establishment of a good business reputation 
and the attainment of client trust [could one] profitably guarantee business 
development and prosperity” (Zhang 2005: 56).  Such customs further enhanced their 
dealings with other businesspersons, representing a key element of their economic 
success.  But, another factor that must be noted with regard to their success is that it 
was predicated on the traders’ political relations.  When these relationships changed, 
largely as a result of political shifts in commercial policy, the business success of the 
actors diminished considerably.  This was true not only of the Huizhou merchants, 
but also with respect to those from Shaanxi and other places as well.  Political factors 
played a strong role.   
Following liberation in 1949, the foundations of new business group emergence 
began.  In various cases, the planning period fostered the need for cooperative efforts 
that possessed similarities to those engaged in earlier by the Huizhou businesspersons.  
This was particularly the case in many parts of southern Zhejiang, where an 
intentional lack of central governmental support necessitated that the local population 
(including local political actors) cooperate together in the furtherance of commercial 
activities.  In areas of Wenzhou and Jinhua (especially Yiwu), characterized by high 
populations and low incomes, and where pronounced life difficulties existed, the 
people began to collaborate in the undertaking of market activities.  The government 
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did its part by turning a blind eye to these pursuits (Peng, 2004: 1065).  In parts of 
Wenzhou locals ongoingly even engaged in illicit smuggling pursuits and other 
outlawed commercial activities, while in greater Jinhua (of which Yiwu is a part) a 
tradition known as “trading chicken feathers for candy (ji mao huan tang)” prospered 
and became a cover for a much broader range of trading endeavors.   
 
THE ORGANIZATION OF PRODUCTION IN CHINA FROM AN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE Historically, forms of regionally based, production specialization 
characterized China’s markets.  A focus of this production system was the cluster 
organization.  According to Denggao Long (1997: 13), the history of production 
clusters in China goes back to at least the Ming and Qing dynasties (but evidence 
suggests that in many areas of China the existence of clusters was even earlier).  
These centers came about, at least partly, as a result of the high level of geographic 
and environmental diversity in China.  Because of this diversity, natural forms of 
comparative advantage arose with respect to specific products.  
Based on the notion of comparative advantage, Xu (2002: 43-44) breaks down 
China’s territory into different regions, positing that by the Qing dynasty there were 
four primary economic zones:  the Jiangnan region, encompassing the delta area of 
the Yangtze River, and, since the Tang dynasty, the most developed region in China; 
the Pearl River delta area, in China’s south, which included Hong Kong and 
Guangzhou, and whose growth was, since the Song dynasty on, very much tied to 
foreign trade; China’s northern plain areas, encompassing the provinces of what are 
now Hebei, Shandong, and Henan, which had early-on witnessed development, then 
economic difficulties, with resurgence again taking place at the onset of the Ming 
dynasty; and, the middle part of the Yangtze, made up of the provinces of Jiangxi, 
Hunan and Hubei, the grain basket for the rest of the nation.  In these different areas, 
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“what resulted was the rise of a situation wherein areas each had their own special 
sense of economic character” (Xu, 2004: 9), with trends of specialization arising in 
different product groups.   
One of the product groups in which specialization occurred was the manufacture 
of silk items.  But, cotton wares also experienced the specialization phenomena as 
well.  Of cotton manufactures, Craig Dietrich (1972: 133) wrote, “the specialized 
sector of the industry became concentrated in certain areas.”  Dietrich went on to 
describe how specific locales also focused on particular aspects of the cotton-
production process, with some areas concentrating on the growing of cotton, and 
others on its processing and manufacture.  Even with respect to the manufacture of 
cotton related products, different geographic areas specialized in distinct modes of 
production, with some dealing in production for local consumption and others 
specializing in manufacture for export.  In a certain region, manufacturers of an 
individual product tended to cluster in a small area, with “a few villages, suburbs or 
parts of a city…commonly found to produce a major portion of [an area’s] cloth 
output” (Dietrich, 1972: 134).  The existence of such specialization furthered and 
was itself enhanced by the expansion of markets.  As markets developed, 
specialization increased and vice versa.  This gave rise to the emergence of 
production clusters. 
In places like Zhejiang Province, prior to liberation in 1949 clusters were 
common.  They usually arose around a first-moving firm, and involved trends of 
increasing specialization (Wang, and Yu, 2008: 26).  The histories of some of the 
clusters are quite long.  For example, scholars have attributed the beginnings of the 
Yongkang metal processing cluster, located in Jinhua (close to Yiwu), to be the Spring 
and Autumn period of the Eastern Zhou Dynasty, sometime around the 8th century 
B.C.  By 1947, the Yongkang cluster had become quite large, with 1,059 firms 
 56 
involved in ironware production, 850 firms producing bronzeware, and 822 tin-ware 
manufacturers.  Although on paper, Yongkang’s metal working firms were 
constrained in their activities between 1949-1978, following reforms firms in the area 
expanded quickly, and by 1983 their total numbers were at least three times that 
present in 1947 (Hu and Fan, 2003: 5).  This suggests the presence of ongoing cluster 
production during the time of Mao.  Fieldwork results suggested similar conclusions. 
The above discussion makes clear that, at least with regard to the three, focused-
upon points of uniqueness of China’s markets:  structures based on marketplaces; 
agency predicated on groups of geographically defined market activists; and, the 
organization of production premised on clusters, a strong sense of path dependency is 
evident between past and contemporary forms.  The review also shows that even 
during the (1949-1978) period of planning, market activities, though certainly 
constrained in form, continued, thereby serving as a link between the past and the 
present.  It remains to be seen, however, how this link underwent actualization.  To 
provide an answer, I rely heavily upon fieldwork results, focusing upon the role of 
Yiwu actors in China’s market transition changes.  
 
THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN FOSTERING 
CONTEMPORARY MARKET FORMS:  AN EMPIRICAL EXAMPLE 
In western business scholarship, there has been little mention of the efforts of Zhejiang 
businesspersons in promoting market forms in China.  But, in China there is a saying 
akin to the following:  “Wherever there are Zhejiang businesspersons, there will be 
markets” (Chen, 2006: 299).  Throughout China, those from Zhejiang have become 
famous for their market abilities.  One reason for this fame is that there are now over 
four million Zhejiang businesspersons who have left their homes to engage in 
entrepreneurial activities and invest in businesses outside their province.  Another 
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source of fame is the success that those from Zhejiang have achieved during the 
reform period.  This has been especially true of individuals from two areas of 
Zhejiang:  Wenzhou and Yiwu.  Here I focus on those from Yiwu. 
Yiwu is unique in that its post-reform development featured an emphasis on 
markets first, and only later promoted manufacturing.  As previously mentioned, a 
long-time business tradition existed in Yiwu called the “Chicken Feathers for Candy 
Trade,” wherein Yiwu traders (mostly from a township called Niansanli), primarily 
during periods after harvests or prior to planting, would go out to other locales to 
trade.  Their stated purpose was to use their self-produced hard candy to barter for 
chicken feathers, which they then sold to producers of feather dusters or used 
themselves as a fertilizer to enhance nutrient-poor soils (2/13/09a Yiwu interview of 
former trader).  In fact, the dealings they engaged in generally involved more than 
this, and throughout most of the Maoist period there existed a substantial trade in 
consumer items as well (2/16/09 Yiwu interview with former trader).  In the early 
1970s, with the advent of what later became the town and village enterprises (TVE’s), 
Yiwu businesspersons began to barter for or purchase such firms’ seconds or excess 
production amounts, going on to then sell these in their trade outings, earning what for 
some amounted to comparatively large returns.  In carrying out their trade, Yiwu 
traders focused their activities on rural-based pursuits, trading in only those locales 
where higher government oversight tended to be minimal.  To support these 
expanding trading activities (and prior to the start of reforms), Yiwu markets, 
particularly ones in Niansanli, grew in scale, coming to include a wide range of 
products produced in other parts of Zhejiang, things like hardware and small metal 
toys from Yongkang, socks from Zhuji, gauze fabric from Jiaxing, buttons and lighters 
from Wenzhou, and balloons from Zhenhai (2/13/09b Yiwu interview with former 
trader).  Later, Yiwu traders began to travel by rail to farther away places, such as 
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Shanghai, Guangdong and Manchuria, to source out products and bring them back to 
Yiwu.  In this way, Yiwu markets received an early start. 
Once reforms began, market efforts took on a new intensity, and various other 
service activities arose to support them.  In particular, Yiwu’s logistics activities 
underwent noticeable development.  In addition, Yiwu traders (and Wenzhou ones, 
as well), changed from engaging simply in trade, to taking part in the building and 
management of markets in other areas.  They used their own, trade-generated capital 
to invest, and relying on Yiwu’s comparatively advanced logistics systems to transfer 
products back and forth, they sent in-demand items to Yiwu for sale, and brought 
Yiwu products to their own markets for exchange, earning arbitrage returns in the 
process.  But, their hardships were extreme.  Anti-business mentalities existed, and 
Yiwu entrepreneurs in their undertakings in other areas often met with prejudice and 
distrust.  Still, the Yiwu entrepreneurs persevered and, on average, their markets 
grew increasingly successful.  This was particularly the case for Yiwu’s own market, 
which continued to expand.  In the process, however, it also experienced the pains of 
development.  Government involvement grew, with the local government eventually 
taking over responsibility for the market’s management, and going on to rationalize 
market operations further.  Today, Yiwu’s market is one of the largest, and certainly 
the most famous market for consumables in China. 
In undertaking the efforts they did, the role of Yiwu businesspersons as 
institutional entrepreneurs is apparent.  Their actions resulted in the breaking down of 
market barriers in China, the facilitation of improved market-driven institutional 
frameworks, and the attraction of additional participants to the emerging market-
movement.  They continue to be involved in such efforts, building and managing 
markets throughout China.  In so doing, they have advanced the processes of market 
transition substantially.  The following is a quote from a market owner and manager 
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from Yiwu, who, along with his brother, now runs markets in four different Chinese 
provinces.   
 
Originally many of those in our markets had little understanding of 
how to do business.  We held classes for them to introduce them to 
basic business concepts.  We also sent them to Yiwu to educate them 
and to give them a sense of what the future might hold.  By sending 
them to Yiwu we also helped them to form ties with producers and 
sellers there.  All of these actions have helped to make our market a 
success (5/17/08 Dongying, Shandong interview with Yiwu market 
owner). 
 
Yiwu institutional entrepreneurs (along with those from other groups), and the 
successful market model they promoted, have helped to diffuse markets and market 
knowledge throughout China, thereby involving more and more actors in market 
activity.  Their efforts have significantly aided the processes of China’s market 
transition. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This essay initially raised a set of questions.   Why has China’s market transition 
process been as smooth as it has been, and, how, after a thirty-year period during 
which planned institutions dominated, was it possible for post-1978 market 
institutions to resemble so closely their pre-1949 counterparts?  The paper concluded 
that path dependency, combined with institutional diversity and institutional 
entrepreneurship, were key to resolving these issues.  After 1949, rather than 
completely dissipating with the rise of planned systems, evidence suggests that 
 60 
bastions of market activity remained in China.  It was these system remnants that 
after 1978 served as facilitators for the rapid reconstitution of market forms.  That is, 
the role of path dependency was important.  The 1978-initiated reforms were the jolt 
catalyzing actors to begin the work of institutionalization (Sine and David, 2003: 187).  
Following the freeing up of market constraints, actors emerging from within existing 
“remnant” fields of market activity, motivated by incentives premised on self-gain, 
and legitimated by a growing political acceptance of new forms, involved themselves 
in processes of institutional entrepreneurship, promoting and engendering institutional 
change.  The actors were tied to templates of market development.  Others learned 
from these templates and they, themselves, then developed.  Market successes 
provided additional legitimacy for markets to expand even further.   
This then helps to explain the ease of China’s market transition.  It depended on 
processes that were promoted endogenously, based on already previously legitimated 
forms (e.g., periodic markets, economic specialization, and individual agency), and 
catalyzed through the efforts of motivated micro-level actors.  The analysis also 
explains the similarities of China’s emerging markets to past market forms.  The 
explanation being that the two periods’ situations were predicated on many of the 
same institutions, ones that had survived (in constrained forms) during planning, and 
which, once constraints on market involvement decreased after 1978, underwent full 
resurrection.  Again, much of the change occurring did so from within, at the micro 
level, rather than by being forcefully imposed from without (although the market 
successes of other nations certainly provided motivation for national-level policy 
makers to continue to promote market transition).  The various involved processes 
were significantly impacted by the path dependent natures of emerging change, the 
institutional diversity inherent in China’s developmental sequence, as well as the 
institutional entrepreneurship of various Chinese business groups.  In total, these 
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factors greatly furthered the China market-transition process and acted to amplify its 
overall success. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
MEANING AND THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF TRANSITION OF 
TRANSITION:  AN APPLICATION OF DISCOURSE ANALYSIS TO TWO 
PROCESSES OF ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA  
 
This paper investigates the interrelations of higher-order and local institutional 
logics, examining how they relate to organizational development.  Its focus is on 
multi-level meanings.  Applying discourse analysis, I consider the theorizations of 
two different organizational frameworks, each emerging out of unique institutional 
contexts, but located within the same organizational field, comparing how transitions 
in higher-order institutional logics impacted the two theorizations over time.  
Differences were evident, indicating that even when facing the same changes in 
higher-order institutional logics, same-field actors, in dissimilar micro-institutional 
logic environments, theorized the changes differently. This suggests the relevance of 
local contexts to organizational outcomes. 
 
Surprisingly, organizational research has directed little focus to the manner by which 
higher-order, field-level processes of institutional change inter-relate with local level 
action (Purdy and Gray 2009:356).  Researchers have given only slight consideration 
to the possibility that the embeddedness of different actors within dissimilar 
institutional contexts impacts the actors’ interpretations of life, influencing the manner 
by which they theorize and frame a particular event.  This is strange because the 
foundations upon which institutionalism are built strongly assert the inter-relation 
between institutions and meaning (Zilber 2002).  This was evident in the work of 
 68 
early institutional scholars.  Such work emphasized that the reality actors face in their 
everyday lives influences the manner by which action occurs (Berger and Luckmann 
1966).  The reality they referred to was a socially constructed one, dependent upon 
the meanings that actors attribute to what is happening around them.  The assumption 
was that institutions depend upon shared meanings, meanings that are premised on 
social interaction (Zilber 2002:234).  As in semantics, meanings encompass both 
sense and reference, and cannot be separated from their contexts.  From the 
beginning, social theorists also emphasized the relation of meanings to action.  
Weber posited that meaning, in the form of interests, drives action.  He also 
conjectured that interests are subjective and socially dependent (Swedberg 2003:16).  
Weber stressed the context-dependent aspect of meanings, a relation that he posited 
helps to structure the nature of agency.  More recently various scholars have also 
emphasized meaning.  Scott depicted the cultural-cognitive as one of the three 
“pillars” of institutions, founded on the shared understandings of actors (Scott 
2001:52).  Quoting D’Andrade, he declared that, “In the cognitive paradigm, what a 
creature does is, in large part, a function of the creature’s internal representation of its 
environment” (D’Andrade quoted in Scott 2001:57).  As such, meanings are 
important.  Even though there is much evidence to support that meanings are 
important to organizational understanding, however, meanings have continued to be 
an understudied area of institutional analysis (Zilber 2002:235).  
This lack of emphasis, as Phillips, Lawrence, and Hardy assert, is at least 
partially due to the fact that institutional research “has tended to focus on the effects 
rather than the process of institutionalization” (2004:635).  One reason for this has 
been that, until recently, institutional analysis has directed little attention to 
institutional change.  In the past, institutional researchers assumed that organizations 
are born into already institutionalized contexts, supposing that the only changes taking 
 69 
place were those undertaken by actors to “increase their legitimacy and their survival 
prospects” (Meyer and Rowan 340:1977).  That is, the assumption was that change 
plays a role in organizational theory only to the extent that actors do what they can to 
adhere to existing in-place scripts of action.  In turn, organizational activity and 
resulting organizational structures cohere into isomorphic frameworks.  Institutional 
theory, rather than considering the possibility of novel change, instead asserted “the 
taken-for-granted nature of much of organizational life” (DiMaggio 1988:5), with neo-
institutional theorists stressing similarities rather than differences, and taking 
meanings as already known. There was thus little apparent need to focus on the nature 
of meaning. 
Another reason for organizational theory’s earlier lack of interest in meanings, 
particularly meanings at the local level, was due to the fact that relevant researchers 
viewed meanings as collective in nature.  They posited meanings to be field-level 
constructs, rather than functions of lower-level systems.  For example, DiMaggio and 
Powell talked about the “collective rationality” inherent in organizational fields, 
emphasizing the “mutual awareness among participants in a set of organizations” 
(1983:148).  They and others like them hoped to “move away from assessments of 
individual rationality or action to investigate how collective rationality comes to 
provide fundamental sources and motivations for…actions” (Hoffman and Ventresca 
2002:8).  Their focus was on higher-level workings and on the similarities in 
meanings possessed by actors across a field.  Resulting research did not consider the 
possibility that individual actors at the local level might interpret a particular event in 
ways that differed from that of others. 
But, within organizational literature, the relevance of meaning has recently 
begun to change.  In conjunction with an expanding interest in institutional change, 
researchers have begun to pay more attention to the role of meaning.  One aspect of 
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this newly developing interest has come forth in the guise of analyses focusing on 
institutional logics.  Institutional logics specify the makeup and the meaning of 
institutions (Thornton and Ocasio 2008:100).  In an organizational sense, they help to 
direct the attention of involved actors to a focus on a limited range of issues and to 
these issues’ solutions (Lounsbury, 2007: 289), thereby normalizing organizational 
behavior and defining actions appropriate to a particular situation (Thornton and 
Ocasio 2008:102).  In this sense, institutional logics provide "guidelines for practical 
action" (Rao, Monin and Durand 2003:795).  But, for much existing organizational 
research, the primary application of institutional logics has been as supra 
organizational, macro-level constructs (Lounsbury 2007:289).  In this sense, work on 
logics has come under the strong influence of neo-institutional thinking.  This was 
apparent in early institutional logic conceptualizations (e.g., Fligstein 1990; Haveman 
and Rao 1997; Thornton and Ocasio 1999; Thornton 2002), which were heavily 
impacted by earlier, isomorphically directed studies.  These studies took a strictly 
field-wide approach to change (in the sense of not considering differences among 
actors), stressing coherence in change forms, and assuming that changes in 
institutional logics affected actors in a similar fashion.  Any discussion of meanings 
was done at the higher field level, and this research regarded logics as “taken for 
granted . . . as appropriate arrangements for all organizations within the field” 
(Hinings, Greenwood, Reay and Suddaby, quoted in Purdy and Gray 2009:355).  The 
focus was on the uniformity of change across an entire industry field.  Resulting 
studies posited a common identity among industry players (Thornton and Ocasio 
1999:803), and assumed a commonality across all actors with respect to the actors’ 
institutional-logic interpretations.  For example, one set of authors (taking industry as 
a field) wrote that, “industry is a relevant boundary for identifying institutional logics 
because industry producers develop common identities and “valuation orders” that 
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structure the decision making and the practices of the players in a product market” 
(Thornton and Ocasio 1999:805).  Related research gave little consideration to the 
possibility that a possible outcome of institutional-logic changes might be one 
wherein, on a general level, actors cohere to a similar institutional logic, but at the 
local level continue to maintain their own individual forms of logic.  There was little 
sense that differing sets of geographically distinct actors might concurrently interpret a 
logic in dissimilar ways, ways dependent on meanings arising out of the actors’ own 
institutional contexts.  Again, rather than considering differences, the emphasis was 
on similarities.   
A second set of institutional logic work (e.g., Purdy and Gray 2009; Reay and 
Hinings 2009; Marquis and Lounsbury 2007; Reay and Hinings 2005) has taken a 
different approach.  It has expressed an interest in disparate meanings, considering 
situations apart from those defined associated with just entire fields.  This set of work 
has contended that coherence to a particular, dominant logic does not always occur, 
and has allowed for the possibility that unique, competing logics might coexist within 
the same field.  Such a perspective distinguishes this work from earlier institutional 
logic approaches, which had relied on the dichotomous approach to institutional logic 
change, wherein change takes place sequentially, in the form of a shift between two 
different field-wide equilibriums:  one logic gives way to another logic—with only 
two, dominant logics involved.  No other institutional logics were considered. 
This second set of work has also examined situations apart from just mature 
fields, which had been the primary focus of the first set of work (e.g., Greenwood et 
al. 2002; Greenwood and Suddaby 2006; Lounsbury 2007).  For example, Purdy and 
Gray (2009) considered a situation involving new-field emergence.  They accepted 
the possibility that during the emergence of a new field differences in outcome might 
occur.  Their research concluded that, for the situation they studied, differences did, 
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in fact, arise, and that these differences were the result of the adoption by actors of 
dissimilar institutional logics.  Purdy and Gray also did not discover just one 
dominant-logic, only, but instead observed the presence of many logics.  Other 
researchers within this set of work have also considered the possibility that 
organizations do not always simply accept changes in logics, but often resist such 
processes.  In one case, (Marquis and Lounsbury 2007) posited the existence of 
multi-level institutional logics, concluding that the competitive dynamics associated 
with differing local and national logics can impact emerging results.  They 
established that competing logics often exist together, finding, in the case they studied, 
that logics existed at both the national and local levels.  Their work, however, again 
focused on entire fields, saying little about the possibility of geographically localized, 
dissimilar changes within the same field, and ignoring the possible influences of local 
institutions.  Even so, other related studies have gotten around the problem of 
geography by taking a geographic-specific approach (Reay and Hinings 2009, 2005; 
Haveman and Rao 1997), thus dealing with one local-logic set only.  Even in 
situations where researchers took such an approach, however, there was still little 
comment as to what influence this might have on resulting meanings.  But, this 
second set of institutional logic research does include some attention to the idea that 
actors can be differentially impacted by changes in institutional logics (Reay and 
Hinings 2005).  Rather than attributing these differences to factors associated with 
meaning, however, researchers have attributed the differences to the differential power 
standings of different-actor groups.  Again, as with other institutional logic research, 
little, in a specific sense, has been said regarding the role of meaning.  Meaning has 
continued to be a neglected aspect of institutional logic research. 
A third set of institutional logic approaches, however, has begun to consider the 
relation of institutional logics to local-level organizational results (e.g., Greenwood, 
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Díaz, Li and Lorente 2009; Lounsbury 2007; Townley 2002).  Related studies have 
moved away from an isomorphic approach to outcomes, and have instead focused on 
the possibility that multiple rationalities might arise within the same field.  Such 
studies have also considered outcomes such as the possibility that, due to differing, 
geographically distinct logics, the introduction of a new practice at the field level 
might yield differential adoption of the practice by different areas (Lounsbury, 2007).  
Another outcome they have considered has been one wherein even in the same 
organization, as a result of differences in local institutional logics, the same practice 
might be diffused in ways that differ across actors, with seeming acceptance of the 
practice by some, but with strong resistance to the practice actually continuing to exist 
(Townley, 2002).  Greenwood et al. (2009) also considered the prospect that, as a 
result of multiple logics within the same field, geographically distinct actors might 
respond to the same overarching logic in different ways, dependent on differing areas’ 
local institutional logics.  They concluded that, “…it is necessary to trace the 
relationship between organizations and the logics that constitute their institutional 
context” (Greenwood et al. 2009:1).   A distinguishing factor within this third set of 
institutional logic work has therefore been that local level factors are important, 
particularly with regard to their impact upon resulting meanings. 
It is in line with this third set of work that I develop the present paper.  Rather 
than focusing on a situation where a number of competing institutional logics exist at 
the higher-order level, however, I instead take the approach of earlier institutional 
logic work and examine shifts in dominant logics.  Unlike the earlier institutional 
logic studies, however, I consider the role of local-level logics as well.  My interest is 
in a form of environmental transformation relating to institutional transition (Peng 
2003).  Institutional transitions are occurrences during which the formal and informal 
organizing frameworks of a society—its institutional logics (Friedland and Alford 
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1991:248)—undergo significant change.   The resulting situation engenders feelings 
of uncertainty among social participants concerning what is appropriate and what is 
not.  Meanings become unclear.  For some, this becomes a period of crisis, but for 
others it is a time of opportunity.  Those stressing opportunity tend to be 
entrepreneurial by nature, and are motivated to act in ways that give rise to new 
organizational forms.  The emerging creations are ones that they believe will better 
fit with the new environment (Sine and David 2003).   
I focus specifically on a particular form of institutional transition referred to as 
market transition (Nee 1996; 1989).  Market transitions involve the shift from 
economic systems of planning to markets.  I consider the process of market transition 
in China, pondering the nature of transition at the local level, examining how, during 
the shift from planning to markets, local systems melded with changes in higher-level 
institutional logics.  I rely on discourse analysis to investigate the theorization 
processes undertaken by two differing sets of actors, each influenced by a differing 
developmental model.  Each of the models possessed a unique, local institutional 
logic.  My interest is in how the two sets of actors, each of which was favorably 
biased towards one of the two respective developmental forms, over time, theorized 
their favored logic.  To understand the nuances of the emerging theorization 
processes, I apply discourse analysis to various journal articles pertaining to each of 
the logics.  I divide a group of selected articles into two sets, with each set possessing 
a favorable view of one of the logics.  The time period I consider is one extending 
from 1978 until 2005.  During this time, China moved from a perspective wherein 
markets were passively allowed, and much variation tolerated, to one in which there 
was an active embrace of market forms, and rationalization of existing systems was 
increasingly of focus.  My assumption is that the two sets of journal articles should 
reflect this higher-order trend.  This is because in China all media related output, 
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even at the local level, must pass through censors, individuals who have been certified 
by the Communist Party’s Department of Propaganda.  Media publications are 
expected to reflect generally the party line.  Isomorphic forces therefore exist, which 
compel authors not to veer too much from party-supported norms.  This means that 
when carrying out innovative action institutional entrepreneurs must engage in 
“institutionalization projects” (Rao 1998:914), constructing “legitimating accounts” 
(Creed, Scully and Austin 2002:476), in which they try to frame their organizationally 
directed innovations in ways that they assume will garner the Party acceptance they 
desire, and which, in line with notions of isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; 
Meyer and Rowan 1977), the innovations will need, if they are to be successful.  
Undertaken actions (at least in the case studied here) are generally “driven not by a 
logic of consequences but by a logic of appropriateness (Thornton and Ocasio 
2008:106).   
To gauge the role of meaning, the specific mechanism I analyze is theorization. 
Theorization, is defined as the “the self-conscious development and specification of 
abstract categories and the formulation of patterned relationships” (Strang and Meyer 
1993:492).  Researchers have focused on theorization primarily in its role as a lead 
up to the diffusion and adoption of a new practice (Strang and Meyer 1993), but 
theorization is also associated with processes of legitimacy attainment (Greenwood et 
al. 2002:60, 61).  This legitimacy-attainment aspect of theorization has not 
previously received significant attention, but it is what is of interest here.  Legitimacy 
has been defined in various ways.  Scott defined it as "a condition reflecting cultural 
alignment, normative support, or consonance with relevant rules or laws" (1995:45), 
while Suchman viewed it as “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions 
of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (1995:574).  Regardless, 
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legitimation is linked to meaning in the sense that for an organization to become 
legitimated it must convey to relevant actors a meaning of itself that makes these 
actors believe that the organization is appropriate and aligned with the demands and 
norms of society.  That is, legitimation depends on the communication of a particular 
meaning (Suchman 1995:586), one that is appropriate and that emerges out of 
theorization processes.  Theorization conveys meaning in the sense that it involves 
the advancement of comprehension-enhancing theories that “actively motivate certain 
groupings as meaningful and consequential” (Strang and Meyer 1993:496).   
I focus on theorization processes to gauge changes in the comparative expression 
of meanings conveyed by the two sets of actors.  I assume theorization–involved 
actors to be the decipherers of ongoing action (Zilber 2002:235), and also suppose that 
legitimation processes are ongoing.  As such, I rely on dynamic forms of 
theorization.  Because theorization processes have generally been considered to be 
static in nature, however, I incorporate into their structures a set of dynamic framing 
processes as well.  My goal in focusing on theorization processes (and framing) is to 
compare how actors in the two areas of interest, places characterized by differing local 
institutional logics, theorized changes in field-level institutional logics.  While these 
changes were the same for both, did the two sets of actors theorize them in the same 
way?  That is, did the same changes have the same or different meanings for the two 
sets of actors?   
There has been little empirical work done on theorization processes, and little is 
known about them (Greenwood et al. 2002:75).  Still, researchers have posited that 
the nature of theorization processes should differ depending on the contexts involved, 
given that locally based actors “have to justify change (or resistance to change) by 
appealing, in a compelling way, to the particular values embedded in [their] setting.  
The form of those appeals will vary by institutional setting, but their purpose will be 
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the same” (Greenwood et al. 2002:75).  The purposes will be the same in the sense 
that the actors are all focused on attaining legitimacy.  The field in which action is 
taking place is composed of local-level governments.  Actors in this field engage in 
processes of theorization, seeking acceptance for their actions from those in higher 
levels of government.  Other researchers have hypothesized that the manner by which 
this occurs should, given the existence of dissimilar institutional logics at the local 
level, differ by location (Greenwood et al. 2002:75).  It is the possibility of such 
differences that is of interest here.  The goal is to see if, in a situation involving the 
same change in field-level institutional logics, during which isomorphic, macro-based 
pressures are present for both sets of actors, the two sets of actors will theorize the 
changes in differing ways. This would suggest that meaning depends upon context.  
Hence, when considering situations in which change is occurring in higher-order 
institutional logics, care would need to be taken in concluding the effects at the local 
level that will emerge from this change.  That is, different meanings will influence 
the nature of change outcomes.   
The paper possesses utility in the sense that it provides enlightenment regarding 
institutional logics, the meanings they project, and how those at the local level, 
impacted by local-level institutional logics, interpret and react to these meanings.  
The goal is to show how different interpretations of field-level changes in institutional 
logics elicit different reactions, which are evident in resulting unique forms of 
theorization.  In this sense, the paper adheres to the assertion of researchers that in 
order “[t]o more powerfully demonstrate the effects of competing institutional 
logics…it is important to show how they differentially shape behavior” (Marquis and 
Lounsbury 2007:805).  The paper also continues the work of other theorists who 
have begun to show that, in the aftermath of a jolt or shock to a system, resulting 
forms of equilibrium do not necessarily imply coherence to a single organizational 
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form.  Although research of the past has asserted that “When rival entrepreneurs 
promote incompatible frames, the frame that enjoys greater political support from the 
state, professions, and other organizations becomes ascendant.  Proponents of losing 
frames can exit, migrate, or convert to the ascendant frame” (Rao, 1998: 912), more 
recent results have shown that deviations from such an outcome can certainly occur.  
Research has provided increasing evidence that within the same field, and under the 
same dominant institutional logic, differing approaches can coexist, with all of them 
achieving institutionalization.  The paper shows how this can be the case, focusing on 
the manner by which manipulations of meaning, taking place via processes of 
theorization, can result in such an outcome.  The paper also deals with other gaps in 
past research.  For example, even though researchers have previously applied 
discourse-related approaches to the analysis of theorization (Greenwood et al. 2002), it 
remains to be seen whether the results obtained in these analyses were specific to the 
context considered.  In order to be fully confirmed, the earlier results require 
generalization to other environments (Greenwood et al. 2002:75), particularly to 
settings outside of North America.  Lastly, unlike prior work that considers 
theorization efforts to be largely static in form, the current study investigates 
theorization processes from the context of ongoing institutional transitions.  
Adopting a dynamic perspective, it links together, via a focus on discourse-related 
mechanisms of theorization and framing, various processes associated with 
environmental transformation, institutional logics, institutional change, and 
entrepreneurial activity.  Again, this is an area that researchers have asserted requires 
more attention (Sine and David 2003:186). 
The research gaps identified above serve as the basis for an examination of two 
differing theorization approaches.  The two approaches are each associated with a 
respective organizational framework, or model.  Models (moshi) have played a 
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significant role in the structuring of the outcomes of China’s recent economic reforms.  
They are functional structures, which their adherents have used both to promote 
specific forms of social and organizational development, and to judge the relative 
progress of the particular locale in which the model is found.  Given the rapidness by 
which “the Chinese state swung from promoting state socialist institutions (and 
condemning capitalist ones) to promoting a version of capitalist institutions (and 
undermining socialist ones)” (Hsu 2006:70), there was a need for structures intended 
to cope with the changes taking place.  A means also had to be found by which to 
judge the rights and obligations of the various forms of development that were 
emerging, “and it was during this time that most ‘models’ came forth” (Yu and Li 
2002:54).  Following the advent and pursuit of reforms in China, many models arose.   
But, especially early on, significant uncertainty existed regarding the appropriateness 
of these models.  This uncertainty was heightened by the fact that the models 
supported differing approaches.  Some geographically specific paradigms advocated 
continued government-led development, while others in different areas championed 
market-based development (Yu and Li 2002:54-55).  A focus of this paper is on how 
two particular models developed and theorized themselves to gain acceptance.  The 
paper directs attention to a “market” led model, and a “government” led one.  Below 
I provide insight regarding various concepts used to develop the paper’s positions.  I 
start off with the notion of market transition. 
 
MARKET TRANSITION 
Market transition is a form of environmental transformation.  It is characterized by 
institutional transitions involving the transition of an economy from a reliance on 
planning to one premised on markets.  The focus of market transition-related 
discussions has generally been directed to macro processes of policy change (which 
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might also be termed changes in higher order institutional logics from planning to 
markets).  As policy makers make decisions in favor of markets, this results in shifts 
in the relative powers (in the form of control over resources) possessed by political 
and economic actors (Nee, 1996:910; Nee and Opper 2009:2).  These shifts, open up 
new avenues of action for involved actors, and are said to lead directly to changes at 
the micro level, changes that arise as a result of alterations in resource distributions.  
Market transition related research, however, apart from observing that the actions of 
entrepreneurs help to accelerate processes of institutional change, has largely 
overlooked the specifics of strategic oriented action at the micro level (Peng 
2003:277).  It also has yet to supply a nuanced description of the interactions 
between changes in macro-level institutional logics and institutional logics at the local 
level.  There thus exists opportunity to enhance the framework of market transition 
theory further. 
Such improvement can occur through an enhanced focus not just on the 
outcomes of market changes, but also on the processes by which market-related 
change occurs via the theorization efforts of local actors.  There is a great need for 
this given that, even as market transition research has itself acknowledged, the change 
from planning to markets results in greater freedoms for micro-level actors:  
“markets open up alternative avenues for mobility through emergent entrepreneurship 
and labor markets” (Nee 1996:910).  How actors apply these freedoms, in possibly 
divergent ways, is not well known, however.  In addition, although the “transition to 
a marketlike economy [stimulates] the rapid growth of economic institutions centered 
on transactive exchanges” (Nee and Su 1990:22), such changes occur over time, in a 
step-by-step sequence, which is not necessarily the same across geographic realms.  
As Nee and Matthews relate, although policy making has the ability to serve as a 
catalyst for change, research on transition processes “is advanced by research that 
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brings societal institutions and structures more fully into explanations of the causes 
and effects of transformative change, rather than [simply] conferring causal priority to 
the political domain (1996:402).    
 
THEORIZATION AND FRAMING PROCESSES 
In attempting to unearth the possible effects of institutional logics on 
institutionalization processes, the paper relies on two factors:  theorization and 
framing.  Although theorization and framing have each received significant attention, 
they have seldom been tied together, and when such ties have emerged, the authors 
linking them have generally regarded the two as essentially the same, doing little to 
distinguish one from the other (Bartley 2004).  In fact, theorization and framing are 
different, yet complementary, concepts.  I start out here with a mention of 
theorization and then proceed to a discussion of framing.  Following this, I then link 
theorization and framing together, showing their complementary aspects.   
Previously, the paper already outlined many of the important notions relating to 
theorization.  It also mentioned framing, but without going into much detail.  Many 
perspectives of framing characterize framing as more or less of a one-time event.  
Such a conceptualization has been particularly prominent in areas of anthropology 
(Oliver and Johnston 2000:40), which regard framing as static in nature, functioning 
simply “to render events or occurrences meaningful,” and acting to “organize 
experience and guide action” (Benford and Snow 2000:614).  From such a 
perspective, frames serve simply to define an existing situation.  But, there is also 
another conception of framing that has recently begun to be accepted as well.  This is 
the notion of framing as “an active, processual phenomenon that implies agency and 
contention at the level of reality construction.  It is active in the sense that something 
is being done, and processual in the sense of a dynamic, evolving process” (Benford 
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and Snow 2000:614).  Here, framing is not a static event, but is distinguished by an 
ongoing dynamism, involving continuous re-interpretation, and alteration of related 
forms.  Relying upon such a conceptualization of framing and combining it with 
theorization can yield impressive results.  This is because theorization classifies 
elements together into categories based on some indicated similarity or linkage 
between them, which can be real or enacted.  In this sense it defines similarities, and 
once the patterns it proposes are named the patterns tend to take on a fixed form.  
Frames, at least as conceptualized here, however, are action-oriented systems and 
function to stipulate shared meanings, doing so by influencing “the interpretations of 
reality among various audiences” (Fiss and Hirsch 2005:29).  Framing frequently 
seeks to answer questions like, “What is going on?” or “What should be going on?” 
(Benford and Snow 2000:614), applying cognitive perspective management to do so.  
Relevant actions rely upon efforts at presentation, involving selective influencing of 
perception, and the linking of important elements with existing forms of understanding 
in ways that are frequently intended to achieve a particular objective.  This generally 
entails purposefully melding issues at the individual level with a broader story line 
into a form that is logical and culturally aligned, at least from the perspective of 
“symbolic vehicles of meaning” (Swidler 1986:273).  The assertion is that by 
combining dynamic framing processes with more static processes of theorization that 
theorization can be depicted in dynamic ways.   
 
THE IMPORTANCE OF DISCOURSE 
The various inter-relations taking place among institutional logics, agency and 
theorization can be observed through analyses of discourse.  Processes of discourse 
are integral parts of any theorization event.  Researchers define discourses as 
“structured collections of meaningful texts” (Phillips, Lawrence and Hardy 2004:636).  
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Discourses integrate the relationships between institutional logics at the macro and 
micro levels with agency-predicated efforts of theorization and institutionalization 
occurring locally.  Discourse analysis “involves the systematic study of texts—
including their production, dissemination, and consumption—in order to explore the 
relationship between discourse and social reality” (Phillips, Lawrence and Hardy 
2004:636).  Applying discourse analysis, researchers can garner an enhanced 
appreciation of the theorization framework in which the discourses are embedded.  
This aids in the achievement of an understanding of the overall institutionalization 
process.   
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The paper integrates a longitudinal analysis of changes in higher order institutional 
logics, with an examination of theorization processes at the local level.  The focus is 
on the relation between higher- and lower-level institutional logics and the manner by 
which those theorizing their lower-level actions manipulate meanings in order to 
conform to the demands imposed by higher-order institutional logics.  I hypothesize 
that such manipulation depends on the lower-level institutional contexts into which the 
actors are embedded.  By simultaneously considering the theorization processes of 
two different, institutionally distinct places, the discussion incorporates a focus on 
local institutional characters.  The two theorization processes examined are ones that 
early on related to:  the Sunan and Wenzhou Models, frameworks that will be further 
introduced at the start of the case analysis below, and from which local institutional 
logics can be determined; and later, in the aftermath of economic development, once 
the models had become of less relevance, to the Sunan and Wenzhou areas in general.  
Following the specification of local-level institutional logics, a historical review of 
changes in higher-order institutional logics will then follow.  I then tie the higher- 
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and lower-level institutional logics together in an examination of how the two places 
theorized their respective processes of development.   
There are various ways I might have pursued this theorization process 
examination.  One way might have been to have interviewed actors with direct 
knowledge of how the models and their portrayals changed, and how the occurring 
changes related to alterations in higher order institutional logics, individuals like:  
academics, journalists, and government leaders.  I decided against this, however.  
The reason for this decision was that existing research has shown that retrospective 
accounts are not always accurate, particularly in cases where a precise sequencing of 
events is needed, and where emphasis is put on the timing of the events that occurred.  
Golden (1992, 1997) investigated whether retrospective memories of past strategies 
are accurate or not, examining the correlations between strategies that were self-
reported by chief executives in one year, and recollections of those same strategies 
made by the chief executives two years later.  Based on the results, he found that 
“retrospective errors may be pervasive; nearly 60 percent of the retrospective accounts 
studied here did not agree with validated reports elicited only two years earlier” 
(Golden 1992:852).  This seemed to be reason enough to look for other choices. 
Rather than relying on retrospective accounts, I decided instead to link 
theorization processes with a set of discourses from the past, judging the changes that 
took place in the two theorizations processes based on a longitudinally framed 
discourse analysis of 50+ articles drawn principally from “The China Academic 
Journals Full-Text Database,” a database that is part of “The China National 
Knowledge Infrastructure.”  This information set has been self-designated as “the 
world’s largest database of research content from China.”  The China Academic 
Journals Database is composed of scholarly journal articles on China ranging from 
1985 up until the present.  Taking 1985 as my starting point, I selected articles in 
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increments of five years from that point on, stopping at the year 2005.  That is, I 
chose articles from the years 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005.  My rationale for 
selecting articles from just these 5 sets of years was that I am interested in the 
differing responses to higher-order institutional logics in the two areas, rather than 
continuous processes of change.  For each of the years, I chose five articles relating 
to each of the two models (a total of 10 articles per year), doing so by separately 
inputting the Chinese characters for the Sunan Model (苏南模) and Sunan (苏南) and 
the Wenzhou Model (温州模式) and Wenzhou (温州) into a search of journal 
abstracts, to come up with articles from which to choose.  The total number of 
articles I attempted to select in this manner was 50.  I say, “attempted to select,” 
because in certain cases the desired number of five articles for a particular 
developmental type could not be attained for a referenced year.  In such cases, I 
selected articles from a subsequent or prior year (depending on the nature of the 
institutional logics involved).  In choosing those articles that I ended up using for the 
study, I tried to find authors who would be supportive of a particular local logic.  For 
example, with regard to the Wenzhou Model, I looked for analyses written by 
researchers from Zhejiang University or the Zhejiang Academy of Social Sciences 
(with the assumption being that because Wenzhou is in Zhejiang, Zhejiang-based 
researchers should be supporters of their local model).  For the Sunan Model article 
selection, I followed a similar process.  In addition, I also included other relevant 
articles from additional sources to bolster understanding of the situations taking place.  
Also, although the authors of the articles were intellectuals and scholars, who 
sometimes tend to have views that differ from those of the common people, the 
impacts of any bias arising from using such a group is minimized by using the same 
group throughout.  That is, although perhaps bias in opinions exists, as long as I 
continuously draw from a similar set of authors this bias should exist for all of the 
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articles surveyed and thus not affect overall results.  A list of the articles used 
appears in Table 2.1. 
 
TABLE 2.1:  LIST OF ARTICLES USED IN THEORIZATION ANALYSIS  
 
Year/Model Article Information 
1985/Sunan Yuan, Zhang. 1985. “Nongcun Fazhan Moshi yu Rencai de 
Peiyang Shiyong Duice.” Keji Jinbu yu Duice 2: 29-31. 
1985/Sunan Zhou, Yuan and Zhao, Ming. 1985. “Sunan Xiangzhen Qiye 
Xinqushi.” Liaowang 36: 25-27. 
1986/Sunan Sun, Guogui. 1986. “’Sunan Moshi’ Tantao.” Nongye Jingji Wenti 
9: 13-15. 
1986/Sunan 
 
Liu, Shibai. 1986. “Lun Sunan Moshi—Wuxishi Xiangzhen 
Gongye Niaokan.” Caijing Yanjiu 10: 3-8. 
1986/Sunan Li, Zongjin. 1986. “’Wenzhou Moshi’ yu ‘Sunan Moshi’.” Jingji 
Yanjiu 8: 67, 57. 
1986/Sunan Zhu, Tonghua. “Lun ‘Sunan Moshi’—Zai Jiangsu Shangye 
Guanli Ganbu Xueyuan dui Biyeban Xueyuan de Jianghua.” 
Jiangsu Jingmao Zhiye Jishu Xueyuan Xuebao 02:1-7. 
1986/Wenzhou Luo, Hanxian. 1986. “Wenzhou Moshi yu Shichang Jingji.” 
Nongye Jingji Wenti  9: 10-12. 
1986/Wenzhou (No author). 1986. “’Wenzhou Moshi’ yu Shichang Tixi.” 
Zhejiang Shehui Kexue 3: 18-21. 
1986/Wenzhou Yuan, Enzhen and Wang Yunxian. 1986. “Shangpin Jingji yu 
Wenzhou Moshi.” Caijing Yanjiu 9: 14-17, 10. 
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Table 2.1 (Continued) 
1986/Wenzhou Zhang, Renshou, Yang, Shaoguang, and Lin, Dayue. 1986.  
“Wenzhou Moshi de Tese ji qi Yiyi.” Nongye Jingji Wenti 9: 4-9. 
1986/Wenzhou Yang, Yi. 1986. “Wenzhou Moshi Tanyuan.” Zhejiang Shehui 
Kexue 5:31-34. 
1986/Wenzhou Zhang, Renshou. 1986. “Sunan, Wenzhou Nongcun Gongyehua 
Moshi de Bijiao.” Jingji Shehui Tili Bijiao 3: 22-26. 
1990/Sunan An, Yuanmao. 1990. “Xiandaihua Guochengzhong de Nongcun 
Bianhua.” Jiangsu Shehui Kexue 4: 72-76. 
1990/Sunan Zhu, Tonghua, and ?, Kejian. 1990. “Jiangsu Xiangzhen Qiye zai 
Tiaozhengzhong Qianjin.” Liaowang 48: 14-15. 
1990/Sunan Zheng, Bangxing. 1990. “Lun Sunan Moshi de Shengmingli.” 
Huazhong Shifan Daxue Xuebao 3: 18-23. 
1991/Sunan Zhao, Chenggang. 1991. “Sunan Moshi Tezheng Tan.” Weishi 
Zazhi 4: 28-30. 
1991/Sunan Sunan Moshi he Shehui Jinbu Keti Zu. 1991. “Wanshan Sunan 
Moshi—Tuijin Shehui Jinbu.” Jiangsu Shehui Kexue 3: 91-111. 
1990/Wenzhou Bao, Bingzhong, and Xu, Dongmin. 1990. “Wenzhou Siying 
Jingji Xianzhuang ji Fazhan Fangxiang de Tantao.” Shanghai 
Shifan Daxue Xuebao 2: 1-3, 14. 
1990/Wenzhou Bao, Rongqing, Xu, Dongmin, Zhu Guanqin, Yang, Xiaolu, Xu 
Qing, Qian, Zhenghong, and Hong, Wentao. 1990. “Wenzhou 
Siying Qiye de Xianzhuang yu Fazhan.” Shanghai Daxue Xuebao 
6: 101-104. 
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Table 2.1 (Continued) 
1991/Wenzhou Wen, Lianhong. 1991. “Fazhan Xiangzhen Jiti Jingji—Zou 
Gongtong Fuyu Dao Lu.” Zhejiang Caijing Xueyuan Xuebao 4: 
74-78. 
1991/Wenzhou Hu, Hongwei, and Zhang, Xiangrong. 1991. “’Wenzhou Moshi’ 
de Xin Biange.” Liaowang 17: 21-23. 
1991/Wenzhou Li, Yunhe. 1991. “Lun Wenzhou Nongcun de Gufen Hezuo Zhi.” 
Nongye Jingji Wenti 11: 51-54. 
1995/Sunan Pu, Guorong, Gu, Caidong, and Mei, Qun. 1995. “Sunan Moshi 
de Chuangxin yu Fazhan.” Kexue Shehui Zhuyi 3: 37-41. 
1995/Sunan Wu, Yangdiao. 1995. “Sunan Moshi de Weida Chengjiu he 
Fazhan Wanshan.” Jiangnan Luntan 6: 5-6. 
1995/Sunan Wang, Xialin. 1995. “Sunan Moshi yu Jianshe you Zhongguo 
Tese Shehui Zhuyi.” Xuehai 1: 3-12. 
1995/Sunan Zhang, Yulin, Wu, Dasheng, and Zhu, Rupeng. 1995. “Sunan 
Moshi de Gaige yu Chuangxin.” Shehuixue Yanjiu 1: 40-49. 
1995/Sunan Fan, Conglai. 1995. “Sunan Moshi de Fazhan yu Xiangzhen Qiye 
de Chanquan Gaige.” Guanli Shijie 4: 156-162. 
1994/Wenzhou Zhang, Renshou. 1994. “Wenzhou Moshi: Qiye, Shichang yu 
Zhengfu Zhineng de Xin Bianhua.” Zhejiang Xuekan 3: 21-28. 
1994/Wenzhou Wu, Xiang. 1994. “Wenzhou Moshi de Xin Fazhan yu zai 
Renshi.” Liaowang 32: 9-11. 
1995/Wenzhou Dong, Chaocai, Li, Yunhe, and Yan, Xuruo. 1995. “’Wenzhou 
Moshi’ de Shida Fazhan Qushi.” Nongye Jingji Wenti 10: 34-36. 
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1995/Wenzhou Yu, Binghui. 1995. “Wenzhou Moshi jiqidui Zhongguo Jingji 
Fazhan de Yingxiang.” Zhongguo Renli Ziyuan Kaifa 6: 42-46. 
1996/Wenzhou Zhou, Hanmin. 1996. “’Wenzhou Moshi’ Zouchu Chentong.” 
Nanfengchuang 8: 19-20. 
2000/Sunan Lin, Lefen. 2000. “Lun Sunan Xiangzhen Jiti Qiye de Gaizhi yu 
Chuangxin.” Xiandai Jingji Tantao 6: 35-37. 
2000/Sunan Wu, Kun. 2000. “Sunan Xiangzhen Qiye Fazhan Zhong Cunzai de 
Zhuyao Wenti ji Duice.” Nanjing Jianzhu Gongcheng Xueyuan 
Xuebao 2: 41-44. 
2000/Sunan Shen, Jian. 2000. “Sunan Xiangzhen Qiye de Fazhan yu Sikao.” 
Yanjiu Tantao 5: 8-9. 
2000/Sunan Chen, Jiansheng. 2000. “’Sunan Moshi’ de Shichanghua Gaizao.” 
Caijing Kexue 4: 100-104. 
2000/Sunan Gu, Songnian. 2000. “Sunan Moshi: Shi yijing Lishi Zhongjie, 
haishi zai Chuangxin Yanjin?” Jiangnan Luntan 12: 16-17. 
2000/Wenzhou Yao, Heping. 2000. “’Xin Wenzhou Moshi’ Daibiaozhe 
Zhongguo Jingji Tizhi Gaige de Zhongyao Quxiang.” Zhongguo 
Jidian Gongye 17: 35. 
2000/Wenzhou Jin, Xiangrong. 2000. “Duozhong Zhidu Bianqian Fangshi bing 
Cunzai he Zhejin Zhuanhuan de Gaige Daolu.” Zhejiang Daxue 
Xuebao 30(4): 138-145. 
2000/Wenzhou Qing, Jiangbei. 2000. “’Wenzhou Moshi’ Tiaozhan Xianxing 
Ganbu Renshi Zhidu.” Dangdai Jingji 8: 16-17. 
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2000/Wenzhou Zong, Changqing. 2000. “Wenzhou Moshi: Dianran Jingji de 
Zaisheng zhi Huo.” Gaige yu Lunli 12: 46-50. 
2000/Wenzhou Ma, Jinlong. 2000. “Wenzhou Moshi de Yanbian yu Chuangxin.” 
Jiangsu Gaige 1: 34-35. 
2004/Sunan Li, Ke. 2005. 2005. “Cong ‘Sunan Moshi’ dao ‘Xin Sunan 
Moshi’.” 2005. Sunan Keji Kaifa 8: 9-10. 
2005/Sunan Chen, Shuyu. 2005. “Cong ‘Liangge Fayang Di’ Kan Wuxi 
Minying Jingji de Fazhan.” Jiangnan Luntan 5: 34-36. 
2005/Sunan Hong, Yingxing. 2005. “Sunan Moshi de Xin Fazhan he Difang 
Zhengfu de Zhuanxing.” Jingji Yanjiu Cankao 72: 23-27. 
2005/Sunan Cao, Baoming. 2005. “Quyu Jingji Shehui Xietiao Fazhan:  ‘Xin 
Sunan Fazhan Moshi’ de Fenxi yu Jieshi.” Jianghai Xuekan 4: 67-
72. 
2005/Sunan Song, Yanqi. 2005. “Jiedu Xin Sunan Moshi.” Xiao Chengzhen 
Jianshe 1: 68-69, 72. 
2005/Wenzhou Fang, Liming, and Xi, Congqing. 2005. “Wenzhou Moshi: 
Neihan, Tezheng yu Jiazhi.” Zhejiang Daxue Xuebao 35(3): 174-
178. 
2005/Wenzhou Wang, Huabing. 2005. “Wenzhou Moshi Yanhua yu Fazhan 
Wenti Yanjiu Zongshu.” Jingji Congheng 2: 74-76. 
2005/Wenzhou Liu, Lunsan. 2005. “’Wenzhou Moshi’ Bianxing.” Chaoshang 
Zhoukan 32: 27-28. 
2005/Wenzhou Ge, Jianxin. 2005. “Wenzhou Minying Jingji Fazhan de Qishi.” 
Dangdai Jingji 12: 30 
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2005/Wenzhou Li, Guohong. 2005. “Wenzhou Minying Jingji Xin—Lun Fazhan 
Zhide Guanzhu.” Zhejiang Jingji 21: 38-39. 
 
 
The choice of 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005, was, apart from the fact that the 
journal database began in 1985, premised on two other factors.  The first relates to 
China’s Five-Year Plans.  One of these plans began in each of the years studied.  
These plans are Chinese Communist Party initiatives intended to establish the 
development framework and strategy for the period to which they relate.  During the 
period considered, the fifth (1976-1980), through the tenth (2001-2005) Five-Year 
Plans were of relevance.  Contents of the plans are generally already known prior to 
their taking effect.  The second, and even more important reason, relates to China’s 
National Party Congresses, which also take place every five years, meeting sometime 
between September and November of the year in which they are held.  The Party 
Congress is (at least on paper) the highest body within the Communist Party in China.  
The Congresses of interest here were the ones taking place in 1977 (the Eleventh Party 
Congress), 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, and 2002 (the Sixteenth Party Congress).  They 
were of relevance because major policy changes generally take place shortly before 
(and sometimes, but less often, just following) these congresses.  During the period 
under study here (1978-2005), major points of change occurred in 1978, 1984, 1988, 
1991, 1996, and 2003.  Therefore, for the years selected, major policy trends would 
have already been evident throughout the nation, as well as in Wenzhou and Sunan, 
the two places of interest.  Any impacts associated with these policy trends 
(assuming they exist) should be able to be ascertained within the journal writings 
reviewed.   
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As previously mentioned, I begin the case study by first examining the local 
institutional logic situation.  I do this by relying primarily on descriptions of the 
models contained within two books, Wenzhou Moshi yu Fuyu zhi Lu, which discusses 
the early situation of the Wenzhou Model, and Sunan Moshi yu Zhifu zhi Lu, focusing 
on the Sunan Model.  Both books were published under the auspices of the Shanghai 
Academy of Social Sciences.  Based on the descriptions of these books, as well as a 
few other supplementary resources, I provide general outlines of the models and their 
resulting local institutional logics.  I then examine the higher-order institutional logic 
situation.  The approach I use is similar to that applied by several others pursuing 
research on institutional logics (Fligstein 1990; Ramirez, Soysal and Shanahan 1997; 
Ruef and Scott 1998; and, Thornton and Ocasio 1998).  The goal of this methodology 
was to determine whether and how macro-level institutional logics changed over time, 
framing the changes that occurred into a longitudinal history.  To do this I carried out 
a literature review of articles and books relating to China’s reform and past 
governance processes, unearthing information relating to the developments that 
occurred.  On the basis of this review, I constructed a history of the events taking 
place over the time period that were of relevance to the formation of higher order 
logics, particularly with respect to the nature and development of the two local 
institutional logics.   
 
LOCAL INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS—THE TWO MODELS 
THE SUNAN MODEL 
The Sunan Model originated in an area of southern Jiangsu Province, adjacent to 
Shanghai (an area referred to as Sunan).  This region, although characterized 
historically by high population densities, is one that from ancient times on has been a 
comparatively wealthy one, with fertile lands, high agricultural outputs, and an early 
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focus on industry.  Prior to liberation in 1949, the industrial output of Wuxi, one of 
the three principle areas making up the Sunan area, was ranked third in the nation, 
behind only the major urban areas of Shanghai and Guangzhou (Tao 1988:3).  Even 
after 1949, the region experienced significant industrial development, diversifying 
away from just a reliance on food processing and textile production, which had 
previously been the mainstays of its industrial economy (Tao 1988:5).  During the 
late 1950s and 1960s, the Sunan area benefitted from various policy changes.  The 
first was the implementation of the hukou guidelines.  These guidelines required that 
workers from agricultural areas, categorized as rural residents, who had previously 
been living and working in urban areas, return to their home areas.  Sunan had seen a 
large segment of its population migrate to Shanghai for work, and when the new 
policies forced these individuals to return to their rural homes, the returning 
individuals brought with them the experiences and networks of personal relations that 
they had gained in the more developed Shanghai urban environment.  The second 
change occurred later, taking place during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), and 
related to a policy called the “go and work in the countryside or mountain areas” 
movement, which encouraged educated urban youth to move to rural areas and apply 
their talents to the development of these areas.  Given Sunan’s proximity to 
Shanghai, many Shanghai youth were sent there.  They brought to the area a wealth 
of talent, resulting in noticeable benefits for commune industrial development.  The 
benefits related not only to the youths’ talents, but again also to the fact that the 
transfers helped in the formation of new ties between Shanghai state-operated 
enterprises (SOEs), and Sunan commune-managed industry.  These factors, 
combined with state policies in the 1970s promoting the growth of industry within the 
agricultural areas, as well as Sunan’s ease of interaction with Shanghai businesses, 
promoted the growth of brigade (shengchan dadui) and commune (gongshe) 
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businesses.  The focus taken in this development was one associated with using 
industry to make up for the shortcomings of agriculture (yi gong bu nong) and the use 
of industry to develop agriculture (yi gong jian nong) (Tao 1988:27).  At the time, the 
agriculture-related industrial production of the SOEs was not sufficient to keep up 
with the quickly expanding needs of the agricultural areas, and the commune firms 
helped to resolve this problem, manufacturing things like agricultural equipment and 
tools that could be used by the communes in upgrading their systems of production.  
In addition, by undertaking its own industrial production, Sunan alleviated problems 
associated with the “scissors movement” (jian dao cha), in which urban areas would 
use their privileged positions to extract resources from agricultural communities, 
processing these resources, and benefiting greatly in terms of the price markups made 
prior to the sale of these products to other areas (Tao 1988:28).  In this sense, the 
urban areas gained greatly, with few of the resulting profits being seen by the 
agricultural areas.  The agricultural areas therefore reacted in ways intended to 
improve their own situations, establishing their own businesses.  Given the political 
climate of the time, the firms that developed were commune- and/or brigade-managed 
ones.  Following early 1980’s disbanding of the brigades and communes under de-
collectivization, the towns and villages took over management of these enterprises.  
Political and economic responsibilities, which previously had both been concentrated 
in the communes and brigades, were to be split up.  The intention was to transfer 
commune and brigade governmental functions to the town and village governments, 
while shifting their economic functions to the town and village economic committees, 
respectively (Jacobs 1985:110, 111).  In most areas, however, this split did not occur, 
and government and economic activities remained intertwined.  The firms continued 
to be politically managed, but became known as town and village enterprises (TVEs). 
Regarding the Sunan Model, itself, Tao cites five key factors as characterizing 
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the framework:  1) the local collective economy as its core part; 2) the TVE as the 
principal organizational form; 3) a developmental foundation predicated on 
coordinated development of the agricultural, industrial and service economies; 4) an 
economy characterized by inter-regional economic cooperation (primarily in the form 
of expanding networks of relations encompassing the urban and rural areas, but also 
between rural areas with one another as well); and, 5) the goal of egalitarian wealth 
distribution (1988:12-20).  The Sunan Model accepted the notion of the development 
of the commodity economy (another name for capitalist forms), with the goal of the 
elimination of poverty in the countryside and riches for all (Tao 1988:357).  Because 
there existed a surplus of labor within the countryside, a primary purpose behind the 
establishment of TVEs was to provide local workers with jobs.  Due to their early 
beginnings and close ties to the SOEs, the Sunan TVEs often used SOE management 
practices and organizational forms as blueprints for their development (Tao 1988:144).  
As such, Sunan-area, locally run public firms tended to be of large scale and multi-
functional, encompassing a wide array of activities within them.  They also tended to 
be bureaucratic and hierarchical, emphasizing coordinated direction.  People 
generally acted as they were told.  Of particular importance were activities relating to 
the supply of inputs and the sale of outputs (Tao 1988:140).  Emphasis was placed on 
established networks of interaction, particularly with out-of-area outsiders, rather than 
on impersonal market relations.   
 
THE WENZHOU MODEL 
The Wenzhou Model originated in Wenzhou City, located in the southeastern part of 
Zhejiang Province, at about the north-south midpoint of China’s eastern coast.  The 
city has a history of being quite isolated from other areas, given the mountainous 
regions surrounding it on its northeastern, western, and southwestern peripheries, and 
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the Pacific Ocean to its east.  Although separated from other areas of China, the 
people of Wenzhou have a history of interacting with the outside.  During the Tang 
Dynasty the city had extensive trade with Japan, and during the Sung Dynasty its 
foreign trade interactions expanded to include Korea and Cambodia as well.  The 
products sold to these outsiders included porcelain, wooden carvings, leather, 
embroideries, carvings, and various agricultural products and timber (Yuan 1987:2).  
At various times during the Yuan, Ming and Qing Dynasties the city also engaged in 
prosperous outside trade.  For example, in 1876, Wenzhou, by treaty agreement, 
became a legal port for outside trade.  This brought many foreigners to the city.  
Wenzhou’s residents became known for their trading abilities, with Sun Yat-Sen 
commenting that the only thing limiting the area’s development was its transportation 
situation.  He recommended that the city, to foster its growth, be connected by rail 
with outside areas (Yuan 1987:3).  During the 1900s, up through liberation in 1949, 
Wenzhou continued to experience increases in its trade.  This growth was predicated 
on the following factors:  1) an excellent harbor; 2) an abundance of natural 
resources; 3) a commercial institutional foundation; 4) an abundance of Wenzhou 
natives diffused throughout the world, living in 47 overseas nations; 5) a tradition of 
excellence in handicrafts; and 6) much economic potential (Yuan 1987:4-5).  
Unfortunately, following liberation in 1949, Wenzhou’s potential went unused.  In its 
conflict with the Taiwan-based Nationalists, the government viewed it as a war-front 
area, investing little in the region, and generally ignoring it.  As a result, the 
Wenzhou port fell into disuse.  In 1976, the amount of official trade occurring at the 
port had fallen by 64.93% as compared to its amount in 1965 (Yuan 1987:6), and prior 
to the start of reforms in 1978, the city had become one of the poorest in Zhejiang.  
Wenzhou has always had a large population (5.61 million in 1978), but its population 
increases of 2.4% annually between 1950 and 1982 led all of Zhejiang (Liu 1992:698).  
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Wenzhou, however, also had comparatively little land for farming (78% of Wenzhou’s 
land is mountainous), significantly less land than that of already restricted resources in 
Sunan, and less by 2/3 the average, per-capita amount in China (Yuan 1987:18).  As 
a result, the Wenzhou people were quite poor.  In 1978, the average income of 
Wenzhou rural residents was only a third the average in Zhejiang Province (Parris 
1993:244).  A high percentage of the Wenzhou people, unable to make enough to 
survive in their local areas, frequently went to other places in search of work and 
sustenance.  Many local people, in an effort to survive, also engaged in illicit 
activities, like piracy and the smuggling of goods in from Taiwan for resale in other 
parts of China.  Such activities continued even during the time of Mao.  The city 
became known as a place undermining socialism by seeking a return to the capitalistic 
practices of the past.  A March 22, 1979 article in China’s national Xinhua 
Newspaper focused on the situation, citing Wenzhou as “a black template of 
capitalism” (ziben zhuyi de heiyanban), and “a counter-revolutionary intent on the re-
establishment of an old order” (fan geming fubi) (Xinhua News Agency Reporters 
1977:2).  Thus, unlike Sunan, Wenzhou was known as a place involved in activities 
not in accord with accepted theories of socialist development.   
From the start of its post-reform development, Wenzhou engaged in private-
based activity.  But, how was it able to take part in such practices given the nature of 
the political environment of the time?  Liu (a political scientist) notes four reasons 
for this ability:  1) consensus among top leaders that poorer areas be given autonomy 
in developing themselves; 2) the active support of a group of central government 
leaders, the most important of whom was Wan Li, an official with close ties to Deng 
Xiaoping; 3) strong backing from regional leaders, particularly officials in Shanghai; 
and, 4) local political support (Liu 1992:703-705).  One other reason for Wenzhou’s 
unique development was its separation from other places.  At the time, society was 
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still relatively closed.  People in China’s cities did not know what was taking place in 
more isolated regions.  Another reason was the 1978 reforms, which freed up 
economic activity, and also created a huge surplus of workers.   Because, with 
higher levels of emerging productivity, fewer workers were required to till the land, a 
means had to be found to deal with this surplus labor problem, which in Wenzhou was 
estimated to have been more than 880,000 workers.  Unlike Sunan, the development 
of Wenzhou’s commune system of businesses had been minimal, and there was also 
no major urban center, like Shanghai, from which to draw expertise and establish 
easily fashioned supply, production, and sales networks.  Existing businesses could 
not absorb the emerging huge mass of workers, nor did they have the funds needed to 
expand.  There was also not enough time for the local state to engage in new business 
formation.  A quick remedy to existing problems had to be found.  This necessitated 
that the Wenzhou people rely on themselves. 
The resources and technology available to start up a household enterprise were 
not significant.  But, local traditions existed with respect to handicraft production and 
concerning the undertaking of commercial activity in outside areas.  An 
entrepreneurial mindset was likewise present and the Wenzhou people were not afraid 
of hardship or of failure.  They already possessed little and failure would simply 
return them to their starting positions.  Success would engender great change, 
however.  What means did Wenzhou’s private entrepreneurs use to start up and 
operate their household businesses?  Yuan cites the following:  1) independently run 
ventures; 2) the “gua hu” practice, or the borrowing by illegal business types of the 
operating rights of legally sanctioned ones; 3) involvement in vertically structured 
cooperative relations, whereby Wenzhou household firms would provide specialized 
production services to already established firms; 4) agreeing, via contractual relations 
and for an agreed-to fee, to take over existing businesses, particularly state-run ones, 
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from those who no longer wanted to operate them; and, 5) networks of cooperative 
relations in which a number of businesses would work together, with each taking on 
one responsibility of a larger production goal (1987:24-26).  Wenzhou’s independent 
operators, as a means to market their products, relied on specialized markets and 
professional sales people.  Technology was not an emphasis, though price was.  The 
environment was very competitive, and stressed a “survival of the fittest” mentality.  
If someone failed, the expectation was that they would learn from their experience and 
try again.  Businesses were small and easily adjustable to changes in the environment.  
Individual achievement was of focus.  Early on, the government played a role of 
general oversight, but not direct involvement.  When problems occurred the people 
were expected to solve them on their own.  For example, in the absence of capital 
resources, private (and still illegal) banks emerged to service peoples’ needs.   
Again, institutional logics are “the socially constructed, historical patterns of 
material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals 
produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and 
provide meaning to their social reality” (Thornton and Ocasio 1999:804).  They act 
to set the tone for activity, promoting generally recognized, collectively adhered to 
parameters of action, and serving as shared assumptions about what is acceptable and 
what is not.  As can be seen above, the institutional logics of the Sunan and Wenzhou 
Models differed substantially.  Table 2.2 summarizes these differences. 
 
TABLE 2.2:  SUNAN AND WENZHOU LOCAL INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS  
Characteristic Sunan  Wenzhou  
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Table 2.2 (Continued) 
-History Relatively wealthy area, with 
strong agricultural focus, but 
with comparatively early 
involvement in industrial 
production 
Ongoingly poor region with need 
for outward focus, and 
development predicated on non-
agricultural activities, particularly 
handicrafts.  Residents engaged in 
various illicit activities aimed at 
their own survival. 
-Ownership State Individual 
-Production Focus Heavy Machinery, Textiles, 
Processing of Agricultural 
Goods 
Small Commodities 
-Reliance on Markets Weak Strong 
-Beliefs Collectivism Individualism 
-Values Egalitarianism Survival of the Fittest, Heavy 
Focus on Profits 
-Competitive Focus Moderate Strong 
-Legal Orientation Relatively Strong Relatively Weak 
-Primary Organizational 
Form 
Town and Village Enterprise Household-Based Firm 
-Preferred 
Organizational Scale 
Large Small 
-Intra-Organizational 
Relations 
Hierarchical Direct Contact 
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Table 2.2 (Continued) 
-Organizational Focus All Encompassing and Self 
Sufficient 
Specialized 
-Networks of Relations Strong Ties with Shanghai 
State Owned Enterprises 
Cooperative among Own People 
-Role of Government Extensive Involvement Early on focus on oversight 
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CHINA’S HIGHER-ORDER INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS:  1978-2005 
Based on a historical analysis of the 1978-2005 period of interest here, in a specific 
sense, early on there did not exist any clear consensus regarding acceptable forms of 
action.  One reason for this was an intentionally enacted diffusion in the focus of 
action, in the form of a decentralization movement.  This was a result of 1980-
ratified programs aimed at revenue sharing and a dispersal of administrative 
responsibilities.  In turn, local areas, in the aftermath of fiscal reforms that 
engendered strong development-focused incentives, actively pursued their own, 
independent growth.  The methods adopted by local level officials were different in 
differing areas.  Throughout the nation, internal jockeying for ideological dominance 
was significant, not only among those engaged in innovative activity (i.e., officials 
promoting their unique models), but also among adherents of planning, who continued 
to fight for their positions of power.  The economist, Chen Yun, was the leader of the 
planning faction.   
Proponents of markets, led by China’s new leader, Deng Xiaoping, who in 1977 
had taken over the top position in China’s Communist Party’s Poltiburo Standing 
Committee, had to be careful in the approaches they took.  On the one hand, they 
needed to make sure not to completely alienate powerful members of the planning 
group.  Even so, even minor reforms were “preceded by often intense debate and 
political dueling among reformers of all stripes, as well as between the reformers on 
the one hand and more orthodox elements in the Party, opposed to the progressive 
dismantling of socialism in China on the other” (Yusuf and Nabeshima 2006:4-5).  
Still, both groups also recognized that a basic level of unity needed to be maintained in 
order to keep society from becoming unstable, something which everyone feared most.  
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But, there were also other reasons why markets could not be immediately engendered.  
One was that such action would undermine the status of the party, amounting “to a 
confession of total economic incompetence” (Woo 1999:55).    Another influencing 
factor was that China’s leaders were, themselves, not particularly clear as to the course 
of action they should follow (Woo 1999:55).  As a result, “For much of the 1980’s 
Chinese reforms proceeded in an ad hoc manner under the nonstrategy of ‘groping for 
stones to cross the river’” (Yang 2004:7-8).   
Still, there did exist a general framework regarding how the reforms should 
proceed, and this framework was successful in establishing an overall institutional 
logic that stipulated what was, at least on the surface, going to be allowed and what 
was not.  This structure emerged during the December 1978 Third Plenum of the 11th 
Central Committee, which many view as the start of China’s recent reform movement.  
What arose was the assertion that economic reforms should be a primary focus of 
action, and that these reforms should be focused on achieving the Four 
Modernizations, goals that had in 1975 been established by the former Premier, Zhou 
Enlai.  The Four Modernizations called for advancements in agriculture, industry, 
science and technology, and defense.  Another result of the Third Plenum meeting 
was that a new expectation existed that the emerging reforms should be tied to action 
in line with the Four Cardinal Principles, stressing maintenance of the socialist path, 
continuation of a democratic dictatorship of the people (renmin minzhu zhuanzheng), 
alignment with Marxist-Leninist-Mao ideologies (makesi liening zhuyi maozedong 
sixiang), and reliance on the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.  Although 
such guidelines were broad in their approaches and were thus open to differing 
interpretations, they still conveyed three clear messages to the people of China:  1) 
the party’s legitimacy would be closely tied to economic achievement; 2) promotions 
in leadership positions would be linked with the ability to deliver economic results; 
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and, 3) the ideological purity of the party and the party’s continued dominance over 
political issues would be an inherent part of any economic action (Woo 1999:11).  
Regarding ideology, the results of the meeting communicated a sense that emphasis on 
past planning-movement philosophies would continue.  Meeting publications 
stressed ideologies based on egalitarianism, cooperative economic efforts, 
hierarchically defined action, and endeavors aimed at self-sufficiency (Woo 1999:17).  
These assertions set the tone of public discourse, and although economist Dong 
Fureng in 1979 suggested the need for privatization efforts as a means to increase 
economic efficiency and adaptability, a policy that in the 1990s ended up garnering 
strong support, because of the political and economic climate prevailing at the time his 
remarks were not taken seriously (Woo 1999:55). 
Still, between December 1978 and August 1988 there was a general and ongoing 
trend favoring the expansion markets.  One reason for this was the intentional efforts 
by market proponents framing market concepts in terms of socialist principles.  For 
example, during the Communist Party’s 12th Congress in September 1982, Party 
Secretary, and market supporter, Hu Yaobang, asserted that “Material civilization 
provides an indispensable foundation for socialist spiritual civilization…Each is the 
condition and objective of the other” (Hu, quoted in Zhang, 1996:46).  At the same 
time, Deng Xiaoping reiterated his notion of “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” 
a concept that stressed the need for development as a facilitator of socialism.  In 
1984, Deng pushed through the first part of a second round of reforms (the first round 
having been those reforms beginning in 1978, which included the 1980-81 approval 
and implementation of the household responsibility system, which in 1978 originated 
in Fengyang County, Anhui Province, as well as the 1980 fiscal and administrative 
reforms).  The framework of the May 1984 changes was the “Provisional Regulations 
on Expanding the Autonomy of Enterprises,” which encompassed a policy known as 
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the dual-track system, and provided managers of state owned enterprises (SOEs) with 
greater freedoms to oversee and manage the firms for which they were held 
responsible.  One motivation behind this legislation was the 1980-1981 Polish labor 
strikes.  The Polish uprisings had the effect of making conservatives realize the need 
for a departure from overly rigid Soviet-style programs, which had led to problems in 
Poland.  There arose an awareness that the conservative’s own legitimacy depended 
on continued strong growth, and that over-regulation would impact negatively the 
overall situation (Woo 1999:37).  The reforms, apart from offering increased 
freedoms to SOEs, also freed up activity associated with the rise of the town and 
village enterprises (TVE).  The TVE changes were extremely significant in providing 
legitimacy to the TVE form (Wong 1988:12).  But, the consequences of these actions 
were different than had been expected.  Rather than improving the situation of the 
SOEs, SOE performance actually declined, said to have been negatively impacted by 
outcomes associated with Janos Kornai’s “soft budget constraint” phenomenon, 
wherein free of investment constraints, possessing easy access to investment funds 
(through China’s state banks), and facing no negative impacts should they fail, SOE 
managers invested recklessly, driven by incentives premised on self gain (Woo 
1999:37).  The changes are said to have served as the precursor for massive increases 
in state-related corruption activity (Meaney 1991:124).  The TVEs, however, quite 
unexpectedly, experienced strong success, prompting Deng Xiaoping to say in 1987 
that, “What took us by surprise was the development of township and village 
industries” (Deng, quoted in Woo, 1999:14).  The numbers of TVEs increased 
significantly, rising from 1,346 in 1983 to almost ten times this amount in 1985 (Wang 
2007:8).  Though the success of the TVEs was touted as evidence of the progress 
being made, in reality the situation was a sign of the still constrained nature of market 
reform.  Organizational entrepreneurs preferred the TVE, a type of state enterprise, 
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because it offered them protection from indiscriminate attacks.  Such attacks were 
often severe, particularly early on, because “Rural enterprises were viewed as 
disruptors of macroeconomic stability and greedy grabbers of production inputs that 
could have been used for SOEs” (Lai 2006:34).  That is, in the absence of private 
investment protecting formal law, planning activists, of which there were still many, 
motivated by widespread anti-private property sentiments, often attacked firms that 
did not possess strong government ties (Qian 1999:12).  Such attacks were especially 
prevalent during various periods of reform pullback, for example the “anti-spiritual 
pollution campaign” of 1983, the “anti-bourgeois liberalization campaign” of 1987, 
and after the Tiananmen Incident of 1989” (Qian 1999:12).  But, businesspersons 
paid a price for their government protection.  Numerous reports surfaced discussing 
the practice by local governments of arbitrary extractions from the enterprises, monies 
that would then be used by the governments for their own purposes (Wong 1988:23).  
TVE situations were thus characterized by much uncertainty. 
October 1984 saw the announcement by China’s Central Party Committee of a 
second phase of the second round of reforms.  Emerging changes reduced the number 
of items that were subject to planning, further increased SOE freedoms, and promoted 
greater opening to the outside world (Meaney 1991:124).  Also, in an accompanying 
“Central Party Committee Resolution on Economic System Reform,” party leaders 
declared that enterprise reform would now be a primary focus of Party work (Lin 
2001:32).  The leaders also stipulated that the new objective of reform was to 
sequentially “reduce the scope of mandatory planning and appropriately expand that of 
guidance planning” (Zhang 1996:112-113).  This signaled the beginnings of a revised 
government focus, one increasingly associated with governance as opposed to direct 
intervention.  Still, the means by which improvement should occur were still not well 
understood.  Much reliance on experimentation continued, again often resulting in 
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unanticipated and undesired results.  For example, a State Council policy of February 
1985, intended to promote improvements in the lending of bank funds, and which 
stipulated that any organization seeking bank loans must either establish its own 
collateral for such funds or find a guarantor to offer such help, ended up motivating 
local governments to act as guarantors for TVE borrowers.  The changes simply 
encouraged a closer collaboration between local governments and the TVEs in their 
areas, since local governments increasingly acted as the guarantors of TVE bank 
loans.  This further aggravated the problem of soft constraints, in that borrowing 
firms, protected by local governments, did not face the level of risks that they should 
have.  In addition, another result was that there was “no easily identifiable party 
liable for the [TVE] debt” (Oi 1999:624).  Governments could renounce 
responsibility, with the banks unable to do anything.  The situation of banks suffered 
as a result.  This was a problem that would have ominous future consequences. 
Difficulties resulting from well-intentioned actions, but ones that engendered 
undesired results, were increasingly becoming a subject of concern.  The results of 
new arising freedoms certainly did not adhere to the notions of market reformers, and 
their Western advisors (i.e., officials from the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, 
and the like), which asserted that increased actor autonomy should result in ever better 
results.  The simple fact was that the ongoing freedom-directed changes were 
engendering poorly thought out investments, inflation, and corruption.  The problem 
was that no checks and balances existed.  The growing scale of unethical conduct by 
unregulated managers aimed at self-enrichment was generating a sense among the 
common people that the values of society were being eroded.  This was particularly 
the case given that society’s values, in an effort to placate the planning faction, had 
continued to be premised on philosophies popular during earlier periods, and stressed 
notions like egalitarianism and action for the common good, concepts quite unlike 
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those of inequality and individualism more aligned with markets.  By the end of 
1985, open signs of discontent, in the form of social unrest, had begun to emerge 
(Woo 1999:39).  This unrest grew larger and more widespread towards the end of 
1986 (Woo 1999:39).  The discord, combined with rising inflation, and various other 
unfavorable reactions to reforms resulted in a view that things were moving too 
quickly, and by 1986 calls were again being made for a retreat from change.  In turn, 
“The liberal faction was in serious political trouble…because the party elite was 
particularly concerned about a Polish–style uprising developing from the student 
unrest” (Woo 1999:14).  By January 1987, planning supporters had succeeded in 
getting reformer, Hu Yaobang, dismissed from his position as Communist Party 
Secretary.  At the 13th Party Congress, held in October of 1987, Hu’s fellow 
reformer, Zhao Ziyang, previously China’s Premier, replaced him, while a protégé of 
Chen Yun, Li Peng, took over Zhao’s former position.  The conservatives now had 
regained the foothold to power they desired.  Even so, the Congress continued to be 
largely liberal in its tone, and was notable for the fact that it included an assertion that 
a role for private enterprise exists in the development of a socialist society (Han and 
Pannell 1999:278).  In addition, the Congress called for China to pursue a “socialist 
planned commodity economy” (Yang 2004:7).  The term “commodity economy” was 
known by China’s people to be associated with capitalism.  The change in 
terminology was a situation that did not sit favorably with planning adherents. 
Party Secretary Zhao, however, did not pay a great deal of attention to the 
feelings of the planners, and the sense was that following the 1987 Congress and into 
1988 the liberal agenda held sway.  Zhao continued to push for more market reforms, 
giving little regard to the levels of support for reforms throughout society.  In his 
actions, Deng Xiaoping supported him, though Deng’s role was more of a behind the 
scenes one, with Zhao being the public advocate of reforms, but exposed to criticism 
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should problems with the changes occur.  Even though Deng was not the public face 
of market reforms, however, his commitment to reform was strong and ongoing, even 
though at times he presented himself differently.   
In early 1988, Zhao, publicly, and Deng, behind the scenes, continued their push 
for market reforms.  In January and February of that year, Zhao sought to implement 
growth predicated on the development of the urban coastal areas into centers of 
export-oriented industry (Woo 1999:41).  His goal was to link TVEs into existing 
networks of international trade, a strategy that showed his understanding of the 
developmental successes of other economies in Asia (Woo 1999:41).  In accord with 
this strategy, in April 1988 the government approved the Law on Sino-Foreign 
Contractual Joint Ventures (Lai 2006: 49).  Unfortunately, Zhao did not stay in office 
long enough to see the results of his work, however, for by August 1988 inflation was 
out of control, having risen from 6% in 1986, to 7.3% in 1987, and 18.5 % in 1988 
(Woo 1999:40).  This was creating major social problems.  Unregulated spending 
by state-run enterprises, with access to seemingly limitless financial resources, had 
resulted in sharp increases in the existing money supply, and inflation and widespread 
anger throughout society were the result.  There was also a sense among a large 
segment of the common people that reforms were leading to unfair benefits for a 
certain segment of the population and that others were suffering.  The Party stripped 
Zhao of his role in economic management, and by September the government had 
begun to implement policies supported by the planning faction intended to deal with 
China’s overheating economy.  Social unrest continued, however, culminating in the 
June 1989 Tiananmen Incident when Zhao was unseated as Party Secretary, and 
replaced by centrist Jiang Zemin.  But, although between 1989 and 1990 the 
conservatives attempted to reassert themselves, and reinstitute planning, they were not 
successful.  Still, the economy went through a disrupting period of uncertainty.  The 
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Tiananmen Incident seems to have signaled the start of a different sort of 
governmental tendency, however. 
China’s leaders realized that changes would need to be made, particularly with 
respect to the existing fiscal situation.  The downfall of the Soviet Union in 1991 
brought a realization that government structures required rationalization, and 
beginning in 1992 China’s State Council began an effort to inaugurate various new 
regulatory agencies, an effort that continued into the early 2000s (Pearson 2005:302).  
There was also recognition that existing government-business relations could not 
continue unchanged.   This sense arose due to actions over the period between 1991 
and 1995 when state sector fixed asset investment increased by over 32% per year as 
compared to 12.2% between 1981-1985 and 15.8% from 1986-1990 (Yang 2004:67).   
Calls went out for greater separation between government and business, and for more 
of a focus on private enterprise.  Deng’s January-February 1992 “Southern Tour” 
(nanxun) was an indication that support existed for such changes, and signaled the 
lessening influence of ideological concerns.  From this point on private ownership 
became more and more acceptable.  In fact, because of the difficulty in sorting out 
their financial affairs, “by the early 1990s collectively owned enterprises were 
becoming liabilities rather than assets” (Oi 1999:624).  Another problem was that 
TVEs and SOEs were both beginning to experience similar problems, ones relating to 
bureaucratic management and the firms’ difficulties in adapting to new market 
conditions.  The conditions were right for changes to be made, and at the 14th 
Congress of the Communist Party held in October 1992, Party Secretary, Jiang Zemin, 
endorsed the concept of a “socialist market economy.”  This signaled a shift in the 
role of the state from one of hands on involvement to a focus centered more on macro-
level action, highlighting guidance and institution building.  The “emergence of the 
notion of ‘governance’ in China was accompanied by a critique of the system of 
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socialist planning and associated forms of government" (Sigley 2006:499).   
In November 1993, the Third Plenum of the Fourteenth Party Congress adopted 
a new set of reforms entitled the “Decision on Issues Concerning the Establishment of 
a Socialist Market Economic Structure.”  These reforms stipulated a new four-part 
strategy:  a rule-based framework, a focus on the construction of a set of market-
promoting institutions, clarified property rights, and new views regarding ownership 
(Qian 1999:23).  The focus was on enhancing the separation between business and 
government as well as on creating greater market transparency.  By the end of 1993, 
the government had readied specifics related to reforms of taxation and fiscal systems 
(Yang 2004:72), and it implemented these in 1994.  The reforms were primarily 
directed at increasing the ratios of government revenue to GDP and central 
government revenue to total government revenues (Zhang 2006:457), and included 
three measures meant to reinforce the hard budget constraints on local governments:  
1) major tax reform; 2) the requirement that local governments maintain balanced 
budgets; and, 3) reforms of the central bank, which lessened the ability of the local 
governments to influence loan distributions (Ahrens and Mengeringhaus 2006:95).  
The reforms were successful in increasing revenue flows to the central government, 
with 55.7% of collected revenues going to the center in 1994, as opposed to 22% in 
1993 (Zhang 2006:456).  What the reforms also did, however, was to increase the 
financial difficulties of the TVEs.  Local governments, unable to get out of paying 
taxes as they had in the past (Qian 1999:28) began indiscriminately exploiting the 
TVEs to resolve their own fiscal difficulties (Wang 2007:100-101).  The TVEs, 
given their property rights situations, were powerless to protect themselves.  This, 
however, encouraged the TVEs to engage in privatization efforts, and according to a 
November 4, 1994, China Daily article many began to separate themselves from local 
governments.  By the end of the decade almost complete privatization was the result 
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(Li and Rozelle 2003:987).  SOEs, particularly small and medium ones, also began to 
undergo privatization, with a “seize the large and release the small” policy in effect 
(Ahrens and Mengeringhaus 2006:91).  There was a general move towards 
privatization, and by 1997 the total number of TVE firms began to decline (Li and 
Rozelle 2003:981).  The trend towards a private economy was furthered by the fact 
that by 1997 many of the staunchest advocates of planning had already died.  The 
progress being made was akin to Paul Samuelson’s remark that “true progress in 
economics is made funeral to funeral” (quoted in Woo 1999:46). 
1997 witnessed not only a growing trend towards a private market economy, but 
also the death of Deng Xiaoping in February, and the start of the Asian Financial 
Crisis as well.   In addition, in September 1997 history was made when, during the 
15th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party the role of the state sector was 
demoted to simply a “pillar of the economy,” while officials designated the private 
economy as an “important component of the economy” (Qian 1999:34).  Another 
breakthrough of the Congress was the increased emphasis given to the rule of law 
(Qian 1999:35), and to administrative reform.  By March of 1998, new reformist 
Premier, Zhu Rongji, was calling for a reduction in central government personnel by 
up to one half (Yang 2004:37).  These reductions involved cutting the number of 
central government ministries from 45 to 29 (with similar actions taking place at the 
local level in 1999) (Qian 1999:30), as well as efforts made at continued banking 
reform.  Attempts were also made to curb corruption, though Zhu Rongji’s efforts in 
this area were largely limited by outside interference.  At the 9th National People’s 
Congress held in March 1998, delegates also endorsed a new emphasis on increased 
privatization (Zhang and Donaldson 2008:29).   
The rising status of private ownership became apparent in March 1999, when the 
Chinese Constitution added Article 11, changing a clause’s original wording from “the 
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private economy is a supplement to public ownership” to “the non-public sector, 
including individual and private businesses, is an important component of the socialist 
market economy.”  The impact was immediate, with local governments becoming 
less restrictive regarding private enterprises (Qian 1999:25).  A primary reason 
pushing forward reforms was competition from other nations, particularly other East 
Asian and Eastern European countries.  China wanted to maintain its status as a 
development leader (Qian 1999:26).  China’s becoming a member of the WTO in 
December 2001 was another sign of China’s commitment to rationalization and 
internationalization.  Significant increases in FDI during the period were evident as 
well. 
In November 2002, Hu Jintao replaced Jiang Zemin as Communist Party 
Secretary, and almost immediately the new government began to take actions to 
correct various developmental problems associated with the Jiang period (Lin 2008:8).  
The National People’s Congress, of March 2003, approved the plans of the new 
Premier, Wen Jiabao, providing for an increased emphasis on rationalization, rather 
than a continued stress on downsizing (Yang 2004:60).  In October 2003, during the 
Third Plenum of the 16th Party Congress calls were made for reforms in corporate 
governance.  The government began to try and curb speculation, particularly in the 
real estate sector, and also placed greater focus on fiscal policy, allowing, in July 2005 
the nation’s currency, the RMB, to move away from a strict peg to the U.S. dollar.  
There were also increasingly active efforts to engage in outward investment.  In 
addition, efforts at privatization continued.  In 2004, the Chinese Constitution 
stipulated private property rights as inviolable (Ahrens and Mengeringhaus 2006:91).  
At the 5th Plenary Session of the Chinese Communist Party’s 16th Central Committee 
held in October 2005, the Chinese government continued to stress development, but 
added that such development should be “comprehensive, harmonious and sustainable” 
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(World Bank 2005:9).  Stress was put on creation of a harmonious society.  Greater 
emphasis was placed on stability and social issues.   
If summarizing higher-order institutional logics for the period from 1978-2005, 
what may be said?  For one thing, it is apparent that there was a growing acceptance 
of markets as a means of economic coordination.  Increasing recognition was also 
arising that markets require the institutionalization of certain basic institutions, such as 
private property, property rights, and freedom of action.  At the same time, however, 
there was also a growing realization that markets cannot always police themselves, 
and while planning restricted the efforts of social actors too much, unconstrained 
markets did not seem to work effectively either.   China’s leaders concluded that 
government was needed, but in a changed form.  China moved increasingly from “a 
notion of ‘government’  (zhengfu) as a task of ‘planning’ (jihua) and ‘administration’ 
(xingzheng) to one that involves ‘management’ (guanli) and ‘governance’ (zhili)” 
(Sigley 2006:496).  This was not a smooth process, however, and reforms of reforms 
were constantly being made.   Particularly during the early part of the process, action 
moved in a fangshou pattern wherein freedoms were allowed, and when their results 
proved to be more than had been expected, reverses then occurred.  Periods of reform 
occurred in 1979, 1984, and 1987-1988, while drawbacks emerged in 1981-1982, 
1986, and 1989 (Naughton 2007:97).  Table 2.3 provides a general summary of 
changes in higher-order institutional logics taking place over the 1978-2005 period. 
 
TABLE 2.3:  HIGHER-ORDER INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS:  1978-2005  
 
Time Summary of Higher-Order Institutional Logics 
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Table 2.3 (Continued) 
1978-1988 Newfound emphasis on economic development, particularly 
within political realm.  Increasing acceptance of markets over 
time period, though much inconsistency in situation throughout.  
Efforts aimed at decentralization resulted in wide variation in 
different areas’ approaches, with much experimentation present.  
Ideologies generally continued to be predicated on those of 
planned period, with emphasis on egalitarianism, cooperation, 
and self-sufficiency.  Even so, role of ideology depended very 
much on the geographic area being considered.  Significant 
regionalism and protectionism existed.  Uncertainty was also 
high.  Among rulers, particularly following Polish labor strikes 
of 1980-81, strong sense that political control must be 
maintained, but also that interests of people must be considered.  
If not, system problems might result. 
1988-1991 Emerging dissatisfaction with reform situation.  General sense 
that reforms were not in accord with existing ideologies, 
resulting in unfair benefits for some.  High rates of inflation 
created difficulties for many, resulting in increasing social 
unrest.  Pause in reform movement.  Largely successful 
efforts made to reign in growth and inflation. 
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Table 2.3 (Continued) 
1991-1997 1991 fall of Soviet Union brought realization that changes 
would need to be made.  Efforts begun to reinstitute more 
central control over nation, though emphasis became 
increasingly one of emphasizing governance as opposed to 
direct intervention.  Inability of Central government to control 
unregulated investments by state enterprises and TVEs pushed 
forward notions that government and business must be 
separated, and that more reliance on markets was needed.  
Increasing acceptance of markets, with less stress on past 
ideologies.  Efforts also made to expand central-government 
resources via fiscal reforms and revamping of tax system.  In 
addition, actions taken to establish basic institutions needed for 
market economy.  Beginnings of privatization movements. 
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Table 2.3 (Continued) 
1997-2002 More emphasis on administrative reform.  Complete 
abandonment of socialist ideologies, particularly notion of 
egalitarianism.  Size of government greatly reduced and 
government’s focus modified, with less direct government 
involvement in economy.  Increased attention given to rule of 
law, with sharp drawback from socialist forms.  Added stress 
put on privatization, and almost complete privatization achieved 
by end of decade.  Significant job losses resulted, along with 
increases in corruption.  Although Premier Zhu attempted to 
attack this corruption, his efforts were undermined to a large 
extent by political forces.  Increased emphasis on opening up, 
with large increases in FDI. China’s 2001 WTO entry signaled 
efforts at internationalization. 
2002-2005 Jiang Zemin replaced by Hu Jintao.  Continued stress on 
development, but greater focus put on correcting imbalances 
within society, with emphasis on harmony.  Greater attention 
given to stability as well.  As part of movement to assert 
China’s international role, investors encouraged to invest 
internationally.  More attention directed to issues of corporate 
governance, with goal of increased levels of efficiency.  
Private property rights designated as inviolable.  Realization 
that more needed to be done to bring benefits of market society 
to all. 
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WENZHOU AND SUNAN THEORIZATIONS 
Again theorization refers to “the self-conscious development and specification of 
abstract categories and the formulation of patterned relationships” (Strang and Meyer 
1993:492).  Here I posit that theorization processes depend upon context.  That is, 
how actors theorize something cannot be completely abstracted away from the context 
of the theorizer and the situation he or she faces.  Actors in one context will theorize 
something differently than will actors in another context.  What the actors deem as 
important will also depend on the situations that have existed in the past, situations 
giving rise to expectations for conduct.  I also assume that based on a comparison of 
differences in the theorizations of different actors, the meanings that actors hold can 
be identified.  Here, to judge theorizations, I apply discourse analysis to two sets of 
articles, one set each for both Sunan and Wenzhou.  The articles chosen represent the 
writings of authors situated in the institutional contexts of the places about which they 
are writing.  I posit that due to these contexts, there should exist differences in the 
manner by which the authors theorize their situations, and that from these differences 
the meanings of action within the two areas may be found.  Since an accepted facet 
of social analysis is that action depends upon meaning, the presence of different 
meanings should indicate the existence of differing forms of action.  Finding 
evidence of differing forms of action would tie the discussion to the subject of 
institutional change.  This is because differing institutional logics at the local level 
should, even within the same overall field, then result in dissimilar forms and patterns 
of change, even in a situation where all members of the field are impacted by the same 
higher-order institutional logics. 
From the results of the discourse analysis, it was apparent that, while there were 
some similarities in the two theorizations, there were many more differences.  As far 
as similarities, both of the theorizations put heavy stress on economic development.  
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Regardless of the time period of the theorizations, this aspect of their framing did not 
change.  This was in line with higher-order institutional logics stressing such a 
theme.  The differences between the two sets of theorizations were more significant, 
however.  One primary difference was that the relations of the two sets of 
theorizations to changes in higher order institutional logics were very much unlike.  
In Sunan-area theorizations, the pattern followed was quite similar to the pattern of 
changes in higher order institutional logics, a similarity that was very systematic in its 
nature.  When changes in higher-order institutional logics occurred, the Sunan 
theorizations tended to reflect these changes.  This was not the case for Wenzhou 
theorizations, however.  In fact, the Wenzhou theorizations stayed largely the same 
throughout the 1985-2005 period, with some change evident only in 2005.  The 
changes in higher-order institutional logics had little influence on its theorizations. 
A reason for this difference might be because, from the start, the theorizations of 
Wenzhou were ones focusing on market forms, private ownership, and self-reliant 
development.  They were also largely devoid of ideology.  Early on, Wenzhou was 
for the most part isolated and thus less impacted by higher order institutional logics, 
and as it became more exposed to the outside world, its orientation was already largely 
in accord with the higher-order institutional logic changes.  For example, unlike 
Sunan, Wenzhou did not have to put greater focus on efforts at privatization, and the 
separation of its government from business.  These were features its form of 
development had included from the start.  Wenzhou had continuously stressed 
markets, business, and private activity.  Perhaps because of this, over the time period 
considered, the Wenzhou theorizations directed almost all of their attention to 
elements associated with industry/business, alone.  They put their overriding 
emphasis on the money-making efforts of Wenzhou businesspersons.  Discussions of 
the role of government, or regarding how Wenzhou might open up to or interact with 
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the outside world were minimal.  In the Wenzhou theorizations, there was also little 
discussion of quality of life issues.  This is in sharp contrast to the theorizations of 
Sunan, which, while also emphasizing economic development, focused on the role of 
government, the positives of public ownership, development predicated and dependent 
on relations with outside areas (in particular Shanghai), and the need for an overall 
betterment of society.  Unlike the Wenzhou theorizations, they put a heavy emphasis 
on ideology, stressing riches for all, and the role of the government in providing 
leadership and guidance.  They also, in contrast to Wenzhou, stressed multifaceted 
development across all sectors:  agriculture, business/industry and service, 
highlighting the need for cooperation with outside areas, as well as the need to rely on 
outside help, for example in the form of foreign direct investment.  The Wenzhou 
portrayals, in contrast, stressed the independence of the Wenzhou people.  They 
emphasized the ability of the Wenzhou people to overcome any difficulties before 
them.   
As time went on, the degree of change in the Sunan theorization approaches was 
also significantly greater than that for Wenzhou.  Again, the Sunan theorizations 
were generally in alignment with changes in higher-order institutional logics, and 
inherent within them was an increasing focus on the need for a greater acceptance of 
private business forms and the necessity of actions aimed at greater separation of 
business and government.  They ongoingly discussed existing problems, and how to 
solve those problems.  This was much less true of the Wenzhou theorizations, which 
to a large degree became increasingly boastful regarding Wenzhou successes and 
economic contributions.  The Wenzhou theorizations also tended not to focus on new 
problems or their solutions, but instead generally discussed the same problems 
throughout.  There was little sense that progress in systems or forms of action was 
being made.  This was very unlike the situation of the Sunan theorizations where, 
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five years after bringing up a problem, touted successes relating to the problem, with a 
focus on new problems.  The Sunan situation was far more dynamic than the 
Wenzhou one, with continual progress being made. 
Again, a reason for this might be the differing statuses of the governments in the 
two places.  In Sunan, theorizations put heavy emphasis on the role of government.  
From the start, government was the focus of action and involved in all activities.  
This was not the case in Wenzhou, where the greatest contribution of government was 
seen to be its ability to leave its people alone to engage in their business activities.  
Wenzhou theorizations focused on the efforts of the people, with little consideration of 
the role of government.  And, again, in Sunan there was a sense that change in 
government was to be ongoing.  The government moved from being involved in 
everything to an increasingly governance-focused role.  It continued to manage and 
provide guidance, but its direct involvement in business activity decreased sharply.  
There was little need for such change in Wenzhou, however, for there the 
government’s role had, from the start, been a minimal one.  In fact, in 2005, 
criticisms began to emerge in Wenzhou that the inability of the government to provide 
oversight was beginning to negatively impact Wenzhou.  Calls began to emerge that 
the government change its ways.   
 
THE ROLE OF MEANING 
Meaning is something frequently referred to, but seldom discussed in detail.  A 
consensus exists that meaning is a social construction (Glassner 2000:590), and is 
structural in form (Mohr 1998), dependent on the linkages among differing elements.  
How something is linked to something else determines what its meaning is.  As such, 
processes of classification, theorization, framing, and interpretation are critical to the 
determination of meaning.   From 1978 on, China’s higher-order institutional logics 
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were predicated on development.  But, at the local level, where institutional logics 
differed, it is apparent that what development meant to one group was what it meant 
for another group.  In Wenzhou, the structure of relations was an individually based 
one, necessitating the need to compete with others in a quest for survival.  The 
government had little status and because of the geographic environment and lack of 
help from higher realms of government, there were few resources to go around.  
People depended on their own efforts to get by.  The early developmental efforts in 
Wenzhou reflected this.  The institutional logics in Sunan differed substantially.  
There, the local governments had played a significantly greater role in helping the 
people achieve sustenance.  Early on, local Sunan governments had taken action to 
organize cooperative activities encouraging people to work together to achieve 
success.  But, resulting success was not one dependent on Sunan’s own efforts only.  
It also depended on help Sunan received from nearby urban communities, specifically 
Shanghai.  As in the situation of Wenzhou, the early developmental efforts of Sunan 
reflected its existing local institutional logics.  What is interesting, however, is that 
based on the theorization processes associated with development occurring, the 
meanings of development that existed in each of the two areas early on, persisted into 
the future.  For Wenzhou, this has meant a continuing dependence on the individual.  
There was also nothing systematic about the Wenzhou efforts.  Instead, they were 
tied to context and results.  Whatever worked in a particular situation would be relied 
upon, and what didn’t would be jettisoned.  Decisions were made at the individual 
level.  Hard work, risk-taking, and cooperation with friends and family while 
excluding others were the institutional fabric of action, and this mindset has 
maintained itself up to the present.  The situation in Sunan was from the beginning 
different.  There, government was in charge, and peoples’ efforts were much more 
coordinated into a larger whole.  People did as they were told, and although 
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deviations occurred, these deviations were ones tangential to more globally accepted 
realms of action.  As these realms of action changed, so did the manner by which 
actors at the local level pursued development.  Change was much more systematic in 
nature, with significant discussion taking place regarding the form that future actions 
would take.  The government led these discussions.  It did so in ways influenced by 
higher-order institutional logics.  The more collectively defined nature of action 
present in Sunan resulted in a significantly greater focus on a unified economic and 
social development.  In Sunan theorizations, writers placed significant focus on the 
social environment.  Again, this is a pattern that has continued up to the present. 
Traveling to Sunan and Wenzhou, one is immediately struck by the differing 
natures of existence in the two places.  Wenzhou is characterized by a sense of 
disorder not evident in Sunan.  The pace of life in Wenzhou is significantly faster, 
and there is a feeling of pressure that does not exist in Sunan, where life seems to 
move in more ordered ways.  Sunan existence also is more multi-faceted.  It is 
evident that greater consideration has been directed to quality of life issues.  At an 
organizational level, firms in Sunan, on average, tend to be bigger, with more 
rationalized forms of management.  The level of technical expertise is also higher 
than that of Wenzhou.  In addition, the diversity of organizational life is substantially 
more diverse, with many more firms owned and managed by outsiders, particularly 
foreigners, than is the case in Wenzhou.  The meaning of development has had an 
obvious impact on organizational results. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The stated goal of this paper was to investigate the manner by which meaning impacts 
organizational action.  The means used to do this was to rely on an investigation of 
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local and higher-order institutional logics coupled with an examination of processes of 
model theorization.  The results show that local institutional logics had a major 
impact upon processes of theorization.  Higher order institutional logics also affected 
resulting outcomes.  These effects were related to the designating of an allowed 
realm of action.  But, within this realm of action, results differed greatly.  This 
suggests that within any field of action, the institutional contexts at the local level are 
important.  To truly understand the nature of organizational action, then, these 
contexts must be considered.
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
EXTENDING LINKAGE BETWEEN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS AND 
SOCIAL STRUCTURE:  A CASE STUDY OF THE CELEBRITY 
CONSTRUCTION OF A CHINESE MARKETPLACE  
 
This paper examines the emergence of firm celebrity, an intangible asset, and 
competitive-advantage facilitator.  Institutional approaches have asserted that 
organizations in the same organizational field, located in comparable structural 
situations, become increasingly similar over time.  But, in any organizational field, 
firm differences also exist. Apart from research on intra-organizational factors, 
however, many processes of firm-differentiation have not received adequate attention.  
This paper considers three social constructions:  legitimacy, reputation, and status, 
investigating how they impact firm celebrity, a firm-differentiating factor.  It adopts a 
historical, relationally framed approach to show how agency and structure act to 
influence the nature of celebrity emergence.  
 
Recent calls by management scholars for a greater coherence between organizational 
analysis and social structure have yet to be fully heeded (Lounsbury and Ventresca 
2003).  There remains much work to be done to reap the benefits gained from an 
expanded understanding of the relationships between organizations and other 
relationally situated social-structures.  Many have complained about a lack of effort 
in this area (Dobbin 2008; Emirbayer and Johnson 2008).  An existing problem, 
however, has been a dichotomy in research positions, with those championing 
atomistic, individualistic accounts tending to separate themselves from individuals 
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promoting structural positions and vice versa (Heugens and Lander 2009:61).  Gaps 
exist.  
This study seeks to bridge these gaps.  Through an incorporation of the notion 
of fields, realms consisting “of all relevant actors in a social space” (Dobbin 2008:56), 
it combines issues of agency with notions of social structure to show how a 
hierarchical framework of social standing emerges (Vandenberghe 1999:53).  This 
involves a focus not only on agency, but also on how “structured structures…function 
as structuring structures” (Bourdieu, quoted in Vandenberghe 1999:48).  The paper 
posits that the motivation for actors to undertake structurally influencing actions is not 
only actors’ own hopes of achieving an improved action-environment for themselves, 
but also their cognizance, via an ongoing monitoring of their environment, of the 
competitive environments they face (White 1981; Granovetter 1985).  This 
influences the actions they choose and the norms they follow, and aligns with the 
conceptualizations of social-exchange theorists, who believe that the success of social 
norms depends on mechanisms inherent within ongoing social relationships (Nee and 
Ingram 1998:24).  
In its formulation, the paper relies upon an inductively founded case-study, 
drawing its principal strength from an integration of theory and interview results, to 
investigate the manner by which a chosen organization, one situated in a non-U.S. 
based environment, garnered competitive advantage in the form of firm celebrity 
(Rindova, Pollock, and Hayward 2006:66).  It heeds the suggestions of scholars 
advocating a heightened focus on the “natural history” of organizations, wherein an 
enhanced understanding of organizational change is achieved through a reliance on a 
temporally based perspective, stressing the manner by which organizational changes 
occur over time (Davis and Marquis 2005:333).  It also adopts a relational view 
(Emirbayer 1997; Emirbayer and Johnson 2008; White 1992), investigating the 
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processes of narration, presentation, and action relied upon by relevant actors in the 
construction of the in-focus structural form.  The paper’s principal emphasis is to 
examine the manner by which the celebrity-attainment process took place.  
A specific goal of the paper, one that is intended to help extend further the 
linkages between organizational analysis and social structure, is to improve 
understanding regarding the inter-relations of celebrity and three other socially 
constructed intangible assets: legitimacy, reputation, and status. Existing work on firm 
celebrity, apart from theorizing about the methods actors should rely upon to achieve 
celebrity for their organizations, has attempted to differentiate celebrity from these 
other constructs (Rindova et al. 2006).  It has not tried to relationally link celebrity 
with them. In this paper, however, the emphasis is on how processes of celebrity 
attainment depend upon their inter-relations with legitimacy, reputation, and status, 
showing inter-linkages not just at a particular instant, but also over time. Barney 
previously noted the utility of such an approach (2001:51).  
Another noteworthy aspect of the paper is that its empirical analysis deals with a 
non-U.S. situation.  The preponderance of existing, intangible-asset research has 
directed overwhelming attention to developments within the U.S., only.  The current 
study, due to its foreign focus, offers the potential to add to overall understanding by 
unearthing insights regarding places outside the U.S. For example, a key variable of 
U.S.-based research has been the market ties an actor has with other high-status actors 
(Benjamin and Podolny 1999; Han 1994).  These ties are said not only to promote 
information flow and resource acquisition, factors of critical importance to success 
within a market environment, but also to influence how others perceive an actor in 
terms of the actor’s quality and performance.  But the frameworks relied upon in 
these studies are premised on the existence of a strong market context. In economies 
transitioning from planning to markets, however, a situation of “politicized 
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capitalism” frequently exists (Nee and Opper 2007), with political connections 
especially critical to success.  In these locales ties to the government should thus be 
of more significance than would be the case in market economies, where prices play a 
more determining role (Nee and Opper 2007:107).  
The paper includes five sections: the present introduction and four other parts.    
Following this introduction is a discussion of celebrity, defining celebrity, and 
considering how firm-celebrity attainment has been characterized in existing literature.  
Past depictions have emphasized the role of the media, directing little attention to 
other important factors.  This paper, however, focuses on the role of additional 
celebrity-influencing constructs as well, detailing various assertions concerning the 
roles of such constructs in the celebrity-development process.  The third section 
considers the empirical results of the case study. It introduces the study’s subject, the 
Yiwu Small Commodities Market (subsequently referred to as Yiwu or the Yiwu 
marketplace), and outlines how it went from a situation of near anonymity to become 
China’s most famous center of trade.  Given that China now has more than 4,000 
marketplaces having total sales of over 100 million RMB (around USD15 million) 
annually (Song, Wang, and Wang 2008:3), this has been no simple task.  The fourth 
section focuses on the relevance of the Yiwu story to celebrity scholarship.  The 
paper concludes with a summary of its main points.  
 
FIRM CELEBRITY, EXISTING VIEWS OF ITS CONSTRUCTION, AND 
HOW LEGITIMACY, REPUTATION AND STATUS RELATE 
 
WHAT IS FIRM CELEBRITY? 
I define firm celebrity as the ability of a firm to garner significant attention from the 
public, while at the same time realizing “positive emotional responses from 
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stakeholder audiences” (Rindova et al. 2006:50).  Celebrity is a social construction.  
It is both a strategic resource (Barney 1991), and an intangible asset (Hall 1992).  
Strategic resources are valuable, rare, non-imitable (uneasily copied), and non-
substitutable forms of organizational property.  Intangible assets are possessions that 
cannot be touched or seen, but that have value.  Scholars have directed significantly 
more attention to intangible-assets like reputation, status and legitimacy than they 
have to celebrity (Rindova, Williamson, Petkova, and Sever 2005; Podolny 1993, 
2005; Fombrun and Shanley 1990; Suchman 1995; Deephouse and Carter 2005; 
Suddaby and Greenwood 2005).  Celebrity remains an under-researched topic.  
 
EXISTING FRAMEWORKS RELATING TO THE CONSTRUCTION OF FIRM 
CELEBRITY 
In fact, firm celebrity has received very little attention.  The attention it has received 
relates more to theory than to empirical investigations.  This is true of not only firm 
celebrity, but also of celebrity in general.  The only paper to discuss succinctly the 
topic of firm celebrity was a 2006, largely theoretical work by Rindova et al. entitled, 
“Celebrity Firms: The Social Construction of Market Popularity.”  Rindova et al. 
portray firm celebrity in relational terms, referring to it as “a property of [an] actor’s 
relationship with an audience, rather than a characteristic of the actor him/her/itself” 
(2006:51).  They contend that celebrity is different from other intangible assets, like 
reputation, status, and legitimacy, in at least three ways: its theoretical underpinnings, 
socio-cognitive foundations, and processes of emergence (Rindova et al. 2006:54).  
The Rindova et al. paper focuses mainly on how firm celebrity is unique as compared 
to these constructs.  
Two of the primary differences cited by Rindova et al. pertain to how celebrity is 
theorized, and to the manner by which firm celebrity comes into existence.  Although 
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studies relating to the three other intangible assets “focus on how a firm’s behaviors 
and performance are evaluated, assuming that the firm is already noticed” (Rindova et 
al. 2006:55), Rindova et al. assert that the focus of celebrity research is different.  
One difference is a lack of emphasis on evaluation (2006:55). They also posit various 
propositions pertaining to the means by which the celebrity-attainment process should 
successfully unfold, stressing the role of the media, and asserting that in order to 
achieve celebrity-success actors must rely on publicizing dramatic narratives about the 
celebrity-seeking firm.  They contend that these narratives must encompass a conflict 
situation (involving a disruption of the status-quo), in which the firm is portrayed in 
the role of a non-conforming, likeable protagonist, possessing a well-developed 
character (2006:57-65).  According to Rindova et al., agents of the firm must also be 
involved in the celebrity-construction process, in the sense that they take an active role 
in projecting “desired images to audiences” (2006:62).  This involves impression 
management, storytelling (Aldrich and Fiol 1994; Lounsbury and Glynn 2001; Zilber 
2007), and the production of “information subsidies” (Rindova et al. 2006:62). 
Information subsidies are packaged accounts of firm actions that are directly issued to 
media representatives to enhance perceptions of the firm’s importance, thus 
heightening the firm’s celebrity.  
Rindova et al. also discuss the process by which firm celebrity is sustained.  
The authors posit that “celebrity is not static over time” (2006:63), and that its 
continuance depends on the future ability of a firm to “overconform” to existing norms 
(2006:63).  That is, once a firm has achieved celebrity, it must shed its non-
conforming rebel image and present itself as a leader in the enhancement of accepted 
institutions (Rindova et al. 2006:63-65).  This is one of the few portions of the paper 
that refers directly to the positive ties of firm celebrity to one of the other three 
constructs.  This occurs when Rindova et al. state that, “By moving away from its 
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previous nonconforming behavior and adopting behaviors that conform to industry 
norms, a firm can increase its legitimacy and appeal to a broader market” (2006:64).  
In addition, although not a direct reference, the paper also implies the importance of 
reputation to the firm-celebrity attainment process when it states that celebrity “cannot 
be fully fabricated” (Rindova et al. 2006:66).  A further illustration of reputation’s 
importance relates to the comment that “the attention and positive emotional responses 
from audiences that define celebrity depend on the sustained perception that celebrated 
firms—at least to some extent—possess the extraordinary qualities attributed to them” 
(Rindova et al. 2006:66).  Still, the Rindova et al. paper’s linkages of firm celebrity 
with the other three constructs are minimal.  
 
INTEGRATING LEGITIMACY, REPUTATION AND STATUS WITH THE 
FIRM-CELEBRITY DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
Here I attempt to expand upon the notion of firm celebrity by tying the three 
intangible-assets: legitimacy, reputation and status to celerity.  Rather than, as 
Rindova et al. did in their paper, differentiating firm celebrity from the other 
constructs, the goal is to show how firm celebrity relates to them in dynamic ways.  
Relying on a historical perspective, I begin with a discussion of legitimacy.  
Legitimacy is a social construction, whose emergence depends on two elements.  
First, actors within a social field must begin to believe that a majority or a large 
percentage of actors within their field view a particular social structuring or manner of 
doing things as being acceptable and desirable (propriety) (Johnson, Dowd, and 
Ridgeway 2006:55).  Second, these actors need to agree that this action/structure 
template is one that deserves application elsewhere (validity) (Johnson et al. 2006:55).   
Legitimacy is defined by Suchman as “a generalized perception or assumption that the 
actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially 
 140 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (1995:574).  It is 
frequently categorized into three types: normative (i.e., endorsements, affiliations, 
adherence to established practices), regulative (i.e., action in line with existing laws, 
certifications), and cognitive (i.e., taken-for-grantedness, attainment of valued 
credentials (e.g., education), seeming acceptance of established forms of action) (Ruef 
and Scott 1998).  Legitimacy is critical to the structuring of relations given that it “is 
a necessary precondition to initiating social ties with stakeholders and obtaining and 
recombining resources” (Delmar and Shane 2004:386).  It is structural in that it 
generally segments actors into two groups: those possessing legitimacy and those who 
don’t.  While there is often also a grey area between the two sets, still, a prerequisite 
for relationship formation is generally that interacting actors must first attain a 
mutually defined level of legitimacy, which then allows their relationship to progress.  
Though Rindova et al. emphasized the role of the media in the process of firm-
celebrity attainment, legitimacy is also important to this process if for no other reason 
than because there are precursors to the media’s involvement.  The media has a 
choice in terms of the actors it will highlight, and there are often many from whom it 
can select, that serve as “vivid examples of important changes in industries and 
society” (Rindova et al. 2006:52).  Generally speaking, except when forced to do so, 
the media will not focus on an actor that it does not appreciate, condone, or believe 
acceptable.  But the media also needs to take into account the opinions of those on 
whom it depends for the resources that sustain it (money being the primary one), 
which in the U.S. tend to be media advertisers (though in China they are oftentimes 
powerful, purse-holding government officials).  Overall, legitimated actors will 
possess a higher probability of being chosen by the media for focus.  Legitimacy 
does not need to be field wide, with every involved participant believing that a 
particular actor should be supported.  But at least most media representatives and 
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their supporters must believe that an actor is worthy of their backing.  There is thus a 
threshold of legitimacy required for a firm to successfully attain celebrity 
(Zimmerman and Zeitz 2002:428).  This leads to the assertion that legitimacy is a 
necessary, but not sufficient, condition for firm-celebrity attainment.  
Reputation, or “the beliefs and evaluations held by external members” about a 
particular actor (Fischer and Reuber 2007:55), also plays a role in firm-celebrity 
development.  Like legitimacy, reputation is relational in nature.  Reputations are 
generally based on comparisons among different entities, which in the case here are 
organizations from the same industry or field.  Key decision-makers frequently rely 
on reputations (and status) when deciding whom to affiliate with (Jensen and Roy 
2008), and, as Fobrum and Shanley contend: “Well-reputed firms have a competitive 
advantage within their industries” (1990:235).  Such an impact is not limited to 
industry effects alone, but also influences field-wide outcomes.  In considering 
reputation, various questions emerge.  For example, to what extent are performance 
and reputation linked?  Also, to what degree does reputation impact firm-celebrity 
outcomes?  That is, will the firm with the best reputation necessarily become the 
most famous organization?  Regarding the first question, research has shown that 
there is generally a relationship between reputation and performance, especially when 
reputation is associated with prominence, or “the extent to which an organization is 
widely recognized in its organizational field” (Rindova et al. 2005:1044).  
Prominence relates to the degree to which institutional intermediaries (such as the 
media and other evaluating bodies), and high-status actors favor a particular entity.  
The relationship between reputation and performance is particularly evident with 
regard to financial performance (Deephouse and Carter 2005; Fobrum and Shanley 
1990).  Good financial performance tends to impact reputation favorably, and once a 
reputation is formed it very often persists (Roberts and Dowling 2002).  This implies 
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that performance and reputation are mutually sustaining, building upon one another 
(Roberts and Dowling 2002).  This meshes with the notion of the “Matthew Effect” 
referred to by Merton (1968), wherein an actor of high status tends to benefit 
disproportionately from actions it undertakes as compared to the results of similar 
actions engaged in by lower status actors.  
In general, however, research focusing on the relation of reputation and 
performance has been conducted in market environments, where information diffusion 
is quite high and conditions relatively transparent.  But, in situations of uncertainty, 
where performance outcomes are not always clear, reputation becomes even more 
important in that it can “help overcome imperfections in the markets for knowledge” 
(Lichtenthaler and Ernst 2007:38).  Reputation thus plays a particularly helpful and 
critical role in transitioning environments, where infrastructures and institutional 
contexts are frequently underdeveloped, and the flow of accurate information is poor.  
In such environments actors, rely more heavily upon signaling processes and other 
externally apparent clues (as opposed to direct knowledge transfer) than they do in 
other contexts.  
The question is how do reputation and firm celebrity relate?  To answer this 
question it must again be noted that reputation is relational in nature.  Reputation 
depends on comparisons to evolve.  It is also a structured, categorical construct in the 
sense that comparisons are made among entities that are viewed as being of a similar 
type or of the same category.  This comparison process is one that requires the 
categorization of actors into a group, and then, based on the standing of actors within 
this group, reputations arise.  But, such a process is oftentimes problematic, 
particularly in a situation where a new organizational field is emerging.  Under such 
a context, comparisons among group members are difficult simply because there are 
so few members of the group to compare, and also because the situations of existing 
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group members are poorly defined.  Reputations are, in consequence, not easily 
determined.  It is possible, however, that in a situation like this actors are compared 
not as members of the same industry (or based on some other apparent linkage), but 
instead on a more intangible characteristic, for example, on some aspect of their 
abilities, like innovative potential, iconoclastic abilities, etc.  These comparisons are 
not only useful in determining reputations, but they also act to distinguish an actor 
from a group that it might otherwise be compared with, a set whose members are 
defined by a more common characteristic, such as industry, demographic type, or the 
like.  Hence, a kind of “decoupling” (Nee 1998:88), or re-framing process can 
emerge in which ongoing events and occurrences take on different meanings, 
engendering new ontological foundations (Benford and Snow 2000:614).  This 
relates to firm-celebrity creation in the sense that a possible-outcome of such 
reframing is for actors to attain standing as a non-conforming protagonist, heavily 
involved in the transformation of the status-quo.  This is a footing that it might not 
otherwise be able to obtain.  And, the attainment of this standing makes the actor a 
highly suitable candidate for media promotion, given that there now exists an 
interesting and worthwhile story to tell.  But, such standing is not sufficient for a firm 
to maintain its existing celebrity.  In fact, as the firm becomes better known it must 
show that its celebrity standing does not conflict sharply with in-place normative, 
regulative and cognitive standards.  A positive reputation, therefore, is increasingly 
required. Minus such a reputation, firm celebrity will be short lived.  This results in 
two additional conclusions: for new firms, located in emerging organizational fields, 
although legitimacy precedes reputation in importance, the reputation-seeking process 
is a critical step in the attainment of firm celebrity (because to achieve celebrity firms 
need to distinguish themselves from their competitors and this involves the 
establishment of reputation); but, for firm celebrity to develop further, there is a need 
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for another sort of reputation, one that is increasingly associated with over-
conformance, as opposed to earlier forms of non-conformance.  
The third of the intangible-asset structures (apart from firm celebrity) referred to 
in this paper is status.  Status is a hierarchical, social construct that is based not so 
much on any particular quality of involved actors, but rather on the positions actors 
hold within a social framework.  Like reputation, it is categorical, in the sense that it 
structures actors into differentiated, general groupings of superiority, equality, or 
inferiority (Chan and Goldthorpe 2007:1097).  Status helps to determine who will 
interact with whom. In this sense, it relates to the “liability of newness” notion 
(Stinchcombe 1965:148), wherein new organizations face a much more difficult 
survival situation than do their more established counterparts, largely because 
resource-rich actors tend to be of high status, but have (often intentionally) few 
interactions with those of lower status.  Start-up organizations, with little status, thus 
face difficulty.  Not only do they tend to lack resources, but because of their lower-
status standing they have little opportunity to interact with those possessing the 
resources they need.  They thus have a hard time of becoming established.  In fact, 
the same actor possessing different levels of status will be treated in different ways, 
and will find his/her situation affected by this, a situation referred to as the Matthew 
Effect (Merton 1968).  Joel Podolny uses the example of professional golfer, Lee 
Trevino, to illustrate this, quoting Trevino as saying, “When I was a rookie, I told 
jokes and no one laughed.  After I began winning tournaments, I told the same jokes, 
and all of a sudden, people thought they were funny” (2005:10).  
What then is the relationship between status and firm-celebrity development?  
This depends on the life-course situation of the firm under consideration.  For the 
new firm, lacking celebrity, low status allows it to take on a non-conforming role, 
which early on is generally helpful to celebrity.  In fact, moderate status can actually 
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work against the celebrity-development process.  This is because such status often 
limits the ability of an actor to take on a role as a non-conformer.  Still, there are also 
cases where the high status of a new firm can promote celebrity, as in a situation 
where a brilliant, iconoclastic researcher leaves a well-known, established firm to start 
up a new firm, and due to the researcher’s established legitimacy, reputation and 
status, the new organization quickly attains celebrity.  Actually, high-status actors, 
like those of low status, possess freedoms that those of middle status do not (Phillips 
and Zuckerman 2001).  
For those firms without status, however, once such a firm has become a 
celebrity, it needs to quickly acquire status to maintain its standing.  The firm needs 
to shift from being a non-conformer to becoming an over-conformer (Rindova et al. 
2006:63-65).  An assertion I make here is that though for new firms status is not a 
necessary condition to achieve celebrity (and can actually limit celebrity’s 
advancement), once celebrity is achieved, the firm needs status to attain the over-
conforming standing required for celebrity’s continuance and advancement.  
One additional facet of the relationship between firm celebrity and status that 
requires attention relates to the types of status that a celebrity-firm will need if it is to 
be viewed as an over-conforming actor.  This depends on the social structure of the 
situation under consideration.  Different societies possess differing norms of social 
status, with these norms being related to the power-distributions found within the 
societies. In the empirical case studied here, characterized by the transition of an 
economy from planning to markets, a process commonly referred to as “market 
transition” (Nee 1992, 1996), politicized capitalism should be evident.  Significant 
power continues to reside in the state. Attainment of status should thus depend heavily 
on the development of networks between the organization and high-ranking political 
leaders.  This leads to the assertion that in a situation characterized by politicized 
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capitalism, the status required by a celebrity-firm to transform itself into an over-
conforming actor should depend on the development of ties between the organization 
and relevant, high-ranking political leaders.  
Something else regarding the development of firm celebrity that requires 
mention involves a focus on resources.  Unlike certain resource-based firm studies, 
which examine “the resources and capabilities of firms that enable them to generate 
above-normal rates of return and a sustainable competitive advantage” (Oliver 
1997:697), here the focus is on the basic resources required by a firm to assure its 
survival (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978:2).  If a firm is to attain celebrity it must have 
available to it the resources needed to do so.  This resource package will differ by 
firm, but the importance of the resource development process to firm-celebrity 
attainment will be true for all firms.  This is a point that needs to be emphasized, and 
leads to a final assertion: in order to successfully attain celebrity standing, firms must 
possess the abilities needed to develop and acquire the resources they need to achieve 
the desired celebrity outcome.  The next section offers an empirical summary of the 
firm-celebrity development process of the Yiwu marketplace, a now famous 
organization in China.  Yiwu is both a real-life instance of celebrity attainment, and 
also a useful case to see whether the assertions outlined above are confirmed by actual 
results.  
 
HOW DID AN INITIALLY UNKNOWN MARKETPLACE GO ON TO 
BECOME CHINA’S MOST FAMOUS CENTER OF TRADE? THE YIWU 
STORY 
 
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE YIWU MARKETPLACE 
Yiwu is located at about the geographical midpoint of Zhejiang Province (in China’s 
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east-central region), approximately a two-hour train ride to the southwest of Shanghai.   
In 1978, the year in which China’s market-transition process began, Yiwu was a 
relatively unknown locale, with few outstanding features.  It was small in size, 
having an area of only 2 square kilometers (as compared to the 800 square kilometers 
now) (12/08/08),6 and a relatively small population. In the words of one interviewee, 
a former Zhejiang Province newspaper reporter, “When I first went [to Yiwu] in 1983 
there was only one, small road in the place.  It was like a farm town, with few people 
and a limited land area.  It really had nothing.  There was not much there to write 
about except perhaps for the small market.  None of us thought Yiwu would ever 
develop” (11/29/08 Hangzhou interview).  At the time, Yiwu’s China-wide celebrity 
was close to zero.  
The contrast with the Yiwu of today is substantial.  Yiwu is now a city of about 
700,000 registered residents (holding Yiwu residence permits (hukou)), and over a 
million other persons living there on a long-term and ongoing basis.  Not only has 
Yiwu’s population increased, but so too has its level of celebrity.  In fact, for a city of 
its size, Yiwu is currently among the most famous places in China.  The thing that 
has made Yiwu special has been the nature of its post-reform development.  The 
following breakdown gives some perspective as to how impressive Yiwu’s 
performance has been:  
 
Between 1978 and 2007, the Yiwu district’s total value of production 
increased…[by] 319 times…an average yearly increase of 22%; 
financial income for the city went…[up] 293.4 times the original 
amount, representing an average yearly increase of 21.6%; the holdings 
                                                
6 This refers to the day of the interview during which I obtained the information. Unless otherwise 
indicated, all interviews occurred in Yiwu. 
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of banks and other financial institutions in the city increased…2851 
times the original amount, for an average yearly increase of 31.6%…In 
2006, of the 100 top county level cities in China, Yiwu was ranked 
12th (after being previously unranked in 1978), and in terms of its 
overall competitiveness within Zhejiang Province, Yiwu was ranked 
first when compared with other similarly sized cities.7  
 
Of late, Yiwu’s achievements have become widely noted, and its celebrity is without 
question.  The city has increasingly been lauded as a symbol of China’s post reform 
success.  It has recently been featured in several documentaries appearing on China’s 
national TV station, CCTV, and has also been the subject of various well-known 
studies by government-related institutes.  Even prior to these events, in May 2006, 
the Zhejiang Provincial government cited Yiwu as a model of development and 
suggested that all government bodies throughout the province learn from its 
experiences.  
Obviously, Yiwu’s performance has impacted its recent celebrity.  Because of 
its success, Yiwu has become known throughout China as a paradigm of achievement.  
Given that China now has thousands of markets like Yiwu, the marketplace does not 
lack for competition.  Yet, Yiwu has for more than 20 years been ranked by China’s 
Ministry of Commerce as the number one market in the nation.  This is the case even 
though there are other markets that surpass Yiwu in total overall sales.  But, there is 
no market in China that can match Yiwu’s standing in terms of celebrity.  The efforts 
to build this standing have been unending, and they have met with great success.  The 
comment of an official associated with Yiwu’s marketplace illustrates this: “We’ve 
been very successful in the ongoing and diligent efforts we’ve made at publicizing 
                                                
7 See:  (http://gd.people.com.cn/GB?123946/8143881.html) 
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Yiwu.  Yiwu is now extremely well known throughout China and is seen as a 
dynamic, innovative place that people, particularly entrepreneurs, want to come to in 
search of riches.  Attracting such people has been critical to our success” (6/13/08).  
Wherever one goes in China, the mention of Yiwu elicits immediate reaction, 
with people quickly making reference to the city’s markets.  Proof of this came 
through 59 author-conducted interviews carried out in three different markets in 
China, markets located in Wuhan (Hubei Province) (19 interviews), Beijing (20 
interviews), and Jinan (Shandong Province) (20 interviews).  The markets selected 
for the interviews were all associated with a product category in which Yiwu is not 
competitive: clothing items.  This choice was deliberate.  My hope was to see how 
Yiwu’s standing would compare with other markets, which are more associated with 
the clothing trade than Yiwu, markets like Changshu (Jiangsu), Guangzhou 
(Guangdong), and Shijiazhuang (Hebei).  One might assume that those selling 
clothing would know these markets better than they knew Yiwu.  This was not the 
case, however, as can be seen from the following table. 
 
TABLE 3.1:  RESULTS OF THREE CLOTHING MARKETPLACE 
INTERVIEWS 
 
Interviews one through 19 were conducted at Wuhan’s Hanzhengjie Market, those from 20-39 
in Beijing’s Bairong Market, and the 39-59 interviews in Jinan’s Luokou Market. 
 
Column One:  Interview Number 
Column Two:  Home area of interviewee 
Column Three:  Question One-“Have you ever been to Yiwu?” 
Column Four:  Question Two-“Have you heard of Yiwu?” 
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Table 3.1 (Continued) 
Column Five:  Question Three-“What characteristics most represent the Yiwu market?” 
Column Six:  Question Four-“Can any other market in China can compare with Yiwu?” 
Column Seven:  Question Five-“Can you think of any negatives regarding the Yiwu 
market?” 
 
Int. 
# 
Home 
Q. 
1 
Q. 
2 
Q. 3 Q. 4 Q. 5 
1 Wuhan yes yes 
markets, disordered, 
many goods, 
women's jewelry 
perhaps 
Changshu 
no 
2 Wuhan no yes 
markets, wealth, 
clothing producer 
no no 
3 Hubei no yes 
manufacturing 
center, market, 
wealthy, cheap 
prices, many goods 
no not sure 
4 Wuhan yes yes 
small commodities, 
market, wealth, 
many goods, 
production center 
no no 
5 Wuhan  yes yes market not sure not sure 
6 Wuhan no yes 
market, many goods, 
wealth, production 
center 
no not sure 
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Table 3.1 (Continued) 
7 Hubei no yes 
small commodities, 
market, business 
ability, wealth, 
civilized 
Shaoxing not sure 
8 Hubei no yes 
market, good 
business environ., 
wealth, product 
selection, bus. skills 
Changshu not sure 
9 Fujian no yes 
small commodities, 
production center, 
market, bus. Ability 
no no 
10 Wuhan no yes 
production center, 
tourism, market, 
business ability 
not sure no 
11 Hubei no yes 
small commodities, 
market 
not sure no 
12 Hubei no yes 
production center, 
market, wealth, 
government support 
no no 
13 Fujian yes yes 
developed, market, 
total dependence on 
market, wealth, well 
ordered 
not sure no 
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Table 3.1 (Continued) 
14 Wuhan no yes 
small commodities, 
poor quality of 
goods (early), cheap 
prices, market 
no inconsist. Quality 
15 Wenzhou no yes 
small commodities, 
exports, wealth, 
future potential 
no not sure 
16 Hubei no yes 
large market, well-
ordered, good 
selection, exports, 
wealth 
no no 
17 Wenzhou yes yes 
market, good 
development, well 
ordered, wealth, 
many products 
yes culture, hygiene 
18 Wuhan no yes 
ability to do 
business, market, 
openness 
not sure no 
19 Fujian yes yes 
market, well 
developed, 
comprehensive 
selection, wealth 
no order 
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Table 3.1 (Continued) 
20 Hebei no yes 
small commodities, 
market, product 
selection,wealth 
yes, Baigou No 
21 Hebei no yes 
market, small 
commodities, 
production center 
no not sure 
22 Hebei yes yes 
dirty, disordered, 
wealth, smart in 
bus.,market 
yes, Shenyang dirty, disordered 
23 Hebei no yes 
small commodities, 
production center, 
market, wealth, good 
economy 
no no 
24 Jilin no yes 
small commodities, 
production center, 
wealth, market, well 
developed 
no no 
25 Hunan no yes clothing not sure no 
26 Wenzhou yes yes 
small commodities, 
hand made goods, 
export center, market 
Guangzhou no 
27 Anhui no yes 
market, small 
commodities  
no no 
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Table 3.1 (Continued) 
28 Liaoning no yes 
small commodities, 
market  
not sure No 
29 Hunan no no    
30 Hubei no yes 
not sure where Yiwu 
is, many foreigners, 
market, distribution 
center 
no poor creditabilty 
31 Wenzhou yes yes 
market, openness, 
wealth, convenience 
no 
clothing just so-
so 
32 Hebei no yes 
small commodities, 
small appliances, 
market, wealth, 
production area 
not sure suspect quality 
33 Hebei no yes 
market area, 
production center, 
clothing 
Baigou suspect quality 
34 Jiangsu no yes 
small commodities, 
production center, 
clothing 
Guangzhou not sure 
35 Zhejiang no yes 
small commodities, 
clothing, markets, 
wealth, business 
acumen 
no no 
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Table 3.1 (Continued) 
36 Hubei yes yes 
small commodities, 
market, production 
center, high real 
estate prices 
Guangzhou No 
37 
Shandon
g 
no no    
38 Fujian no yes 
small commodities, 
clothing, production, 
distribution center, 
market 
Guangzhou, 
Shenzhen 
not sure 
39 Sichuan no yes not sure 
Guangzhou, 
Wuhan 
no 
       
40 Wenzhou no yes 
small commodities, 
wealth 
no no 
41 Jinan no yes 
small commodities, 
wealth, market 
Guangzhou, 
Shijiazhuang 
no 
42 Jilin no yes market, clothing not sure no 
43 Jinan no yes clothing market not sure no 
44 Jinan no yes 
market, small 
commodities 
Changshu, 
Guangzhou 
no 
45 Hubei no yes small commodities Wuhan no 
46 Zhejiang yes yes 
small commodities, 
market 
no no 
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Table 3.1 (Continued) 
47 Zhejiang no yes small commodities Changshu No 
48 Jinan no yes 
distribution center, 
market 
no no 
49 Wenzhou no yes 
small commodities, 
production center, 
wealth 
no no 
50 Jinan no yes 
small commodities, 
market 
Guangzhou no 
51 Jinan no yes 
small commodities, 
market, wealth 
Guangzhou not sure 
52 Zibo no yes 
wealth, small 
commodities 
Hangzhou, 
Changshu 
no 
53 Zhejiang no yes big market no not sure 
54 Jinan no yes not sure not sure not sure 
55 Hubei no yes 
small commodities, 
market, wealth 
Wuhan no 
56 Jinan no yes 
small commodities, 
clothing, market 
not sure no 
57 Liaoning no yes 
small commodities, 
market, clothing 
no no 
58 Jinan yes yes 
market, small 
commodities, 
wealth, developed 
Guangzhou, 
Changshu 
no 
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Table 3.1 (Continued) 
59 Jinan no yes 
small commodities, 
market, business 
acumen 
Wuhan, 
Guangzhou 
No 
 
 
Analysis of the results shows that about 63% of the interviewees, when asked 
“Do you think any other market in China can compare with Yiwu?” responded with a 
“no,” or “not sure.”  Again, this was surprising given the interviewees’ product ties.  
There were only about 3% of respondents who had never heard of Yiwu, even though 
there are 2,862 cities in China, which, like Yiwu, are classified to be county-level 
forms (xian ji chengshi).  Of the characteristics cited as being most representative of 
Yiwu, 83% of respondents cited markets, about 58% made reference to small 
commodities, 44% indicated that they viewed Yiwu as a center of wealth, and, 14% 
mentioned the strong commercial abilities of Yiwu market participants.  One 
surprising response was that approximately 18% of the respondents believed Yiwu to 
be a major clothing market, even though this is not actually true.  The combined 
responses were quite interesting given that only 20% of the interviewees had ever been 
to the city.  The responses, combined with Yiwu’s history of performance and its top-
market billing, lend credence to the city’s celebrity standing.  
 
 
YIWU’S LEGITIMACY, REPUTATION, AND STATUS DURING THE EARLY-
REFORM PERIOD 
The early development of the Yiwu marketplace was a self-catalyzed one, a bottom-up 
process, depending on the efforts and entrepreneurial abilities of the Yiwu people to 
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carry out.  What is of interest in this paper, however, is the process by which Yiwu 
became a celebrity-firm, and how this standing has helped Yiwu achieve competitive 
advantage.  The focus is on how local actors strategically managed legitimacy, 
reputation and status to influence the perceptions of outside stakeholders.  The paper 
will discuss the early situations of the three constructs, individually.  
 
LEGITMACY In a general sense, at the start, and for the first few years of 
China’s reforms, Yiwu possessed little legitimacy.  The unique forms of activity 
(predicated on market exchange) emerging in Yiwu were not fully compatible with the 
expectations of society, largely because these expectations were themselves undefined 
and in a state of flux.  Normatively, there existed in China much conflict regarding 
what exactly the government and people should condone and what they should 
oppose.  Many people, particularly officials, were unwilling to commit themselves to 
any new forms of action. Significant uncertainty existed.  From a regulative 
standpoint, there was little legal clarity, with many existing laws (particularly 
economic laws) having lost their meaning, and with new laws not yet formalized.  
Cognitively, among many there was a significant questioning of what to believe in.  
There were also few markets in existence similar to Yiwu, which actors could point to 
as justification for Yiwu’s structural and action templates.  In fact, throughout China, 
and especially in Yiwu, numerous social contradictions were evident.  While there 
were supporters of Yiwu, there were also many who opposed it.  Nobody, however, 
seemed to be sure as to whether markets would succeed or not, and they were not even 
openly discussed.  According to one interviewee, even among Yiwu’s provincial and 
central government supporters “there existed a mindset wherein [the officials] 
pretended the Yiwu market did not exist.  They knew it was here, but they didn’t see 
it” (10/12/08).  Up until the late 1980s, Yiwu continued to be a kind of non-entity, 
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and in the words of one Yiwu propaganda official, “Early on there were three upper-
hierarchy political policies regarding Yiwu:  1) no press coverage; 2) no direct 
expression of opinion regarding Yiwu’s situation; and, 3) no overnight stays in Yiwu.” 
(9/27/08).  The former head of Yiwu’s Department of Propaganda conceded that, 
“increasing Yiwu’s fame through the promotion of Yiwu in outside areas was not our 
major priority, at least not until the late 1980s” (12/08/08).  Under conditions of high 
uncertainty, nobody was sure if Yiwu would be legitimated or not.  
Regardless, during the 1980s, one of the focuses of Yiwu government leaders 
was to legitimate the marketplace (11/01/08).  A major reason for this was because, 
apart from the marketplace, there was not much else in Yiwu that possessed any strong 
hope for development, and the local leadership was aware of this.  It also knew that 
its own success, as was the case for local officials throughout China, depended on the 
developmental situation of the community it oversaw.  But to develop the market, 
Yiwu’s leaders needed to garner active support from outsiders (particularly at the 
Zhejiang Provincial level).  But, Yiwu was short of resources and had little standing. 
Its legitimating efforts were especially difficult because many marketplace participants 
actually just wanted to be left alone.  They were not interested in forming linkages 
with the outside, apart from the ties they already had (mostly with other Yiwu’ers 
located in other parts of China).  This is because, at the time, Yiwu and its markets 
were simply a point of distribution.  Little production occurred there, and Yiwu 
traders took on the roles of exchange conduits, bringing goods produced in other areas 
(mostly Guangdong, Dongbei (Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang) and other Zhejiang 
locations) to Yiwu and reselling them to other Yiwu natives, who would then take 
them to other markets, reselling them there for substantial profits.  Yiwu traders were 
service providers, and the service they provided was one based on knowledge and 
information.  They were successful in their activities because there was huge demand 
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for products and a lack of outside knowledge concerning how to access these products.  
Yiwu residents, because of their previous involvement in trade (even prior to reforms, 
Yiwu residents had been involved, often illegally, in trading activity), knew how to 
find and utilize sources of product.  They were also skilled at getting the goods to 
Yiwu for further distribution elsewhere (services undertaken by other Yiwu natives), 
and Yiwu logistics services were superior to those of other places.  A kind of 
monopoly in distribution arose. Yiwu traders believed, however, that their success was 
possible only “because nobody knew about Yiwu.  Most people didn’t know you 
could come to Yiwu to do business, and those from Yiwu would purposely not tell 
outsiders about the Yiwu situation, or tell them where they were from.  Early on, the 
Yiwu market was an Yiwu market only” (10/13/08a).  The Yiwu traders did not want 
Yiwu to become well known because they feared that if it were that they would lose 
their advantage.  They did not even write down their Yiwu addresses on the products 
they were selling, because they did not want others to know where they were from 
(12/16/08).  They also did not welcome the arrival of outsiders who they felt might 
end up taking away from them money-making opportunities.  This situation extended 
into the early 1990s, after which time adjustments began to occur.  
Even so, throughout the period senior local-leaders and those among the 
Zhejiang provincial hierarchy who supported market reforms (and as a result, Yiwu), 
continued to try and legitimize the marketplace and its operations.  These efforts 
were strategic in nature, and included the application of educational and propaganda 
mechanisms to establish local (county and provincial levels) validation for the Yiwu 
model, and to link Yiwu with previously legitimated forms.  At the local level, 
“lower-level bureaucrats were a problem.  There were many among them who were 
not advocates of markets.  Opposition arose due to some of the consequences of 
market development.  Through market participation, farmers, who the officials 
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viewed as being of comparatively low status, were beginning to make more money 
than the officials and the officials resented this.  The officials in turn made efforts to 
constrain market development.  Higher-ranking local officials thus focused the 
party’s propaganda efforts on educating the Yiwu people (particularly the bureaucrats) 
as to the benefits of markets.  We wanted the markets to succeed” (12/08/08b 
interview).  Another reason for focusing legitimacy efforts at the local level was that 
there also existed opposition to Yiwu “from local state-businesses.  They were 
bothered by the market’s improved competitiveness.  Yiwu was having a big impact 
on the prices at which goods were being sold, and the state monopoly was being 
eroded, with monopoly gains no longer possible” (10/6/08).  Yiwu’s administrators 
tried to deal with this opposition, by attempting to garner the acceptance of local state 
firms leaders.  Otherwise, the leaders could make trouble.  
Various market-supporting Province officials, individuals like Shen Zulun (who 
later became Zhejiang’s governor), Li Dexin, and Dong Chaochai, also helped Yiwu 
legitimize itself.  For example, in 1985 Shen Zulun took the risk of including a 
report, entitled “Encourage Business to Develop Our Counties, Develop Yiwu 
Vigorously,” which discussed the positives of markets, as a key part of a widely 
publicized Provincial meeting, the Zhejiang Provincial Agricultural Township 
Working Symposium.  The meeting gave Yiwu its first major opportunity to achieve 
positive, Province-wide exposure (11/01/08).  The aim of this exposure was directed 
towards legitimating the Yiwu form of development, and improving Yiwu’s overall 
reputation (11/01/08).  Shen also helped Yiwu gain Provincial permission and some 
financial support for its early market expansions.  Without such assistance these 
expansions would probably not have occurred, or at a minimum would have been 
extremely difficult to carry out.  This assistance was critical to Yiwu’s early success.  
One other early legitimation effort was to try and intentionally link Yiwu with 
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already legitimated, planned forms of action to heighten Yiwu’s “acceptability” 
among decision-makers.  Although Yiwu’s situation differed substantially from 
China’s traditional jishi, or periodic markets, during Yiwu’s early development, Yiwu 
leaders consistently referred to Yiwu as such an economic form.  They also 
ongoingly talked about Yiwu’s development as one predicated on a variety of already 
acceptable elements: planned and small-scale (geti) efforts; the sale of small 
commodities; and the involvement of poor farmers, who otherwise had few other 
opportunities for support (Jinhua Department of Industry and Commerce 1982:1).  At 
the same time, institutional processes of legitimization were occurring as well. Macro-
level ideologies and laws were undergoing change, and this helped to make Yiwu 
more acceptable.  That is, the central state was playing a role in market legitimation 
(Nee, 2000).  Yiwu administrators were aware of these changes and attempted to 
portray Yiwu as aligned with them, for example framing Yiwu as a form of Deng 
Xiaoping thinking (12/08/08).  Also, from a population-ecology perspective (Hannan 
and Freeman 1977, 1988), as the number of marketplaces increased, Yiwu’s 
acceptability also increased.  All of these macro-level changes played a role in 
Yiwu’s overall legitimation process, leading to enhanced legitimacy for the market.  
Overall, then, at least with respect to issues of legitimacy, this early-reform period was 
a time when the foundations for later celebrity emergence were being formed.  
 
REPUTATION According to one interviewee, “Prior to 1990 the efforts of Yiwu 
administrators were primarily focused on legitimating Yiwu” (11/01/08).  Early on, 
these efforts were overwhelmingly local in nature (11/03/08).  Even so, by around 
1988 Yiwu was becoming increasingly well known (11/29/08 Hangzhou interview).   
But, Yiwu’s developing reputation was mixed.  On the one hand it was becoming a 
paragon of market success.  But, it was also becoming known as a center of fake 
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products and of goods that were of poor quality.  Regarding this latter standing, state-
owned firms, particularly in Shanghai, whose products were being copied and sold in 
the Yiwu markets as the real thing (but at lower prices) were targeting Yiwu as an 
improper economic-actor.  Consumers did not know that the products being sold in 
Yiwu were imitations.  When used, however, the items were of poor quality and had 
short lives, impacting the standing of those firms whose labels were being copied.  
The outside firms began to send representatives to Yiwu and Hangzhou (the capital of 
Zhejiang) to file complaints, and to enlist newspapers from their own areas, 
particularly in Shanghai, to write reports critical of Yiwu.  These efforts, however, 
did not have significant impact.  Yiwu was still a largely local market and “even the 
[Zhejiang] Provincial government didn’t pay much attention to the situation preferring 
to do its best to ignore Yiwu” (2/16/09).  There was one sense, however, in which 
Yiwu’s reputation was impacting its development and potential celebrity, and this was 
with respect to Yiwu’s reputation among other Zhejiang entrepreneurs.  By 1988, 
individuals from Wenzhou and Taizhou, two entrepreneurially focused Zhejiang 
communities, had begun to come to Yiwu.  They were attracted to Yiwu by the 
reputation of Yiwu’s government for openness and support of business activity.  This 
reputation included the fact that taxes in Yiwu were comparatively low (as a result of a 
policy instituted by an early, Yiwu Party Secretary, Xie Gaohua), as were stall rents.  
The market itself also had a reputation as being a good location for doing business, 
and characterized by comparatively inexpensive logistics fees and significant 
opportunities.  The entry of these outside actors began to stimulate the formation of 
new, useful business networks and increased the overall diversity of Yiwu 
(differentiating it from emerging competitors adding further to positive reputation 
effects (Fombrun 1996:393)).  The outcomes brought Yiwu rewards.  They also 
resulted in increases in the size of the marketplace, which further enhanced Yiwu’s 
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reputation (Fombrun and Shanley 1990:250), and its celebrity.  Early on, then, 
reputation formation did play a role with respect to Yiwu’s firm-celebrity development 
process, but this role was not a large one.  
 
STATUS As a new entity, involved in questionable activities, ones that 
constrained the ties it was able to form with powerful established actors, Yiwu early 
on possessed little status.  The vast majority of high-status political actors, in 
particular, were unwilling to form close ties with it.  Still, Yiwu’s low status was, as 
theorized by previous research, useful in its ability to take on non-conforming status 
(Phillips and Zuckerman 2001).  Also, given that during the early post-reform period 
Yiwu had few competitors (though this number was continually increasing), there still 
did not exist hierarchies of status that Yiwu had to be concerned with, restraining it in 
its actions.  In this sense, Yiwu was relatively unrestricted in what it could do and the 
relationships it could form.  While this presented difficulties in the sense that as a 
path-breaking organization Yiwu had no pre-established template to follow, and no 
other organization to emulate, particularly early on when it even lacked the 
opportunity to rely on benchmarking mechanisms to guide it (Still and Strang 2009).  
But, in another sense, the situation was ideal, because Yiwu could establish itself on 
its own terms, without the need to justify its actions.  Thus, early on, it appears that 
status was not a primary factor impacting Yiwu’s celebrity potential.  
In summary, Yiwu’s priority, in the aftermath of the formal establishment of its 
market, was centered initially on self-legitimation.  Legitimation efforts took various 
forms, but were directed towards achieving a base of support for Yiwu’s mode of 
development.  The first priority of Yiwu administrators was the solidifying and 
standardizing of local support, attempting to bring conformity of focus to all Yiwu 
organizational-actors.  The means used to accomplish this were mechanisms of 
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education and propaganda, stressing the appropriateness of Yiwu and the society-wide 
benefits of its operations.  Yiwu’s also focused its legitimacy efforts on identifying 
and developing support at the Provincial-government level and using this support to its 
own benefit.  To further these efforts, Yiwu attempted to frame its developments in 
one of two ways.  They positioned Yiwu as in line with previous traditions, but also 
represented Yiwu as a unique innovator.  Additionally, Yiwu attempted to line itself 
up with institutional changes taking place at the macro level.  It ongoingly portrayed 
itself as an embodiment of Dengist (Deng Xiaoping, the then leader of China) 
philosophies.  
Issues of reputation and status took a backseat to legitimation efforts.  This is 
logical given that legitimacy is “a critical ingredient for new venture success” (Starr 
and MacMillan 1990:83).  In the absence of legitimacy new firms generally face a 
hard time of finding the resources they need (Zimmerman and Zeitz 2002:414), 
making survival problematic.  Yiwu simply did not have the standing or resources to 
allow it to focus on issues of reputation and status.  Still, gradually, based simply on 
its own performance, Yiwu became increasingly well known.  Such reputational 
changes, however, were two-sided.  While viewed as successful economically, Yiwu 
was also becoming known as a low-status opportunist, relying upon questionable 
practices of imitation, the sale of poor-quality products, and misrepresentation to 
benefit itself.  Positive change regarding this standing, however, would have to wait 
for various developments, including improved economic conditions, the impact of 
outside forces (brought on by an increased openness), and a better resource position 
before taking place.  
 
A SECOND PHASE OF THE CELEBRITY DEVELOPMENT PROCESS: THE 
IMPACT OF ECONOMIC JOLTS, INCREASED OPENNESS AND RESOURCE 
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ABUNDANCE ON YIWU 
Researchers theorize that a major source of organizational change is one associated 
with environmental jolts, or points of unexpected and discontinuous transformation 
(Meyer 1982; Romanelli and Tushman 1994).  Various events, things like financial 
disasters, the unanticipated death of a top leader, a sudden loss of legitimacy, etc., 
often act to destabilize existing conditions (often through sharp changes in resource 
availability (Park and Mezias 2005:987; Wan and Yiu 2009:792)), giving rise to a 
situation where the probability for other changes increases sharply.  Such “jolts” 
result in periods of instability, and are often times of crisis.  But as with the Chinese 
character for crisis, weiji (composed of a character for danger and one for 
opportunity), such periods inherently possess both the possibility of ruin and the 
potential for organizational gain.  
In the late 1980s, Yiwu experienced such a severe jolt.  It was an event that set 
in motion a series of changes that had significant impacts on Yiwu, and upon its 
legitimacy, reputation and status.  It was also a happening that, surprisingly, began 
the process by which Yiwu’s celebrity expanded greatly.  The event was the 
Tiananmen Crisis of 1989, when the Chinese government violently put an end to 
Beijing student democracy protests.  In turn, there arose a deep questioning of the 
appropriateness of China’s markets and market reforms, generally, and of Yiwu, in 
particular. In the words of one interviewee, this situation was “a great shock for Yiwu” 
(2/24/09).  Not only did many conservative officials begin to harshly criticize and 
attack Yiwu, but many local residents also began to question Yiwu’s future.  The 
future of the marketplace was in doubt.  A large segment of the Yiwu population was 
“very upset.  They felt like Yiwu’s future was over” (1/16/09 Beijing interview).  In 
reaction, many Yiwu officials sought to tone down Yiwu’s standing.  But, other 
officials took aggressive efforts to promote the positives of Yiwu’s activities.  
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Working in conjunction with private businesspersons, the Yiwu government spent 
RMB 20,000 on a documentary that appeared on the national television network, 
CCTV, which featured Yiwu’s marketplace and told stories of the new riches being 
made.  The documentary featured a famous CCTV reporter, Zhao Zhongxiang, and 
although it lasted less than 15 minutes, it was enough to assure people of Yiwu’s 
standing, as well as the acceptability of markets.  This is because the common people 
(lao bai xing) reasoned correctly that the central government would only allow 
subjects possessing governmental support to be featured on CCTV.  The 
documentary was the first time that Yiwu had received such national exposure.  It 
made people aware of Yiwu’s existence, and it provided Yiwu with a needed shot of 
legitimacy.  
But, something else it did was to focus attention on Yiwu, and this had multiple 
consequences.  For one thing, it attracted even more outsiders to the market.  Yiwu 
became known as a place where one could make money, and many moved to Yiwu in 
search of riches.  These outsiders, although generally not well educated, brought with 
them many skills and forms of experience that had previously been missing.  A 
positive of Yiwu was its ability to fit these traders into its market.  Many 
interviewees attributed this ability to the local government’s fair treatment of the 
outsiders (2/27/09).  In the words of a Fujian businessperson, who first arrived in 
Yiwu in 1992, “Yiwu was quite successful in integrating people form Fujian, 
Guangdong, and other places in Zhejiang into its market.  Without these persons 
Yiwu would not have developed as it has.  Each of the places has its own unique 
capabilities, and the merging of these strengths resulted in significant competitive 
advantage for the market…In fact, the more open Yiwu became, the more its situation 
improved” (2/26/09).  
The increasing attention being focused on Yiwu also resulted in more notice 
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taken of it by others, however, particularly members of the political realm.  As one 
interviewee commented, “It was not until the opening of the market to the outside that 
there was strong pressure on us to become more and more rationalized. There came to 
be significant pressure on us from higher-level government officials to make 
changes…At the same time, we also faced pressure to go to the outside to monitor 
other markets: Shenyang, Chengdu, Chongqing, Xinjiang, Taizhou, and Wenzhou.  
Other market actors also increasingly came to see us.  These developments gave rise 
to forces for change” (2/11/09a).  One force for change arose due to a realization that 
Yiwu faced strong competition from other markets:  “We found that the other 
markets were getting close to the level of Yiwu, and we felt the pressure to improve” 
(2/11/09b).  The increasing awareness of others regarding Yiwu’s situation was 
coupled with Yiwu’s increasing awareness of them.  A true market field began to 
arise characterized by ongoing mutual monitoring by involved actors.  Market 
hierarchies and standards emerged, structuring action and rationalizing competition.  
This resulted in a heightening of overall legitimacy, the formation of reputations (via a 
comparison of performance outcomes), and the engendering of field-based status 
differences (based on such elements as differences in price and quality, customer 
share, types of product, etc.).  While facing strong competition, Yiwu was 
comparatively well positioned with regard to the three constructs, and had begun to 
distinguish itself via its strong performance.  The foundations of Yiwu’s celebrity 
standing were becoming set.  Still, Yiwu needed to improve itself more.  The entry 
into the marketplace of additional market participants had begun to strain Yiwu’s 
infrastructure and changes were required (10/11/08).  While a factor attracting actors 
to Yiwu was the market’s low cost structure, particularly in terms of the small amount 
of taxes being charged, market-operating revenues were consequently too low.  This, 
coupled with the fact that money for development from the Provincial government 
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was minimal, meant that Yiwu needed to develop other resource sources.  This 
required interacting with key members of its social environment (Pfeffer and Salancik 
1978:19).  The individuals of importance were power holders within the political 
realm. 
Yiwu needed the support of these power holders to improve its situation.  Yiwu 
had actually already come up with a new means to develop additional sources of 
revenue, but needed the OK of authorities to pursue this strategy.  Yiwu hoped to 
become the first city of its size to try and implement an approach that had previously 
only been allowed in Guangdong Province’s Shenzhen and Zhuhai cities, places of a 
much larger size.  Implementation of the strategy required the approval of the 
Zhejiang Provincial Government’s Commission for Economic Restructuring 
(tigaiwei), at the time led by Dong Chaocai, both a market and Yiwu supporter.  
Dong allowed Yiwu special permission to implement its chosen strategy.  This 
strategy was critical to Yiwu’s growth and subsequent celebrity.  It involved making 
Yiwu into an experimental zone, wherein the Provincial government gave Yiwu the 
ability to auction off, in measured amounts, the rights to local land, providing the 
people with the property they needed to build office space, factories, residential units, 
and other real-estate assets.  In return, the city gained a substantial source of revenue. 
The results of the policy were quick and considerable:  “After the policy was 
implemented the city took off.  The whole situation completely changed…The 
people and the government both became rich…The people’s focus on market activities 
also increased substantially” (12/8/08a).  
Yiwu administrators used their new resources to improve the market.  They 
initiated various infrastructure-enhancing projects, which involved the construction of 
new, improved markets, and also began to focus on market-behavior improvement.  
One market participant noted that, prior to taking this action, “Yiwu was already 
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beginning to become known as a center of fake products” (2/24/09).  According to a 
Bureau of Industry and Commerce official working in Yiwu at the time:  “Product 
copying was quite extensive, but…[e]ducational efforts relating to such copying really 
took off once Yiwu began opening up in the early 1990s…The reason for initiating 
these actions was twofold:  1) pressure from upper level authorities, and 2) the 
recognition that counterfeit goods and copying was not in the interest of our markets.  
The outside media and representatives from foreign countries had already begun to 
focus on Yiwu and action was needed” (12/16/08).  Even so, Yiwu still was far from 
its goal of achieving celebrity.  At a minimum, it lacked legitimacy, and this 
deficiency restricted the advancement of its reputation, status and celebrity.  
Although more media attention had begun to be focused on the marketplace, the extent 
of this attention was still not enough to achieve the celebrity standing Yiwu sought.  
More help was needed.  
 
BECOMING A MEDIA STAR: HOW YIWU USED ITS RESOURCES TO 
GARNER CELEBRITY 
In China, legitimacy is politically determined.  Power resides in the party and 
government.  The party controls the media, the courts, and also has control over the 
appointment of administrators.  The government carries out the application of laws 
and policies.  These are generally written quite severely, but are frequently 
implemented in ways that are weaker than their words would otherwise imply.  
Those who implement laws, especially tax regulations, adherence to standards, and 
land policies, have much discretion as to how the laws will be implemented.  This 
gives them the power, backed up by the police and military, to determine the success 
or failure of any economic entity.  The notion of politicized capitalism is a real life 
phenomenon in China.  
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Yiwu administrators were constantly aware of this situation, and they knew that 
if they were to succeed they would need the power of the polity behind them.  But, 
how could a small place like Yiwu, with strong potential, but lacking legitimacy, 
reputation and status, improve its situation?  It needed some opportunity to form 
connections with the political elite, and it found such an opportunity in the form of the 
annual China Mayor’s Conference.  The first such conference was held in 1991, 
taking place in Hainan. Even though a small city, Yiwu sent a contingent to the event.  
While there, this group lobbied hard to try and garner the right to host the 2nd 
conference, to be held in 1992.  It used some of Yiwu’s growing wealth to market 
Yiwu to conference attendees, and was successful in its efforts. The China’s Mayor 
Association chose Yiwu to host the May 1992 event.  In the words of one Yiwu 
promoter:  “At the time Yiwu had already started to gain some recognition within the 
market community, but outside of this realm it was still little known…We succeeded 
even though Yiwu had little standing.  It was totally against the odds. When the 
committee selected us to hold the meeting, we didn’t even have a three star hotel.  
Our success was predicated on good insight, hard work and a lot of fortuitous luck” 
(10/20/08 Hangzhou interview).  
But, even having been chosen to host the meeting it was not clear what mayors 
would attend.  The opportunity to host the conference would only be valuable if top-
ranking mayors agreed to participate.  Yiwu put its focus on obtaining the 
commitment of the then mayor of Beijing, Chen Xitong.  If Chen were to attend and 
found the event to his liking, this would be of great benefit to Yiwu in its quest for 
legitimacy.  But Yiwu was largely unknown, and its status position was low.  The 
likelihood of Chen’s participation thus seemed almost nil.  Chen, however, decided 
to attend.  Why did he agree to come?  There were at least two reasons.  First, 
because of its newly obtained wealth (see above), Yiwu had enough resources to pull a 
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successful meeting off.  It possessed the fundamentals that Chen required.  With 
regard to the second reason, this is evident in the remarks of the person who directed 
the event:  
 
Our timing was right. The primary reason Chen decided to come was 
Deng Xiaoping’s strong support of markets.  In January-February 
1992 Deng had made his “southern tour,” but it still had not been 
publicly disclosed.  Sometime around this period, knowing of Deng’s 
trip, Chen had given a market-supporting speech.  The speech was 
published in The Peoples’ Daily, meaning it had found favor among 
key power holders.  Holding the meeting in Yiwu, a center of market 
activity, worked in with Chen’s plans, and the meeting went 
great…Chen was enthralled…He ordered Beijing’s stores to start 
purchasing Yiwu’s products.  Prior to Chen’s arrival, Yiwu’s markets 
were relatively closed. After the trip, everything changed…Many 
dignitaries began to visit, and Yiwu’s standing improved almost 
instantaneously (10/20/08 Hangzhou interview).  
 
After Chen’s visit, Zhejiang and central-level media coverage of Yiwu expanded 
significantly, as did the number of high-level visitors from other places.  Suddenly 
possessing legitimacy, Yiwu became the poster child of those supporting market 
reforms, many of whom were China’s senior leaders.  These officials had suddenly 
taken notice of the market.  They used their power to promote Yiwu, especially in 
influencing the reporting of the media.  While authors have discussed in fearful tones 
the increasingly centralized character of the media in the US (Bagdikian 2000), citing 
that now only six major firms control most of what is propagated, such warnings are 
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actually not of much relevance in China, where the communist party oversees all 
media workings.  In China, one body, the polity, controls what will be reported and 
to what degree.  
This situation was of great benefit to Yiwu.  Having achieved legitimation, 
Yiwu became a favorite media topic.  But, not only was the increased scope of 
Yiwu’s coverage of benefit, but so too was its tone, which was overwhelmingly 
positive.  According to an interviewed reporter, this is not unusual given that “In 
China reporting takes place using the following logic: zhengmian wei zhu, which 
means focus on the positive.  There are less than five percent of articles each week 
that focus on real social problems.  Out of 60 pages per week, maybe two will 
examine problems.  This is the tradition in China for party newspapers. We are a 
propaganda mechanism” (10/16/08).  
Possessing the attention and acceptance of the media, and with resources at its 
disposal, Yiwu administrators took the initiative to promote themselves further.  
Such efforts have taken various forms.  First, Yiwu has put great effort into forming 
and maintaining networks with political leaders.  The Yiwu government annually 
spends a substantial amount of money to invite outside officials to Yiwu for all 
expense paid junkets.  About 40% of all officials coming to Yiwu each year receive 
such treatment.  Given that in 2007 Yiwu “had 500 groups visiting that included 
officials of a vice minister and/or deputy provincial governor status or above” 
(6/13/08), this can add up to a big expense.  For example, Yiwu “invited leaders from 
Tibet to the city for a 3 day stay, spending RMB 100,000 to do so” (6/13/08).  As to 
why these officials receive such treatment, one former official notes that: “Officials 
not only control media access, but they also control policy, and if Yiwu is able to 
garner policy benefits these will be of great advantage to it in its competitive standing 
with other places” (11/3/08).  Second, Yiwu allocates significant amounts of 
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resources on the promotion of itself.  When asked if “other markets advertise 
themselves like Yiwu,” a former vice director of Yiwu’s propaganda department 
replied, “Not to the extent Yiwu does. Our expenditures in this area are significantly 
greater than those of other cities of similar and even greater size.  Yiwu faces little 
competition with regard to propaganda efforts from other market areas. One reason for 
this is because Yiwu has more money than they do, and this is directly the result of our 
special land use policies” (11/3/08).  According to this same official, the Yiwu City 
government allocates its propaganda office four to five times the amount of funds that 
the propaganda offices of other comparably sized cities receive.  The propaganda 
department’s budget is RMB 20 to 25 million annually and in addition to these 
amounts there are various private propaganda initiatives undertaken as well (strongly 
encouraged by the local government) (11/3/08).  The amount that Yiwu spends on 
propaganda is more than 100% of the combined total spent by all of the other cities in 
the Jinhua district in which Yiwu is located (12/11/08).  Yiwu’s district includes at 
least five other cities of similar size as Yiwu.  Each year, more than ten million RMB 
are spent on CCTV advertisements alone.  In addition, the city has an office of 
promotion in Frankfurt, Germany as well as offices in Hangzhou and Shanghai.  The 
city also advertises in Shanghai and Hong Kong, placing advertisements on Dragon 
Satellite TV and Phoenix TV (12/11/08).  The city likewise sends Yiwu government 
and market-related officials on trips to other areas of China, with at least 100 such 
trips taking place each year:  “These trips are made to attract new or higher quality 
businesses to our markets and they are also effective in promoting Yiwu’s overall 
reputation as well.  They tend to be well covered by the local medias in the places we 
visit” (6/13/08).  Third, Yiwu puts heavy emphasis on making it easy and 
comfortable for the media to cover to it.  For example, it offers the media various 
forms of encouragement to undertake such efforts.  This assistance started as early as 
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the late 1980s, and includes periodic invitations to favored reporters to come to Yiwu 
for a good time.  It also encompasses the writing of stories for reporters by the 
propaganda department, as well as the production and dissemination of “interesting” 
stories.  In the words of one reporter, “Yiwu has been very systematic in its 
promotion strategies.  Yiwu’s leaders have also given us great support” (11/01/08).  
Such support has included direct payoffs. For example, one former People’s Daily 
reporter, a Yiwu native, noted that in 1998 the city began a policy wherein it provides 
bonuses to any reporter who publishes a story or picture (with caption) in a newspaper 
or magazine of a provincial status or above:  “I was making RMB80,000-90,000 per 
year just from writing about Yiwu…In other places, no such rewards are offered or the 
amounts are significantly less” (12/04/08).  Fourth, Yiwu has also intentionally and 
ongoingly attempted to characterize itself as distinctive.  With every passing year, 
Yiwu has seemed to initiate some new policy or form of action that in some way sets 
Yiwu apart from other markets.  A former media representative commented on this 
saying “Yiwu’s greatest advantage now is that it is distinctive, it is newsworthy.  We 
played on this advantage and tried to build on it. We needed to because without 
provincial and central government support in China it’s difficult to succeed here” 
(11/01/08).  Another reporter observed that, “There is much to write about here.  
Other places are helpful in providing information, too, but Yiwu has more newsworthy 
information.  The government purposely positions its activities in such a way to 
make them attractive to news purveyors.  They also have the resources to promote 
themselves, and spend a great deal on such endeavors” (11/22/08).  A fifth way Yiwu 
promotes itself is by seeking outside accreditation and certification.  Researchers 
have cited such factors as being key to legitimacy, reputation and status attainment 
(Martens et al., 2007; Rao, 1994; Rindova et al., 2005).  Some of Yiwu’s recent 
achievements in this area have been its being named by one of China’s top magazines, 
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“China’s Most Newsworthy City of 2008-2009,” as well as achieving designation as a 
“2008 Zhejiang Province Safe City,” “The County Level City in China Having the 
Most Foreign Residents,” and “The County Level City in China Having the Highest 
Rate of Money Turnover.”  Yiwu is also the only county level city in China that can 
process foreign visas, and the only one able to adjudicate the legal cases of foreigners.  
It has been designated China’s largest interior port, and the only city that allows 
foreigners to participate in its People’s Congress. The central government has certified 
Yiwu “An Hygienic City,” “An Environmental City,” “A Forest City,” “A Park City,” 
and many more.8  A sixth way that Yiwu attempts to enhance its celebrity standing is 
through the formation of networks with other high status (not just political) actors.  
Actually, these networks are both instrumental and legitimizing. For example, one 
Yiwu administrator commented on Yiwu’s establishment of ties with intellectuals: 
“We try to attract the attention of scholars and experts, people who normally would 
not be interested in a community as small as Yiwu.  In turn, we can learn from them 
and improve.  This helps us greatly, especially since our educational backgrounds are 
not that great.  But we are willing to learn, and we want to learn from those who 
know more than we do” (12/4/08b).  There is also the realization that these networks 
are legitimating as well.  And, Yiwu plays on this, commissioning famous 
intellectuals to write books and articles about it.  Even though most of the writings 
are largely propaganda, they still carry with them the aura of scholarship, and this acts 
to improve Yiwu’s legitimacy, reputation, and status.  The books all stress several 
things.  First, they all discuss Yiwu’s distinctiveness, indicating how it is different 
from others.  They all also refer to Yiwu’s early standing as a non-conformer, as a 
protagonist in a dramatized story of conflict and change (Rindova et al. 2006:56).  
But, in addition, the books also indicate the fact that Yiwu has transformed itself into a 
                                                
8 See: (http://yiwu.gov.cn/glb/) 
 177 
special kind of conforming status.  They portray Yiwu as becoming the exemplar of a 
now established field, distinguished in the sense that it stands out from its competitors, 
but now an over-conformer rather than a non-conformer as before.  One of the books 
includes a quote from China’s former Minister of Commerce (and now party secretary 
of the city Chongqing) stating that, “If a person wants to research China’s socialist 
market economy, then that person must go to Yiwu” (Huang and Zhang 2007:3).  
Yiwu has become the new paragon of China’s emerging form of economic 
development.  Finally, Yiwu also attempts to develop ties with others it considers to 
be of high status.  One group targeted has been foreign businesspersons.  Yiwu 
ongoingly puts out stories discussing the numbers of foreigners living in its city, now 
well over 10,000.  It also highlights the establishment by high-level foreign buyers of 
buying offices within the market.  Yiwu administrators clearly recognize the 
legitimacy and reputational value of ties to high status actors.  
 
DISCUSSION 
Having detailed the process by which Yiwu achieved firm celebrity, the paper shifts to 
a focus on the previously outlined assertions.  Each will be dealt with separately. The 
first assertion stated that, “Legitimacy is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for 
firm-celebrity attainment.”  At the start of its existence, Yiwu had low levels of 
legitimacy, reputation, and status. Its legitimacy was under-developed for several 
reasons.  To understand these, it is necessary to consider organizational legitimacy.  
Organizational legitimacy is the degree to which a firm is recognized and accepted 
(Hannan and Caroll 1992).  Early in its development Yiwu was an unknown entity.  
This, in many ways, was an intentional situation.  Relevant Yiwu supporters, 
including Zhejiang Provincial leaders, wanted Yiwu to remain unknown.  China’s 
markets were still not fully accepted, and Yiwu was clearly a market-related entity.  
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It was better to keep Yiwu under wraps to see what happened.  But, if Yiwu were to 
achieve firm celebrity, it needed to become known (Rindova et al 2006:50).  To do 
so, however, required legitimacy, a factor dependent on macro-level trends.  Yet, 
even having attained a certain level of legitimacy (following the 1989 CCTV 
broadcast), firm celebrity for Yiwu was still not immediately forthcoming.  Yiwu 
was simply one of many markets.  It was distinctive, but because of macro-level 
based concerns, it continued to lack status.  Powerful actors, particularly in the 
political realm, were not willing to form known ties with it.  Also, Yiwu’s reputation 
was mixed.  On the one hand, it was a successful organization, in that it was 
surviving (not always easy for a new firm), and its members were doing well.  But, it 
had many deficiencies and lacked the resources (most importantly money) required to 
improve upon its weaknesses.  Yiwu’s deficiencies (inadequate infrastructures and 
questionable behaviors by its participants) adversely impacted its reputation, and also 
restrained the marketplace from promoting itself too much.  Thus, even possessing 
legitimacy, firm celebrity was not forthcoming.  While legitimacy was needed for 
firm celebrity to arise, it alone was not enough.  This suggests support for the first 
assertion.  
The second assertion relates to reputation.  It posits that, “For new firms, 
located in emerging organizational fields, although legitimacy precedes reputation in 
importance, the reputation-seeking process is a critical step in the attainment of firm 
celebrity.  This is because, if they are to achieve celebrity, firms need to distinguish 
themselves from their competitors.  This involves the establishment of reputation.” 
Reputation is dependent on processes of comparison.  It embodies a ranked structure, 
with firms being graded in a top-down sequence.  For new firms in emerging 
organizational fields, such rankings are not possible.  In fact, early on, Yiwu was not 
even that aware of its competition, instead focusing on its own activities.  Very little 
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mutual monitoring among competitors took place. Hence, standard forms of reputation 
frameworks could not form.  Instead, early on, Yiwu’s reputation was founded more 
upon its standing as a new form of development.  It was being compared with other 
new forms of development, rather than with other marketplaces, and its reputation was 
emerging on the basis of this comparison.  Yiwu framed itself as a pioneer.  Its 
development was predicated on markets first, and production second.  This differed 
from all other places, where production came first, followed by markets.  In turn, 
Yiwu garnered a reputation as an entity able to find new ways to provide its 
stakeholders with value, becoming a developmental innovator, a place embodying 
processes that were unique as compared to the situations of others.  The reputation-
forming process did not depend on a comparison between marketplaces, but rather on 
a comparison of developmental forms.  This helped Yiwu to achieve celebrity.  
Reputation formation was thus an important factor in Yiwu’s ability to become 
famous. There exists qualified support for the assertion.  
The focus of Yiwu’s positioning, however, changed over time, a process 
associated with the third assertion.  This third assertion states that, “For firm celebrity 
to develop further, there is a need for the establishment of a positively perceived firm 
reputation, one that is increasingly associated with over-conformance, as opposed to 
non-conformance.”  The framing of Yiwu was one that initially positioned it as an 
innovative mechanism of development rather than as a marketplace.  Yiwu framed 
itself as providing opportunity to those without other significant life chances, people 
like farmers and poor laborers.  No special talents or relationships were necessary in 
Yiwu.  Anyone willing to work hard and possessing a bit of luck could succeed.  In 
this sense, Yiwu was different from other places.  It was an open place and full of 
opportunity.  This made it special. Yiwu’s early reputation was predicated on its 
standing as an anomaly.  All things said, however, Yiwu was still a marketplace.  
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But, a reputation-formation process based on a comparison between marketplaces had 
to wait until a field of marketplaces came into being.  A certain level of recognition 
and acceptance of marketplaces needed to form before such a reputational basis could 
emerge.  Once an emerging organizational field achieves a certain level of 
legitimacy, however, if a firm’s celebrity development is to continue, the firm must 
begin to distinguish itself from other members of the field, those with whom it is 
naturally compared.  This is generally not a innate process, wherein one firm is a 
clear and recognized paradigm of “the important changes [occurring] in industries and 
society in general” (Rindova et al. 2006:52).  There are potentially, depending on 
how the situation is framed, many such firms, and not all firms can take on the 
“paradigm” role.  One firm must separate itself from its competition.  This suggests 
the rise a ranking structure.  This ranking structure, however, is not one based on 
status, in the sense that a network of relations determines it.  In Yiwu’s case, such 
relations had not yet had time to form.  This structure is rather one dependent on the 
signals being emitted by organizational-field members.  This, however, is analogous 
to reputation.  That is, the development of firm celebrity depends on reputation.  A 
key foundation of Yiwu’s reputation and hence its celebrity was Yiwu’s relative 
success, particularly in financial terms, as compared to its competitors.  It developed 
a reputation as an organization that successfully overcame the odds to become a high 
performer and ongoing innovator, doing so while providing its stakeholders with 
value.  Yiwu became an entity famous for its field-leadership abilities: an over-
conformer.  This differed from its previous standing as a non-conforming anomaly.  
There is support for the assertion.  
The next assertion deals with status.  It posits: “For a new, un-established firm, 
status is not a necessary condition for the development of firm celebrity.  Once 
celebrity is achieved, however, status is required to attain the over-conforming 
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standing needed for celebrity’s continuance and further development.”  According to 
Rindova et al., “status derives not so much from a firm’s past actions and investments 
but, rather, from observation of its affiliations with prominent network partners and its 
centrality within market exchange networks” (2006:55).  Early on, Yiwu had little 
status, and it also had little legitimacy, reputation, or fame. Yiwu administrators put 
their priority on achieving legitimacy.  To do garner legitimacy however, meant 
relying on the influence of powerful individuals, particularly actors within the polity.  
And though these actors were not particularly willing to form openly perceived ties 
with Yiwu, there were behind the scenes ties and these were important to Yiwu’s 
legitimation efforts.  Even so, prior to Yiwu’s success in forming open relationships 
with well-known, high-status individuals, like the mayor of Beijing, the market had 
only a modicum of legitimacy.  This constrained its ability to become a celebrity.  It 
appears in fact, that based on the Yiwu situation, status formation is a prerequisite to 
celebrity.  A change in the wording of the proposition above is required.  Open ties 
to powerful actors are not necessary for the development of celebrity, but some form 
of relationship with these actor types is required.  It is only through such 
relationships that full legitimacy, a precursor to celebrity, can be achieved.  The 
proposition needs rewriting.  Still, with regard to the second part of the assertion: the 
perceived need for celebrity firms to possess ties with high status others so as to 
become known as over-conformers, the evidence suggests that this is true, at least with 
respect to Yiwu.  Yiwu has used its resources to curry and maintain such ties, and in 
doing so has successfully perpetuated its celebrity.  The motivations behind these 
actions relate to the realizations that the networks that an actor forms with those of 
high status are not only able to influence the perceptions of others in the field, but also 
aid in the garnering of resources, doing so not only by influencing decision-making, 
but also by providing greater access to information and knowledge.  Actors become 
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better informed, helping them in their development.  
The fifth assertion states, “In a situation characterized by politicized capitalism, 
the status required by a celebrity-firm to transform itself into an over-conforming actor 
should depend on the development of ties between the organization and relevant, high-
ranking political leaders.”  Evidence for this can be drawn from the discussion above 
and the comments of the interviewee referred to earlier in the paper, who referred to 
two reasons regarding the importance of political markets: access to media coverage, 
and advantages relating to policy formulation.  In China, a nation characterized by 
politicized capitalism, the polity controls media access.  Good relations with the 
polity, therefore, result in media advantages.  Rindova et al. stressed the importance 
of the media in celebrity attainment.  This explains the importance of polity relations.  
A similar situation exists with respect to policy formation.  For a firm hoping to be 
seen as an over-conformer, such contacts are very important.  Under a context 
characterized by political capitalism, achieving leadership in any field is a political 
process.  Members of the polity decide who will and will not succeed. Evidence in 
support of the assertion exists.  The final assertion was the following:  “In order to 
successfully attain celebrity standing, firms must possess the abilities needed to 
develop and acquire the resources they need to achieve the desired celebrity outcome.”  
The Yiwu case showed this proposition to be especially true. Prior to it attaining 
needed resources (in particular, money), the marketplace did not achieve its potential.  
It was only after new wealth became available that the marketplace began to takeoff, 
at least from a celebrity standpoint.  Still, it must be noted that it was not simply the 
availability of resources that was important.  It was also the way in which Yiwu used 
these resources, applying them to improve infrastructures, develop useful networks of 
relations, and create a grand overall plan for the future that assured the market’s 
success.  
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CONCLUSION 
The focus of this paper has been to show the inter-relations between celebrity and 
three social structures:  legitimacy, reputation, and status, and to understand how 
these relations shape organizational hierarchies.  The paper examined the manner by 
which the constructions influenced the development of organization-differentiating 
firm celebrity.  The paper found that the three constructs are actively related to 
organizational developmental outcomes.  Another finding of the paper was that 
resources matter, as do the manner in which they are applied.  In the case of Yiwu, 
local administrators were successful in their attempts to garner the resources they 
wanted, using these resources to facilitate the emergence of legitimacy, reputation, and 
status for their organization.  Well-thought out application of resources, in 
conjunction with the development of legitimacy, reputation, and status were the means 
by which Yiwu attained a celebrity that helped to differentiate it from its competitors. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
THE ROLES OF INSTITUTIONAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND 
LEADERSHIP IN STIMULATING NORMATIVE CHANGE:  A CASE OF 
PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION IN CHINA 
 
Innovation, defined as the initiation or introduction of a new process or method, 
involves change.  Organizational theorists have traditionally characterized change 
as exogenous, resulting from isomorphic institutional adjustments or discontinuous 
events (jolts).  Until recently, they have given less attention to endogenous, or self-
generated, change.  This paper focuses on both forms of change.  It relies upon a 
case study to examine the relation between organizational innovation and agency, 
investigating recent innovations in a Chinese public organization, the All-China 
Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU).  Relying on interviews and extant literature, it 
considers the linkages between institutional entrepreneurship and innovation within a 
subunit of the ACFTU, focusing on the means by which innovation has been achieved.  
The paper also examines other factors that have impacted innovation and 
organizational change processes.  It raises four primary questions:  What 
organizational innovations took place; what actors and factors facilitated their 
occurrence; how were the innovations legitimized; and how are they being theorized 
and disseminated?  Answers to these questions help to clarify one type of innovation 
in Chinese public organizations, a type in which leadership and institutional 
entrepreneurship, complemented by both media involvement and political action, play 
leading roles. 
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This paper is about organizational innovation.  It examines the nuances of non-
technical innovation-generation in a selected public organization.  Inherent in this 
examination is an analysis of the means by which innovators disseminate their 
developments to wider organizational society.  Public organizations are important in 
this regard given that they frequently motivate “the institutionalization of business 
firms and nonprofit organizations” (Frumkin and Galaskiewicz 2004:283).  Although 
researchers often define innovation in a strictly Schumpeterian sense wherein “only 
patented inventions that are actually brought to the market are true innovations” (Nee, 
Kang, and Opper 2009:18), in this paper, I define the term more generally as “a 
process through which new ideas, objects, and practices are created, developed or 
reinvented, and which are new for the unit of adoption” (Walker 2007:592).  I also 
assume that innovation encompasses the processes by which potential adopters come 
to accept such ideas, objects and practices.   
In the past, research on organizational innovation has directed itself primarily to 
one of two areas, either the generation or the adoption of organizational innovation 
(Damanpour and Schneider 2008:496).  Most of this research has examined the 
“environmental and organizational conditions that facilitate or inhibit innovation 
adoption” (Damanpour and Schneider 2008:495).  Many emerging approaches have 
utilized a rationalistic tone in their discussions, asserting that those engaged in 
innovation intentionally and actively strategize to achieve results.  Here, however, 
the focus is not on adoption, but on processes of innovation generation, theorization, 
and dissemination.  Likewise, this paper does not assume the existence of early-on 
strategic action by those involved in innovative activity (though it might be present).  
Rather, its interest is to highlight the manner by which innovation arises, gains 
legitimacy, and is presented to potential adopters on the outside.  The paper posits 
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that innovation resulting from unsystematic and unintentional beginnings is possible.   
There is one element that is in strict accord with other studies of innovation, 
however.  This is that innovation involves change.  With regard to organizational 
theory, innovation “is a means of changing an organization, whether as a response to 
changes in its internal or external environment or as a preemptive action taken to 
influence an environment” (Damanpour 1991:556).  In fact, many researchers 
consider innovation (again in relation to the organization) to be a subset of 
organizational change (Woodman, Sawyer, and Griffin 1993:293).  However, how 
innovation-related organizational change occurs is still not completely clear.  There 
does not even exist, for example, agreement regarding the sources of organizational 
change, with some theories asserting the primacy of exogenous change (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983; Meyer 1982; Meyer, Brooks, and Goes 1990), and others putting the 
emphasis on endogenous transformations, or change coming from within (Greenwood, 
and Suddaby 2006; Leblebici, Salancik, Copay, and King 1991).  Still others stress a 
mixture of the two (Seo and Creed 2002).  This paper adopts the latter approach. 
The paper specifically examines innovation and organizational change in a local, 
Chinese public organization, The Yiwu General Trade Union (YGTU), a branch of 
China’s All-China Federation of Trade Union (ACFTU).  Although the YGTU is a 
small organization, it has had a significant impact in China, and this is the primary 
reason for its selection.  The paper relies upon an institutional perspective to analyze 
the YGTU’s recent developments.  It addresses three existing gaps in the literature.  
The first concerns the origins of innovation.  A common refrain emerging in 
organizational analysis has been that “The genesis of an innovation must be 
explained” (Hirsch and Lounsbury 1997:416).  By highlighting the empirical 
specifics associated with a specific example of innovation generation, the paper helps 
to answer the question of how innovation and institutional change occur.  This is of 
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use because institutional theorists have found it difficult to navigate around the 
concept of organizational change.  In fact, the understanding of micro-level change 
processes, and how the outcomes of these processes are transferred to more macro 
levels has been minimal (Garud, Jain, and Kumaraswamy 2002:196; Hoffman 
1999:351; Tsoukas and Chia 2002:568), with many asserting that the means “by 
which firms obtain or develop, combine, and leverage resources to create and maintain 
[those] competitive advantages are not well understood” (Sirmon, Hitt, and Ireland 
2007:274).  Specific questions of importance are:  How is change triggered; how do 
actors garner the necessary resources to implement change; how does embeddedness 
play a role in impacting change processes (Reay, Golden-Biddle, and Germann 2006); 
and, how do change-involved actors go about constructing and presenting themselves 
(and their changes) so as to achieve their goals (Hirsch and Lounsbury 1997:412)?  
To aid the analysis, strong (but not complete) emphasis is put on the role of agency, in 
the guise of institutional entrepreneurship, a form of endogenous change.  This 
necessitates consideration of the “paradox of embedded agency” (Holm 1995; Seo and 
Creed 2002), or the question of how actors, supposedly embedded within a given 
context (and thus constrained by it), are able to go about enacting change. 
Second, the paper deals with the issue of how organizations achieve legitimation. 
Legitimation is “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity 
are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of 
norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman 1995:574), and is essential to the 
success of institutional entrepreneurship.  But because past assumptions have posited 
that legitimation attainment is overwhelmingly associated with ties to the practices of 
already institutionalized, powerful organizations (Meyer and Rowan 1977), 
researchers have directed minimal attention to the sources of organizational legitimacy 
(Aldrich, and Fiol 1994:646; Zimmerman, and Zeitz 2002:414).  The reasoning has 
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been that mechanisms of imitation determine legitimacy outcomes.  The sources of 
legitimation are thus already clear.  To garner legitimacy an organization simply 
needs to imitate already legitimated, powerful others.  Institutional theory, in turn, 
has had difficulty in coming to grips with how new practices, incompatible with 
existing understandings, initially attain legitimacy (Munir 2005:93; Reay et al. 
2006:979).  It also has had a particularly hard time in explaining, “how third parties 
impact firm-level accumulation of legitimacy” (Pollock, and Rindova 1993:632).  
The analysis here seeks to answer these and other “how” questions.  For example, 
how was a non-powerful other, in the form of the YGTU, which (at least initially) 
possessed few apparent resources, able to attain legitimacy and use its legitimacy to 
strategically achieve competitive advantage? 
The third concern dealt with by the paper entails an analysis of the YGTU’s 
methods of theorization and its dissemination (not including adoption) of its 
innovations to others.  The approaches relied upon by the YGTU encompassed not 
only aspects of institutional entrepreneurship, but also involved the notion of 
“politicized capitalism” (Nee and Opper 2007).  Politicized capitalism refers to the 
continuing activism and involvement of state actors during market reform, a 
development characterized by innovation.  It melds together elements of both central 
planning and markets.  In this integrated realm the state (particularly at the central 
and provincial levels) helps to determine the success or failure of actions occurring 
locally.  As such, the paper differs from some recent approaches regarding China’s 
institutional development that have rigorously emphasized the singular importance of 
micro-level processes.  These approaches have discounted the influence of the central 
state and other broader structural frameworks, ignoring insights gained from some 
Weberian-informed approaches of the past (Selznick 1984).  Their assumption has 
been one asserting that the transformation of China’s economy has been 
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overwhelmingly dependent “on the decision-making powers available to local 
governments and businesses and on institutional innovation through coordination (i.e., 
incentives and governance) in the form of private exchange between these new 
political and economic actors” (Krug and Hendrischke 2008:81).  The seeming 
contention of these approaches is that, following the decentralization of power to 
China’s localities, the central state became irrelevant, with action at the local level 
taking on overwhelming prominence (Lin 2001:6).  The position of this paper, 
however, is that the central government in China has continued and continues to play a 
strong, but not always deciding, role in determining the course of both overall reform 
and organizational innovation and change.  While local actors are indeed often the 
source of new innovations, action at the central or provincial levels frequently 
influences which among many organizational forms will garner legitimation.  These 
favored forms have a greater potential of being widely adopted.  It is therefore the 
intersection of the macro- and micro-orders that is of interest here. 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Still, the primary focus of this paper is how human agency helps to promote both 
innovation and organizational change.  Such a focus is one possessing utility for 
studies of institutional change.  As Paul DiMaggio once intoned, “without more 
explicit attention to interest and agency of the kind that institutional rhetoric has thus 
far obstructed, institutional theorists will be unable to develop predictive and 
persuasive accounts of the origins, reproduction, and erosion of the institutionalized 
practices” (1988:11).  The work seeks to understand how through agency institutions 
arise and disseminate to the wider world.   
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INSTITUTIONAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
To achieve such an understanding, the paper applies the concept of institutional 
entrepreneurship.  Scholars define institutional entrepreneurship as a process 
whereby a socially skilled actor (an institutional entrepreneur) acts “to get disparate 
groups to cooperate precisely by putting themselves into the positions of others and 
creating meanings that appeal to a large number of actors” (Fligstein 2001:106).  
That is, the manner by which actors manage their outside relations with others impacts 
their future success.  In fact, the idea that actors differ in their social skills, or their 
abilities to “motivate cooperation in other actors by providing those actors with 
common meanings and identities” (Fligstein 1997:398), helps to explain why 
individuals facing similar contextual environments and working to achieve 
comparable goals often end up achieving dissimilar results.   It also helps to explain 
why only a few actors among all actors found within a particular situation end up 
becoming institutional change-makers. 
Institutional entrepreneurship abilities are not simply defined by social skill, 
however.  They also depend upon qualities of leadership.  This is why researchers 
have asserted that “If scholars want to understand why organizations do the things 
they do and why they perform the way they do, then top managers must be a central 
part of any explanatory theory” (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996:6).  Many 
investigators in fact believe that organizational leaders are often the most obvious and 
impact-generating institutional entrepreneurs in an organization.  The thinking is that 
it is only these leaders who possess the social capital and authority required to have a 
real impact on organizational outcomes.  But, this view is not ubiquitous.  The 
perspectives of organizational theorists “coming out of population ecology (e.g., 
Hannan and Freeman 1977) and new institutional theory (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell 
1988) [have been] that executives have little effect [on a particular organization] 
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because organizations are exceedingly inertial, swept along by external forces, and 
constrained by a host of conventions and norms” (Hambrick 2007:335).  This conflict 
in viewpoints can at least partially be resolved by research implying that the settings 
and conditions under which top leaders operate tend to strongly influence the degrees 
to which leaders impact their organizations (Crossland and Hambrick 2007; Mackey 
2008).  The primary factor that researchers believe determines this influence is 
leaders’ levels of discretion, “or latitudes of action” (Hambrick 2007:335).  In 
addition, the motivations and personal characteristics of leaders, and the resources 
(including their own time) that leaders can direct to change-oriented activities also 
impact the outcomes that arise. 
Another trait commonly associated with institutional entrepreneurs is their 
standing as outsiders.  It has been suggested that institutional entrepreneurs tend to be 
“fringe players” (Leblebeci et al. 1991), meaning that they are on average less 
powerful entities vis-à-vis their competition (powerful actors would not need to rely 
on their social skills to garner the cooperation of others given that they generally 
possess the ability (power) to make others adhere to their wishes).  Researchers also 
assume that institutional entrepreneurs are comparatively less embedded in existing 
networks of relations (Greenwood and Suddaby 2006:29).  Embeddedness is “a 
middle ground between under- and oversocialized views” (Granovetter 1985:487), and 
refers to the degree to which social interactions and relationships influence the nature 
of action, particularly economic action (Uzzi 1996:674).  Un-embedded actors are 
said to be free of the institutional constraints that would inhibit more embedded actors 
from taking innovative or change-related action, and thus they have more opportunity 
to change their organizations.  But, here one needs to be careful.  Although 
embeddedness has often been portrayed as an either/or relation, meaning that one is 
either embedded or un-embedded, differing forms of embeddedness often characterize 
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actors at the same time.  For example, one can be embedded in a network of social 
relations, but not necessarily be embedded in a particular field-type structure.  Fields 
are ordered and defined social realms that delineate the nature and form of 
encompassed social interaction, and in which involved actors possess unique (but 
common to the field), normative understandings and beliefs (Bourdieu 1990:66-68).  
In other words, field conceptualizations encompass facets relating both to an actor’s 
social interactions, as well as to their forms of action and thought.  The contention 
here is that actors can be embedded in a structure of social relations without being 
embedded in a field.  Thus, embeddedness does not necessarily imply constraints on 
behavior and thought, because one can be socially embedded, but not field-embedded.  
This suggests that the research of Reay et al. (2006), stressing that (social-relation) 
embeddedness is often a catalyst for innovation and change, and the views of other 
theorists asserting that (field) embeddedness acts to constrain such outcomes, might 
simultaneously both be valid.  This also potentially helps to resolve the quandary 
concerning the previously mentioned “paradox of embedded agency.”  
Although it is possibly implied in the above discussion regarding the relation of 
institutional entrepreneurs and social skill, another point that must again be strongly 
emphasized is that institutional entrepreneurs are political beings.  Institutional 
entrepreneurs facilitate the melding of diverse and oftentimes mutually opposing 
views into a common perspective dedicated to the fruition of institutional change.  
They frequently, however, lack the resources to carry out their efforts, and thus must 
regularly rely on outside assistance for support.  To garner such support, however, 
institutional entrepreneurs need to market themselves.  They must become 
salespersons selling a concept, with that concept being some form of change.  This 
involves the effective theorization of their positions (Strang and Meyer 1993), as well 
as the need to seek out legitimation for their efforts.  Theorists jointly refer to these 
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processes as the theorization stage of institutional change (Greenwood, Suddaby, and 
Hinings 2002:60).   
 
INSTITUTIONAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP AS A PROCESS 
This leads into a discussion of some of the intricacies of institutional entrepreneurship.  
Institutional entrepreneurship is a process, involving multiple steps.  It initially 
entails the determination (most often occurring at the individual actor level) of the 
need for change, and the commencement of some subsequent form of innovative 
action by that actor who has determined that a change is needed (motivation for 
change is required).  Alone, however, these steps are not sufficient to achieve 
institutional change.  They simply represent facets of the pre-institutionalization 
stage of change (Tolbert and Zucker 1996), which is followed by semi-
institutionalization.  Theorization is the first step of this stage.  The semi-
institutionalization stage involves the determination and statement of a generic 
organizational problem (Tolbert and Zucker 1996).  It also encompasses a process of 
model construction, or the formulation of a framework meant to explain and justify the 
innovative changes that are taking place.  With this model defined, change is then 
more easily facilitated.  Initial legitimation efforts, at least with respect to cognitive 
and normative legitimacy, also occur during the theorization stage (Greenwood et al. 
2002; Tolbert and Zucker 1996:183), a stage during which agency and structure 
become linked via model construction.  Hargrave and Van de Ven hypothesize that 
model-making resolves five factors:  1) knowledge of what is being explained 
(definition of the problem); 2) the principal actors involved; 3) the factors giving rise 
to action; 4) the processes by which action takes place; and, 5) the outcome of action 
(2006:867).  Models are an important part of the institutional change process because 
they help to clarify the new, idealized organizational world.  This, in turn, makes this 
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world acceptable to its potential adopters (Strang and Meyer 1993:493).  Models, as 
with templates, enhance “the effectiveness of knowledge transfer” (Jensen, and 
Szulanski 2007:1727), in that they augment understanding and acceptance among end 
users.  This is true assuming that the process of model construction takes into 
consideration the needs and thoughts of potential adopters, revealing to them how 
application of the model would meet their requirements.  If not, and too much cause-
effect ambiguity exists, adoption and effective application of a model will be low 
(Strang and Still 2006). 
The dissemination of an institutional change model is a component of the second 
part of the semi-institutionalization stage.  Many researchers refer to this second part 
as diffusion (Greenwood et al. 2002:60-61; Strang and Meyer 1993), but diffusion 
assumes that “executives know what new developments are hot and which are not” 
(Strang and Soule 1998:266).  It also takes for granted that the practices being 
transferred to others will be fully accepted, and that convergence will occur.  But, 
research has shown that this is not always the case.  Compliance and convergence are 
two different processes (Ashworth, Boyne, and Delbridge 2009).  A reliance on the 
concept of dissemination, therefore, assumes that diffusion is not always an adequate 
mechanism when considering the manner by which actors become aware of and go on 
to adopt a particular innovation.  This paper will not consider adoption; but, even 
with regard to awareness-construction processes, dissemination encompasses many 
mechanism not encompassed by diffusion.  These mechanisms include sensemaking 
(Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld 2005), storytelling (Lounsbury, and Glynn 2001; 
Martens, Jennings, and Jennings 2007; Zilber 2007), media-publicity efforts (Pollock, 
and Rindova 2003), reputation building (Rindova, Williamson, Petkova, and Sever 
2005), and legitimation.   
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METHOD 
 
STUDY PARTICULARS 
This is a qualitative, case study, dealing with generation of innovation at the YGTU.  
Case studies are particularly useful “when ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are being posed, 
when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a 
contemporary phenomenon with some real-life context” (Yin, 2003:1).  The YGTU 
is an appropriate subject of analysis for several reasons.  First, I am interested in the 
nature of China’s changing industrial relations, which have been transformed in the 
aftermath of the 1978-initiated market reforms.  One would assume that China’s 
trade unions have had a role in these changes, especially since analysts assert that 
China has the largest trade union membership in the world (Metcalf and Li 2006:1).  
China’s trade unions, however, are not independent entities, but are public 
organizations, under the control of China’s Communist Party.  Because of this, 
researchers have raised questions as to how effective the unions actually are (Taylor 
and Li 2007).  In fact, many have concluded that China’s unions simply serve a 
ceremonial function.  The issue of how to maintain stability during the market 
development process, however, is one of China’s greatest concerns.  Thus, whatever 
the past history of the unions, a key step in their futures must be their transition from 
largely ceremonial organizations serving only the interests of the party (Chen 
2003:1007), to more activist and effective entities able to better assist society.  This 
makes the organizational innovations occurring at the YGTU of particular interest.  
Second, Yiwu, itself, is a poster-child for China’s market development progress.  
Economically, Yiwu has progressed from a small, backward rural community to 
become one of China’s key business centers.  During this process, it has avoided 
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much of the social instability common in other parts of China.  It is thus a useful site 
to pursue research on market development and the function of China’s unions.  Third, 
the YGTU has played a significant role in helping to maintain social stability in Yiwu.  
But, to do so, it has had to re-invent itself through innovation.  Not only has it 
changed itself, but its experiences have become a model of development for other 
local China trade-unions.  Its history of innovation and the manner by which it has 
come to serve as a model for others thus makes it a very appropriate focus. 
 
SAMPLE 
I derived the gist of the paper’s results from face-to-face interviews (conducted in 
Chinese), and from various published written and video resources.  Initial author-
conducted interviews took place during December 2008, and then continued during 
the months of May and June in 2009.  I carried out the majority of the interviews in 
Yiwu, with one set of interviews occurring at the headquarters of the ACFTU in 
Beijing.  An assistant also performed some additional telephone interviews from 
China (following the author’s return to the U.S.) in July 2009.  In addition, during 
July 2009, I also called some of the interviewees for follow-up questions.  A total of 
around 30 hours of interviews took place.  Those interviewed included officials of 
the YGTU, national and local Yiwu media representatives, professors engaged in 
YGTU research, officials from local trade-union related organizations, and migrant 
workers.  Excluding the migrant workers, ten persons were formally interviewed:  
three officials from the YFTU, three media representatives; two local trade-union 
affiliated officials; and, two, China-based professors researching the YGTU 
phenomenon.  The number of workers interviewed approached 100 individuals.  
But, apart from three-extended, one-on-one interviews with workers, the other 
interviews were conducted with groups of workers, with each of the groups numbering 
 204 
between 30 and 40 persons each (three groups in total).   The location of the worker-
conducted interviews was Yiwu’s Labor Market.   
The opportunity to carry out the interviews arose through an introduction to the 
head of the YGTU, Chen Youde.  Oftentimes, doing fieldwork in China, particularly 
in China’s rural areas, is problematic.  Trust issues arise that make such processes 
difficult.  Also, without some reliance on personal relations, interview responses are 
not always truthful or accurate.  But, because I was introduced to him through a 
friend (a form of guanxi), Chen was extremely cooperative during the interview 
process.  He was the primary focus of the interviews, and I interviewed him, on five 
different occasions, for a total of more than 10 hours.  In addition, an assistant 
conducted another telephone interview with him that extended for about an hour.   
 
STRUCTURE OF THE QUESTIONING 
The innovations engendered by the YGTU have come to be known as the Yiwu Trade 
Union Socialized Worker’s Rights Model.  Following my introduction to Chen in 
December 2008, I engaged in some preliminary interviews with him to obtain a 
general understanding of the model’s background, concluding that there existed an 
interesting story.  This was important to determine because, as Eisenhardt writes, “a 
good story is an essential first step” to any successful case study (1991:627).  I then 
spent time considering how I wanted to tell this story and what questions I would need 
to ask.  The original set of questions I drew up focused overwhelmingly on the 
processes behind the generation of the Yiwu Model.  Prior to initiating the face-to-
face interviews, I tested out the questions on others to make sure that they understood 
what I was attempting to ask.  With this confidence assured, I then began my 
interviews of Chen.  Chen, however, did not seem comfortable discussing the model 
or with a dialogue concerning the more theoretical aspects of its construction.  I thus 
 205 
modified my approach.  Rather than asking very specific questions that related 
directly to the research topic, I instead memorized the questions that I wanted to ask, 
and then allowed Chen to talk openly about his experiences as well as his background.  
At times when he would refer to topics associated with one of my questions, I would 
prompt him for additional insights.  Although time consuming, this approach worked 
far more suitably than had the original set of formal questioning.  Chen, too, was 
much more satisfied with the results.  I then used a similar approach with the other 
interviewees.  For the telephone interviews, however, reliance on such a method was 
not possible.  Here, specific questions were addressed to the interviewees.  The 
results were not as optimal as the free flowing style of questioning, but the process 
generally sufficed to obtain the information required. 
 
RESULTS 
 
My goal here is to focus on the four questions posed at the beginning of this paper, 
and to answer “how” innovation occurred at the YGTU.  These questions are:  What 
actual organizational innovations took place; what actors and factors facilitated their 
occurrence; how were the innovations legitimized; and how are they being theorized 
and disseminated?   
 
THE YGTU’S INNOVATIONS 
To comprehend better the innovations at the YGTU, I first provide some background 
regarding the development of Yiwu, and the situation existing at the YGTU prior to 
the arrival of Chen Youde.  Yiwu is a part of the Jinhua region, and is located in the 
nearly exact middle of Zhejiang province.  In 1978, it was an underdeveloped, rural 
community.  Although Yiwu’s county (it has since become a city) population in 1985 
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was already 593,002 persons, the overwhelming majority of this was dispersed 
amongst Yiwu’s agricultural areas.  In fact, in 1985, in the only semi-urban area of 
Yiwu, Choucheng Township, there were only 41,592 residents (Wu 1986:88).  
According to a newspaper reporter who visited Yiwu during the 1980s, “When I first 
went to Yiwu there was only one small road.  There was really nothing.  We didn’t 
think much of the place or that it would ever develop” (11/29/08 interview).  Yiwu’s 
position in the administrative hierarchy was very low, and although it had a market it 
had very little else.  Few were aware of its existence. 
The contrast with today is great.  In contemporary China, Yiwu’s status has 
changed considerably.  This is due to the success of Yiwu’s market, which the city’s 
residents now tout as being the largest small commodities market in the world.  The 
population of Yiwu currently exceeds 1.7 million residents, of whom over one million 
are from other parts of China and the world.  In 2008, registered (local) residents of 
the previously referred to Chou Cheng District were 116, 591, and when population 
figures include outsiders this figure is much higher.9  Chou Cheng is now only one of 
several districts making up urban Yiwu.  In other ways, Yiwu has also improved 
immensely.  One may gain a sense of Yiwu’s success from the following quote:  
 
Between 1978 and 2007, the Yiwu district’s total value of production 
increased from 128 million RMB to 41 billion RMB, 319 times the 
original amount, an average yearly increase of 22%; financial income for 
the city went from 20 million RMB to 5.888 billion RMB, 293.4 times the 
original amount, representing an average yearly increase of 21.6%; the 
holdings of banks and other financial institutions in the city increased 
                                                
9 See:  http://www.stat-yw.gov.cn/Article.asp?ArtlD=664&BClassD=30 (accessed 7/14/09). 
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from 30 million RMB to 85.56 billion RMB, 2851 times the original 
amount, for an average yearly increase of 31.6%...In 2006, of the 100 top 
county level cities in China, Yiwu was ranked 12th (after being previously 
unranked in 1978), and in terms of its overall competitiveness within 
Zhejiang Province, Yiwu was ranked first when compared with other 
similarly sized cities.10 
 
But, with success often come problems, particularly social ones, and Yiwu has 
faced its share.  Many of the countless outsiders who have come to Yiwu have been 
migrant laborers, and early on, especially prior to the involvement of the YGTU, 
scores of these workers faced employment situations that were not always fair.  
Many employers took advantage of them, cheating them out of wages and/or asking 
them to make concessions that were not in accord with the law.  The laborers 
responded in ways that one might expect.  Conflicts were common, and prior to 1999 
there had already taken place multiple killings of company heads by angry workers.  
Owners and managers hired thugs, similar to the mafia, to protect themselves, and to 
deal with their non-obedient employees and/or those they viewed as threats.  
Laborers frequently banded together, particularly on the basis of geographic 
background, to fight for their rights.  A result of the situation was that during an 
approximately one-and-a-half year period between September 1998 and May 2000, a 
time encompassing the start of Chen’s time at the YGTU, four major incidents of 
management/worker friction took place in Yiwu.  During these incidents, the wives 
of two bosses, three children, and two laborers all lost their lives, and an additional, 
related suicide also took place (Ge 2008:34).  The social situation of Yiwu was not 
good (May 17, 2009 interview). 
                                                
10 See:  http://gd.people.com.cn/GB?123946/8143881.html 
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Before Chen Youde’s arrival in 1999, the YGTU played a minimal role in 
improving the situation.  One YGTU administrator characterized the union at that 
time to be a kind of retirement home for the government (zhengfu de yanglaoyuan) 
(May 19, 2009 interview).  Other trade unions in China were no different.  Nobody 
expected union leaders to accomplish anything other than to not make trouble.  
Becoming the head of the trade union was akin to garnering an honor, but the position 
had little power.  With respect to the contributions of Chen’s predecessor, a YGTU 
administrator simply said that he “observed all the rules and regulations.  He did 
what his higher ups asked him to do” (July 4, 2009 interview).  There is little sense of 
leadership or activism inherent in these comments. 
The trade unions also faced a variety of difficulties in improving their status.  
This was evident following the 1978 reforms, when the unions had difficulties in 
adjusting to the newly arising situations.  Researchers have cited various reasons for 
this (Han, Luo, Lin, and Ge 2008:112-118).  For one thing, the pre-reform function 
of the trade unions was very much tied to the workings of the state-operated 
enterprises (SOEs).  The law on unions requires that employees of SOEs and 
collective enterprises be members of a union (Zhang 2009:195).  This is not true for 
employees in private enterprises, however.  In conjunction with China’s market 
development, however, the number of SOEs has fallen while the number of private 
enterprises has increased.  For evidence of this we can look to the period between 
1996 and 2001 when the number of private enterprises went from 443,000 to more 
than 1.32 million, an average increase of 24.5% annually (Han et al. 2008:112).  At 
the same time, the number of state enterprises in China declined.  Given that the 
original purpose of the unions was linked with the SOEs, this change resulted in a 
reduction of union influence, and the unions have had trouble in adjusting to this 
situation.  The unions’ institutionalized mechanisms of operation and the needs of 
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society increasingly became misaligned as well.  Although there was a growing need 
for the union to focus its efforts on the protection of worker rights and worker 
education, it continued to follow its old form.  Regarding this form, apart from acting 
as a conduit for information flow between the government/party and the enterprises (a 
kind of transmission belt) (Ng and Warner 1998), the union served little function, and 
there existed few social forces motivating it to change its ways.  The only push for 
adjustments emanated from the political sector, and this arose only at times when 
crises erupted.  But, even had the unions wanted to adopt a more involved role in the 
protection of worker rights they were not set up to do so.  They possessed few 
resources to facilitate change.  They likewise had to deal with forces militating 
against positive transforms.  These included individual-level factors, such as 
jealousy, distrust of motives, and other forms of resentment.  
Although the maintenance of personal relations is important in any society, in 
China because of its incredibly competitive social environment, it is especially critical.  
Issues of “face” (Ho 1976; Hwang 1987), wherein the disclosure of direct meanings 
and intentions is avoided, make these relations extremely hard to judge and manage, 
and require special talents.  Action-taking individuals face many constraints.  
Within the extremely competitive, Chinese social-environment, leaders do not want 
lower ranking administrators to outshine them, colleagues of similar or near similar 
status do not want their equals to do better than they do, and even lower level workers 
resent leaders who receive too many accolades.  This makes it difficult for anyone to 
initiate and promote positive social change.  This is because people don’t want to 
upset others; and change often engenders conflict.   Outside the firm, too, there were 
forces acting to constrain the union’s actions.  Businesses viewed the union as an 
impediment to their progress and took actions meant to counteract the expansion of 
union powers.  But, in actuality, in this regard businesses didn’t need to expend great 
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effort.  The union didn’t possess many resources it could use to force actors to 
comply with its wishes.  Still, in the face of these difficulties the YGTU succeeded in 
promoting change, and this is what makes it exceptional.  The organization has 
become a recognized innovator in China, possessing a reputation as a difference 
maker.   
The YGTU’s primary innovation has been the establishment of a framework of 
worker-rights protection for Yiwu’s workers.  This framework was not simply the 
implementation of a plan formulated at some higher political level, but was 
independently developed by the YGTU as a means to improve Yiwu.  It includes a 
number of different parts.  A principal component of the framework was the 
establishment in October 2000 of the Yiwu Worker’s Legal Rights Association (or 
Center as it is now known), the first of its kind in China.  The Center’s 
responsibilities include legal education for workers, the investigation of worker 
complaints, mediation assistance, and the provision of legal services, including expert 
testimony and assistance in the actual presentation of case arguments, to those found 
to be in need.  The innovative result was the empowering of workers to make them 
aware of their rights and obligations, something which at the time was not a 
legitimated outcome.  Another organizationally related innovation was the 
inauguration of a network of relations that links representatives from all of those 
governmental departments and units that interface with worker rights issues (including 
representatives from the legal system), along with members of the media, and other 
outside experts.  The goal was to integrate the worker-rights actions of a variety of 
agencies so as to increase operating efficiency, improve communications, and enhance 
overall understanding.  While seeming like a logical action to take, it was anything 
but easy to engender.  Third, the YGTU was innovative in its use of the law to 
support its cause.  This was perhaps more an innovation relating to implementation 
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than development, but even so it involved change and a new manner of action.  China 
has a significant and well-thought-out set of laws governing society.  In the past, 
however, local unions seldom relied upon these laws to manage the worker-rights 
situation.  Instead, when problems arose they would either not get involved or simply 
apply arbitrary forms of solution to problem resolution.  There were rarely any set 
forms of problem-resolution action.  This resulted in much ambiguity and a lack of 
standards.  Chen, however, changed this situation believing that existing law should 
be applied forcefully.  And, where no appropriate law existed he determined that a 
precedent should be set that would then be followed.  But, he first made sure that 
affected business-owners were made aware of the laws that would be applied.  He 
spent much time developing routines of education and enforcement, essentially 
institutionalizing and standardizing the processes by which the YGTU would organize 
and manage worker rights (Han 2007:162-164; 224).  A fourth innovation of the 
YGTU was its own acceptance of responsibility for the improvement of its resource 
situation.  This differed from the stances of other trade unions, which simply 
accepted a limited resource base, preferring inactivity to the trouble associated with 
trying to enhance resource availability.  Given that many view the key to 
organizational success as being “the ability to acquire and maintain resources” (Pfeffer 
and Salancik 1978:2), this is an important point.  At the time of Chen’s arrival at the 
YGTU in 1999, the organization was extremely short on resources, particularly 
money.  During the late 1990s many formerly public firms had gone through a 
process of privatization thus eliminating their need to maintain an enterprise union.  
With the drop in the numbers of enterprise unions, the YGTU’s funds declined.11  
The shortage of operating funds was such that the YGTU frequently had to delay 
                                                
11 A major source of funding is from those firms possessing unions.  The firms by law are to submit 
2% of their total payroll to their union.  The union then funnels a portion of these funds to the local 
general union (like the YGTU in Yiwu). 
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payment of salaries to its own employees.  Needless to say, there were few funds 
available to carry out other activities.  Chen dealt with the situation in various ways.  
In one case, to support the existence of the new workers-rights center, the YGTU 
asked the government for permission to open its own school.  This school’s 
announced purpose was to hold classes for the representatives of the enterprise unions 
(the SOE unions and any private companies that had also established unions), but in 
reality, it had another even more important goal.  Chen hoped that the tuition the 
school charged its students would be enough to provide the YGTU the funds it needed 
to support its change efforts.  In November 2000, a month after the start of the 
workers rights center, the government approved the school’s application.  During the 
school’s first month it earned more than RMB 38,000, a sum desperately needed for 
the center.  But resentful of its success,12 other government offices undertook efforts 
to do away with the opportunity, and were largely successful in its efforts:  “this 
[action] frustrated all of the YGTU’s employees, and made them aware of the 
difficulty of establishing the new center” (Han, et al. 2007:227).  Apart from seeking 
additional help from the government (help which early-on was not significant), Chen 
also relied on various other socially developed sources of help as well. 
 
THE PEOPLE AND FACTORS BEHIND THE YGTU INNOVATIONS 
In the words of one interviewee, “In China, everything depends on the leader.  If the 
leader is good, capable, and hardworking, the organization will be good” (June 14, 
2009 interview).  China is a hierarchical society and power is concentrated in its 
leaders.  This is true not just at the state level, but is also the case within business and 
public organizations.  Leaders are the key to understanding change in China, and this 
paper therefore focuses on an organizational leader, Chen Youde.  Although it may 
                                                
12 This conclusion was drawn from the comments of YGTU employees and the Han et al. book. 
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appear to be one, the paper is not meant to be a testimonial, nor does it minimize the 
importance of the YGTU as an organization.  In fact, although the paper largely 
focuses on Chen, it is an organizational study, but in an entrepreneurial sense, given 
that it “fits the five criteria for a simple organizational structure proposed by 
Mintzberg (1983:158)…Structures like this are most often found in entrepreneurial 
firms” (Mintzberg, quoted in Weick 1993:632-633).  It sets out to show how a 
socially skilled, motivated, selfless leader, who is inspired to do good, can impact 
innovation within a public organizations in China, even when faced with what seems 
to be a resource-deficient situation.  Based on numerous accounts, without Chen, the 
innovations of the YGTU would not have occurred.  It was Chen serving as head of 
the YGTU that was of paramount importance.  Why Chen and what made him 
special?  The answer requires insight into his past. 
Chen’s parents were farmers.  He had no special privileges growing up, but he 
was a hard worker and had a strong sense of responsibility.  After graduation from 
high school in 1974, one of his first major responsibilities was an unofficial position in 
the government managing a local commune.  According to knowledgeable 
individuals, he did a great job.  Some factors influencing his performance might have 
been the strong work ethic and the motivation to do good that he had garnered from 
his upbringing.  Still, largely because of his lack of connections, he was passed over 
for promotion to official standing, essentially signaling the end of his governmental 
career.  The local people (including local officials), however, supported him, and 
they petitioned higher-level organization departments (zuzhi bu), which are 
responsible for personnel decisions, asking them to investigate the situation.  This 
was a very uncommon occurrence, and the departments sent officials to probe.  The 
examining officials recommended that Chen be granted an appointment, and he 
became a government official.  After this success, Chen’s mother beseeched him to 
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“never forget the common people because it was they who made your triumph 
possible” (Ge 2008:28).  According to Chen, these words have been with him ever 
since (June 13, 2009 interview).  In 1983, Chen became a county magistrate, and in 
1985 the party appointed him to be a county party secretary.  He served in that 
position for close to 14 years until his posting to the YGTU.  As a party secretary he 
had a significant amount of power and standing, and also interacted on a daily basis 
with the common people (lao bai xing), dealing with their problems, and learning how 
to help them resolve their conflicts.  He also had to manage a variety of complex 
issues, for example the collection of taxes.  In many situations, simply ordering an 
action to take place was not possible:  “One of the central misconceptions about 
China is that because it is an authoritarian system it can do anything it wishes.  
Actually, China lacks the institutions and credibility that allow modern bureaucracies 
to function effectively” (Johnson 2004:25).  Chen, thus, needed to negotiate, 
compromise and sometimes even resort to confrontation to be successful.  These 
experiences refined his abilities in tactfulness, strategy development, and conflict 
management.  His social skills underwent continuous improvement, and he became 
socially skilled.  This was critical to his later success.    
When Chen moved to the YGTU, he was not happy.  Although officially, the 
move was a promotion, he was not satisfied simply to receive a high salary and wait 
for retirement.  At the time, Chen’s opinion of his new role was that it was a position 
“of little importance—a high position with little meaning” (May 16, 2009 interview).  
One interviewee, who has known Chen for many years, noted that during the period 
immediately following the YGTU appointment “Chen was very depressed.  He did 
not fit in well with his new work environment” (June 2, 2009 interview).  But, Chen 
did not allow his emotions to stop him from taking action.  Instead, he decided to 
undertake, at the local level, a survey of the existing situation.  While this may seem 
 215 
to have been a simple decision on his part, in actuality it is one that many Chinese 
leaders avoid taking because it opens up the realm of the unknown.  Political 
leadership in China is often such that if a leader just sits in his/her office and does 
nothing of substance (apart from getting along with their superiors), but also does not 
spawn attention-creating problems, that leader will generally achieve career success.  
If the leader actually takes action, yet ends up creating a problem, he/she can suffer 
greatly, particularly in the short term.  By interacting face to face with the local 
population, Chen thus exposed himself to significant risk.  Because of this, one 
YGTU employee related that “One of the most impressive things about Chen is his 
willingness to go down to the local level and interact with the common people and 
understand their problems and situation.  Few other leaders do this” (May 19, 2009 
interview).  Based on my previous investigations of other Chinese leaders, it is 
apparent that it is those leaders willing to take such risks, and engage in action 
pertaining to the needs of the people, who in the long term end up achieving greatness.  
In fact, in the post-reform history of Yiwu, Chen follows other such local leaders, 
individuals like Xie Gaohua, Yang Shouchun, and Mao Guanglie, who also undertook 
local-level surveys to discover the real needs of the common people, and who then 
took action appropriate to the situation.  Yiwu residents now consider these 
individuals to be among the best of Yiwu’s political-executives during the reform 
period.    
Chen’s foray into investigating the YGTU’s situation completely changed his 
attitude towards his new position.  After the survey process, an YGTU employee 
quotes him as saying, “The YGTU is ‘my new home.’  I’ve found new hope for 
tomorrow” (Ge 2008:31).  What caused this change in attitude?  The key factor was 
Chen’s discovery that “95% of the workers employed in Yiwu’s more than 10,000 
private firms were, like Chen, just off the farm.  He saw in them fellow brethren” (Ge 
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2008:31), and felt like he had the means to help them.  He believed he could make a 
difference, and had the motivation to take action.  Chen also “felt compassion for 
those from the outside, who were farmers like [him].”  He related that, “I knew how 
difficult their situations were” (June 13, 2009 interview).  Chen’s feelings were 
representative of most of those within the YGTU.  Chen and his YGTU employees’ 
feelings of compassion, motivation and “spirit” have been keys to the organization’s 
success. 
But, even possessing these traits, in the absence of any legal powers to force 
businesses to act in line with its guidelines, the YGTU appeared to have little potential 
to engender innovative change.  Many questioned the YGTU’s ability to make a 
difference.  Apart from a lack of legally sanctioned powers, the YGTU lacked other 
needed resources as well.  It had little money, and its number of employees was 
limited.  In such a situation, what could it do?  Although the YGTU had little 
money and no real power to enforce its determinations, what it did have was Chen’s 
history of activity in Yiwu, which had left him with a good reputation (as someone 
who actually did things rather than just talking a good line), a strong work ethic, 
excellent social skills, and plenty of social capital.  Chen used these attributes to aid 
the YGTU in its quest to transform the status quo and improve the situation facing 
Yiwu-situated workers.   
Here, I again mention the idea of embeddedness, and stress the difference 
between an embeddedness associated with social relations and one relating to fields.  
Social-relation embeddedness involves linkages with other individuals through 
friendship or other relations, and is one form of embeddedness.  This is not the same 
thing necessarily as field embeddedness, however.  Field embeddedness implies 
linkages among involved actors in terms of normative forms of belief and action.  In 
other words, field embeddedness implies a kind of pressure on actors to think and act 
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in a certain way.  When he came into the YGTU, Chen possessed social 
embeddedness, but was not constrained by field embeddedness (at least from the 
standpoint of the YGTU context).  Coming to the union from the outside, he was not 
limited by notions of how he should behave as a union head, and thus took actions that 
perhaps other union heads might not.  Also, as someone others believed to be in an 
organization with little status, other government officials ignored him and allowed to 
do as he pleased.  This left him with a high degree of discretion regarding his actions. 
Even with Chen’s relative freedom and willingness to innovate for good, 
however, trying to improve the situations of the workers employed in Yiwu was a 
difficult process, and during this process Chen “upset a number of locals, company 
bosses especially, and these bosses had strong connections within the community.  
This created some real problems.  In order to continue, the YGTU needed to garner 
assistance to see it through this period” (May 27, 2009 interview).  Chen, himself, 
recognized this need, saying “I knew that in order to accomplish something, I could 
not rely upon myself, only” (June 13, 2009 interview).  Where did the YGTU find 
the help it needed?  It found it in the media and in the support of higher levels of 
government.  In China, the media, like the unions, is a party entity.  It is formally 
under the control of the party’s Bureau of Propaganda (xuan chuan bu).  This said, 
however, to comprehend the relationship between the YGTU and the media, “it is 
necessary to understand that the Chinese press today is no longer totally under state 
control” (Chan 2007:87).  While in its reports the media still focuses primarily on the 
positive (zheng mian wei zhu) (October 16, 2008 interview), and there continues to be 
bias in some of its “news” (particularly of a political nature), it is also true that “On 
their own initiative, [the Chinese media] cover[s] stories [it] considers newsworthy” 
(October 16, 2008 interview).  And, even though some of their stories are ones for 
which reporters garner kickbacks (i.e., a reporter is asked to report favorably about a 
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particular event and by doing so receives under the table compensation), most 
reporters are still patriots who want to see China improve.  When made aware of a 
situation in which a particular organization or individual is making attempts to better 
Chinese society, they will support that entity in its efforts.  This is something Chen 
understood, and the YGTU “played to this” (July 4, 2009 interview).   
Chen also knew that in order to succeed he would need the support of higher 
levels of government.  Political workings at the local level are often embedded in 
difficult-to-change structures, which make the initiation of locally based, truly 
innovative action difficult.  Although there were many in Yiwu who supported what 
the YGTU was attempting to do, there was also significant opposition.  The 
inauguration of a worker’s-rights legal center would potentially empower workers, 
providing these workers with an understanding that might upset existing stability.  
The fear was that this could impact in-place benefit and resource structures.  To 
minimize the effects of this opposition, Chen sought help from a higher level of 
government, taking his plans to the Jinhua government (which oversaw Yiwu) for 
approval and support.  With the support of Jinhua, the worker’s-rights center would 
become a reality, regardless of opposition from Yiwu actors.  Chen was successful in 
his efforts.   
 
THE THEORIZATION PROCESS OF THE YGTU INNOVATIONS 
According to Tolbert and Zucker, theorization involves the specification of a problem, 
and the justification of a means to solve it (1996:183).  The YGTU’s theorization 
process was quite important for the organization given that the YGTU initially had 
few resources on which to rely to carry out its innovation activities.  It needed 
outside support, and had to convince others to help it.  This meant giving these others 
a reason for their support.  During the late 1990s, although an increase had occurred 
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in Yiwu in the number of social conflicts occurring between firm managers and their 
workers, and this was known by many to be a problem, what had to be specified was 
the relation of the YGTU to this problem.  What could the YGTU to improve the 
situation.  Chen accepted responsibility for making this linkage clear.  He was able 
to oversee the merging of the YGTU with the problem-resolution process, fusing 
together the specification and justification steps.   
In fostering this integration, one thing Chen did was to identify how the efforts 
of the YGTU were in the interests of others, particularly those who might potentially 
be in opposition to the YGTU:  “Our function is two fold:  On the one hand, to 
benefit society, and on the other to benefit business” (December 4, 2008 interview).  
Such a position helped to reassure both political and business leaders regarding the 
YGTU’s actions.  Simply making this statement was not enough, however.  Chen 
had to show that the statement was actually true.  Obviously, this depended on 
tangible results, but it also depended on development of a model.  Model 
development, facilitated through the contributions of enlisted academics from various 
top universities, helped because it imposed a coherent framework on the changes that 
the YGTU was implementing, enabling a kind of sensemaking process to occur 
(Weick et al. 2005).  This improved understanding.  Apart from specifying the 
nature of the YGTU’s involvement, the reasons for this involvement, and the 
processes the YGTU was implementing, the model-making effort also sought to 
clarify the positive outcomes of the actions that were taking place.  In fact, according 
to one reporter, “Chen spent a significant amount of time investigating the benefits 
that the YGTU’s efforts had on others” (May 27, 2009 interview).  To facilitate 
recognition of the YGTU’s efforts, Chen asked those profiting from the YGTU’s 
undertakings to provide public-forum testimonials attesting to their benefits (May 27, 
2009 interview).  Chen, utilizing his abundant social skills, then enlisted the media to 
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report these testimonials to the public, building up additional support for the YGTU’s 
endeavors.  Thus, not only did Chen oversee development of a model, but he also 
formulated a process of storytelling to go along with that model (Zilber 2007), a 
process that depended on the conveyance of a number of pertinent real-life stories to 
the public, which were meant to back up the YGTU’s assertions regarding its good 
works.  These examples specified causal linkage between past events, framed actors 
in particular roles, and tied emerging successes directly to the YGTU and Chen (Zilber 
2007:1036).  To make sure that the story got out to the public, the YGTU not only 
relied on the media, but it also output a significant amount of written narratives on its 
own.  Since 1999, the employees of the YGTU have published over 420 articles, 
which have appeared in the People’s Daily and other nationally prominent 
publications (May 19, 2009 interview).   
 
THE DISSEMINATION/LEGITIMATION PROCESSES OF THE YGTU 
INNOVATIONS 
The dissemination and legitimation processes are closely linked.  One without the 
other is not possible.  But, with respect to the YGTU, these processes were dependent 
not only on efforts at institutional entrepreneurship, but also on political action.  As 
one interviewee related, “The successful implementation of the Yiwu Model was 
directly related to political mechanisms” (May 27, 2009).  These mechanisms were 
particularly associated with outside-of-Yiwu political workings.  A reason for this 
was that many Yiwu leaders continued to resent the YGTU’s work.  The YGTU’s 
actions made trouble for them: 
 
There were many conflicts between the YGTU and the other city 
departments.  These other departments felt like Chen was making 
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problems for them.  They preferred to maintain the status quo.  The 
shocks Chen was engendering were creating power-sharing and issues-of-
responsibility difficulties and many government leaders were not 
particularly comfortable (June 14, 2009 interview). 
 
As in the situation above, which related to Chen’s efforts to inaugurate a school to 
help fund the workers’ legal rights center, other situations arose wherein government 
administrators did what they could to disrupt the YGTU’s progress.   
The event that led to improvement in the YGTU’s state of affairs (but which has 
still not enacted a completely effective worker-rights environment) was the 
inauguration by the central government of media task forces to investigate the 
workings of China’s locally based unions.  With respect to these investigations, “the 
timing of the YGTU was perfect” (June 13, 2009 interview).  This was because just 
as the YGTU neared its current maturity, top Chinese leaders began to realize that 
China’s social situation, particularly the relationship existing between production 
workers and management, required improvement.  Top government officials initiated 
a search to learn what systems were already extant that might be further promoted.  
They sent a small group of Xinhua (the state news agency) reporters out to various 
provinces to investigate, asking these reporters to write up internal reports, which 
would be seen by China’s top leaders only.  After some time in the field, the 
reporters learned about the YGTU.  Concurrently, they also read a story praising the 
YGTU that appeared in The Zhejiang Workers’ Daily.  Still, prior to visiting Yiwu 
their expectations were not high.  They had already researched various other unions, 
which they had been told were strong innovators, but had found that these reputations 
differed from reality.  Upon arriving in Yiwu, however, “the Xinhua reporters 
discovered that the YGTU’s efforts were actually better than they had originally 
 222 
thought.  The two things that most impressed the reporters about the YGTU “were 
the ability of the YGTU to actually solve problems, and the YGTU’s success in 
attaining the good will of Yiwu workers” (June 14, 2009 interview).  The report they 
wrote praised the YGTU.  Hu Jintao, China’s top leader, reviewed the report and on 
November 27, 2004 publicly commented on the situation, saying that there “was a 
strong need” to implement Yiwu’s workers’ rights program throughout all of China 
(YGTU 2005:1).  Overnight, the situation of the YGTU changed.  The organization 
achieved instant legitimation.   
The YGTU suddenly became a new stop for all Chinese union officials to visit, 
and “beginning in 2005, the number of visitors to the YGTU increased sharply” (June 
13, 2009 interview).  In the spring of 2005, a major contingent of national reporters 
visited the YGTU, filing a number of reports, which circulated throughout China.  
During August of the same year, the YGTU hosted the annual meeting of Zhejiang 
union delegates, and in November Yiwu was also the site of the three day, national 
union convention, an event that was attended by several top leaders, including the 
head of the ACFTU, Wang Zhaoguo.  These events and happenings quickly 
disseminated the Yiwu Trade Union Model throughout China.   
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Although the YGTU represents a successful example of public organizational 
innovation in China, this success needs to be put into some perspective.  The 
improvements being made are, while impressive, still limited.  During the Chen 
period, the YGTU has assisted only four to five thousand workers with their problems, 
only a fraction of the total problem amount.  But what must be realized is that this 
number significantly exceeds the results of other trade unions during the same period 
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(June 16, 2009 interview), and YGTU actions have certainly played a strong role in 
lowering the number of arising worker-management conflicts in Yiwu.  As a result, 
among those workers in the know,13 the YGTU has earned a good reputation.  As a 
Yiwu factory worker commented, “The YGTU is good.  If even more workers knew 
about the YGTU, it could be of even greater benefit to society” (June 14, 2009b 
interview).  But, not all workers know about the YGTU.  On a visit to Yiwu’s labor 
market, I asked workers there (most of whom are only short-term laborers) if they had 
heard of the union; few of them had.  They clamored to get the union’s contact 
information, citing problems they had experienced with late or missing pay (June 14, 
2009c interview).  The contention that the union could be of even greater help if 
more workers knew about it, however, requires comment, for as a Zhejiang University 
professor stated, “What if all the workers in Yiwu knew about the union?  The union 
could never handle all of the work.  They only have six or seven key administrators 
and a total of 38 persons on their staff.  Their resources are far too limited to provide 
the help required” (June 15, 2009 interview).   
A major problem for the YGTU continues to be one associated with turf battles 
and the distribution of resources.  Although the organization has attempted to 
heighten cooperation among departments, such cooperation more often than not 
remains an ideal rather than a reality.  For example, when asked about the YGTU, a 
Yiwu Labor Bureau official responded by saying that he didn’t know anything about 
it, and was completely unwilling to talk (June 14, 2009d interview).  It was obvious 
that this official was not a big fan of the YGTU.  A Zhejiang University professor 
familiar with the YGTU, said he understood.  He referred to the situation as part of a 
                                                
13 Here I distinguish between workers who are even aware of the YGTU’s existence.  Yiwu has a 
relatively mobile migrant labor force, with workers coming to Yiwu for a year and then going 
elsewhere (i.e., Guangdong, other places in Zhejiang, etc.), and then perhaps returning again in the 
future. Such workers tend to have little knowledge of the YGTU’s benefits.  
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power struggle over resources.  Other government departments continue to be 
unwilling to allow the YGTU to achieve too much success for fear of hurting 
themselves:  “cooperation for the betterment of society is difficult” (June 15, 2009 
interview).  Resource distribution is a delicate balance.  If one agency or department 
gets more, it often upsets the existing situation for all others.  Engendering 
innovation in public organizations thus remains an uneasy task. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper set out to answer four main questions, specifying the how of innovative 
change in Chinese public organizations.  It approached these questions through a 
multi-step process.  It started out by detailing the innovative actions of the YGTU.  
It then delved into the how of the innovations, specifying the factors and actors 
involved in the processes that took place.  Of particular importance was the 
institutional entrepreneur mechanism.  We saw how the facilitation of institutional 
entrepreneurship, as theory had predicted, involved elements of social skill, leadership 
(including an ample amount of available discretion), political astuteness, as well as the 
resolve of actors to change a situation they believed needed changing.  The notion of 
the institutional entrepreneur as an outsider requires clarification, however.  Chen 
was an outsider in the sense that he was not embedded within the field of union 
practices and rationality, but socially he was not an outsider.  He had an existing 
network of extensive contacts that he knew how to use.  He used this to his advantage 
and to the advantage of the YGTU.  He also was not unwilling to attempt change, 
even if it meant offending others.  This situation points to the need for the 
clarification of how embeddedness is specified.  One can be both embedded and un-
embedded at the same time, depending on the context of focus.  Such an assertion 
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helps to resolve the “paradox of embedded agency,” given that some forms of 
embeddedness do not necessarily constrain institutional entrepreneurs from making 
change, and can even help to promote change.  The paper also explained how the 
YGTU’s innovations became legitimized.  With regard to the legitimation process, 
there were several actions involved, including actual and recognized achievement by 
the YGTU.  The YGTU’s achievements helped not only workers but also businesses 
and the government.  By engendering real achievement, even if limited in scope, this 
catalyzed the potential inherent in existing relationships with the media, which then 
led to the attention of power-holders at the central-state level.  The acknowledgement 
of the YGTU’s efforts by China’s party leader, Hu Jintao, resulted in instant 
legitimation for the YGTU, an example of the “politicized capitalism” that 
distinguishes China’s development from the idealized market situation.  In terms of 
theorization processes, these have been ongoing, and have also been essential to the 
success of the YGTU’s actions.  Apart from its own efforts to publicize itself, the 
YGTU has relied heavily on outside assistance, both from the media and invited 
academics.  The goal of the theorization activities, which have included model-
construction processes, has been to clarify and make comprehensible the forms of 
action used, and the results achieved, by the YGTU.  Dissemination, at least in the 
sense of making others aware of the YGTU and its successes, has been fostered by the 
efforts at and results of theorization and legitimation.  Adoptions of YGTU 
innovations by others were not a subject of investigation.  Another important element 
in the successful ability of the YGTU to engage in innovation was that conditions 
were right for such change.  Involved actors, particularly at the central-state level, 
recognized the need for change, and the efforts of the YGTU blended in well with 
these needs.   
Lastly, it is apparent that the most important factor in the success of the YGTU 
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has been the management and guidance of Chen Youde.  It seems that attempts at 
similar institutional-change within other organizational environments in China would 
benefit from a leader-actor of a comparable type.  Effective and well-intentioned 
leadership, encompassing high levels of discretion, is thus a key to China’s public 
organization innovation.  As a leader Chen possessed discretion, and he was 
motivated to help the people.  He also was an effective leader in the sense that he was 
risk-accepting, and confident that what he was attempting to do was the right thing, 
making him unafraid should his attempts fail, and he also had the experience, 
reputation, social connections, persistence, and willingness required to achieve 
success.  The achieved success, then, depended not only on “conscious choice and 
discipline” (Collins 2005:31), but also upon the skills and character Chen brought to 
the table.  But, even for Chen the route to success has been difficult and much more 
remains to be done.  Innovation within Chinese public organizations, it seems, is a 
complex process, and not one achieved easily.   
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATELY DEFINED CORPORATE CODES OF 
PRACTICE IN CHINA:  AN EMPIRICAL STUDY INTO THE PROCESSES 
OF WORKPLACE STANDARD INSTITUTIONALIZATION  
 
The transition of a nation from a planned to a market form of economic coordination 
encompasses many institutional adjustments, and involves various mechanisms of 
change.  This paper focuses on three change mechanisms:  agency, economic 
structure, and authority, seeking to understand how, under transition, new institutions 
arise to guide people in their actions.  It investigates the situations of workers in two 
Chinese communities, hypothesizing that a specific set of agents, large-scale foreign 
buyers, has been involved in the establishment of new workplace standards.  Is this 
indeed the case?  If not, what other mechanisms have acted to further the workplace 
standard-making process?  The paper finds, based on its object of study, Wal-Mart, 
that foreign buyers have had less of an impact than one might expect, while newly 
emerging market structures have had the greatest impact.  Authority mechanisms 
have also had an effect, though a comparatively smaller one. 
 
The late 20th century witnessed several episodes of significant institutional change.  
One important set of transformations was the conversion of economic coordination 
mechanisms, from planned to market forms.  Such changes occurred in a number of 
nations and have come to be known as “market transition.”  Research on market 
transition has generally focused upon only a small group of issues, however, 
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particularly ones relating to the outcomes of market transition rather than the 
processes of it.  Surprisingly, little attention has been paid to developments 
concerning the formation of new social standards.  One area that has not received 
enough attention is the emergence of workplace standards.   
This paper examines the possible role of large-scale foreign buyers, 
organizations like Wal-Mart, Target, Carrefour, Marks and Spencer, and Makro, in 
generating workplace standards in China.  Three possible mechanisms of change are 
considered:  agency, markets, and authority.  Because of its standing in the retail 
field as well as its own self-pronounced assertions, one large buying firm, Wal-Mart, 
was selected for analysis.  Via a qualitative investigation, the work examines the 
relation of the three differing change mechanisms to Wal-Mart sellers’ adoption of 
workplace standards to determine the scope of mechanism’s impacts.   
 
THEORY AND EXISTING RESEARCH 
 
AUTHORITY AND MARKET TRANSITION 
A significant change relating to market transition is that involving the role of 
authority, especially as it relates to the polity.  Planned economies rely upon the state 
to dictate the parameters of socio-economic action.  The rise of market coordination, 
however, alters this situation.  Many changes occur:  value systems take on greater 
independence, and property rights become multi-faceted.  In addition, control over 
many decision-making powers, particularly those relating to economic issues, is 
diffused out to individual actors within society.   
The polity’s decreasing level of direct involvement in economic activity would 
seem to represent an increase in the freedom of individual economic actors.  Another 
set of changes taking place is that under a market system the abilities, fortunes, 
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motivations and dispositions towards risk of actors are allowed to differ.  In turn, the 
economic performances of involved actors also tend to vary greatly.  Social 
inequality increases, and power differentials, increasingly predicated on the relative 
economic success of actors within society, grow.  No longer is the social order based 
on egalitarianism.  Instead, the power of certain economic actors expands, giving 
them greater influence over society.  In certain cases, unfair and unjust business 
practices arise.  While such routines seemingly advance the interests of those 
initiating them, in actuality they pose a threat to the survival of newly arising markets. 
The potential for conflict increases.  Thus, limits must be found to counter the effects 
of the inequitable conditions for the market system to survive. 
 
THE ROLE OF AGENCY: BIG FOREIGN BUYERS AND WORKPLACE 
STANDARDS 
Because in today’s China influence arises from wealth, entities possessing control 
over the opportunity to incur profit have substantial power to implement positive 
social change.  There are many groups in China that fit into this category; primary 
among them are the big, foreign buyers, firms like:  Wal-Mart, J.C. Penney, Disney, 
and Target of the US, England’s Marks and Spencer, France’s Carrefour, and Makro 
from Taiwan.  Wal-Mart, itself, is said each year to import an estimated $18 billion 
of products from China.  It is estimated that this makes the company China’s eighth 
largest trading partner, importing more from the nation than countries like England 
and Russia.14   
Many believe that the large buying firms have done little to improve the social 
situations of the nations in which they operate.  A widely held view is that, at present, 
Western corporations “are rarely the leading advocates for civil liberties and labor 
                                                
14 http://Wal-Martwatch.com/home/homepages/annual_report_2005. 
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reform” (Guthrie 2003:52).  Still, there exists potential incentive for the companies to 
take on such roles.  As Martin Wolf writes, “the market economy rests on and 
encourages valuable moral qualities” (Wolf 2003:47).  It does this by establishing a 
framework of incentives whereby certain traits, deemed by greater society to be 
important, are made synonymous with a firm’s own perceived legitimacy needs.  
A particularly sensitive issue relates to how China-based producers treat their 
workers.  Are large, Western buyers currently acting as agents of positive change, 
promoting (Western) legitimized codes of practice in the overseas firms with which 
they maintain business relations?  With regard to this situation, it is posited that the 
conditions for an agency relationship exist.  Such relationships arise “Whenever one 
[actor] depends on the action of another” (Pratt and Zeckhauser 1985:2). The agency 
relationship of relevance here is the possible dependence of China’s workers on the 
actions of the large, Western buying firms.   
 
EXISTING RESEARCH ON FOREIGN INFLUENCES OF CHINESE 
WORKPLACE OPERATIONS 
Limited studies have been carried out examining the general impact of foreign 
businesses on Chinese commercial routines, with one such study finding that business 
practices in China have improved as a result of these impacts (Pedersen 2006:33).  
Likewise, research on the impact of corporate codes of conduct among producers in 
two, Guangdong-based, buyer-driven commodity chains determined that in an 
underdeveloped institutional environment, characterized by “a virtual absence of legal 
protection and independent worker organization,” emerging corporate codes have had 
positive results.  It was also noted, however, that in order for further workplace 
advancements to take place the role of government must expand significantly (Frenkel 
2001:542). 
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While these studies have been positive regarding the impacts of foreign firms on 
Chinese business practices, other findings have presented a different picture.  For 
example, interviews conducted in Guangdong revealed that in a quest for profits, 
workplace standards have suffered considerably.15  It seems that, at least in some 
areas of Guangdong, agents of change, in the form of the big foreign buyers, have not 
had as much of a positive influence on business ethics and/or commercial culture as 
had been alluded to previously.  Instead foreign buyers appear to be taking advantage 
of locally destructive situations to enhance their own immediate profits.   
This view of the south-China workplace environment meshes with those of other 
findings.  One study found that social relations in Guangdong have been significantly 
impacted by market transition.  Workers in local state enterprises are no longer 
enmeshed in the communal, intra-company relations that existed previously, but have 
become increasingly independent and self directed.  Self reliant, but with little 
individual control, they are now easy targets of exploitation by the managers that 
employ them (Lee 1999).  Given the fact that foreign investment in Guangdong has 
been significant (meaning that foreign influence should be high),16 there therefore 
exist significant questions regarding what the impacts of the foreign buyers in China 
have actually been. 
Because, to date, there have been few studies that have focused specifically on 
the nature of Chinese work standards arising out of the interactions of the big foreign 
buyers and the business owners of their supplying firms, the goal of this paper is to 
undertake such an investigation.  The work’s specific objective is to answer the 
question of whether, as a result of large, foreign buying firm efforts, China has 
                                                
15 Interview, conducted on March 29th in Guangzhou, Guangdong Province, with American-Taiwanese 
owner of Dongguan manufacturing enterprise. 
16 According to official provincial statistics, the amount of foreign capital in the province as of 2004 
was over USD 22 billion, a very significant amount (see, http://www. 
gdstats.gov.cn/tjnj/table/16/16_e.htm). 
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witnessed an improved climate of workplace standards.  If it is found that large 
foreign buyers have not had a significant impact on such standards, a second goal of 
the paper will be to determine if there exist any alternate processes that are currently 
acting to bring about such improved conditions. 
 
METHODS 
Because it is impossible to examine the impact of all foreign buyers on the 
business practices and ethics of managing business owners in China, this paper selects 
a representative business as its focus, Wal-Mart.  The sole reason for this selection is 
Wal-Mart’s standing in China:  the company’s buying power in the nation gives it 
potentially strong agent influence among Chinese businesspersons.   
To determine the extent to which Wal-Mart’s ethical standards have impacted 
the business frameworks of Chinese businesses, one-on-one interviews with the 
owners of Wal-Mart supplying firms were conducted to get their feedback on the 
situations of the businesses under their control.  A specific focus of such contacts was 
the manner in which the owners are treating their employees, and how this treatment 
has been changed through interactions with Wal-Mart.   
Two “rural” cities were selected as interview sites.  These cities have each 
experienced rapid, export-oriented development, and are highly representative of two 
of the main models of business development in China.17  The cities were chosen not 
only for their representativeness, but also based on the author’s established relations 
with members of the local polity.  In each of the cities, the owners of four or more, 
current or past, Wal-Mart direct suppliers were interviewed.  These suppliers were all 
companies that, based on their own responses, had gone through the process of 
                                                
17 The two models are the Wenzhou and Sunan Business Models. 
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becoming certified Wal-Mart suppliers.   
 
THE INTERVIEW LOCATIONS 
Interviews were conducted with managing-owners of Wal-Mart supplying businesses, 
other businesspersons, and government officials in Yiwu, Zhejiang Province and 
Jiangyin, Jiangsu Province.  Both of these cities are ones where economic growth has 
been impressive, even by Chinese standards (they are ranked in China among the top 
performing cities for their type of municipality (county cities)), and where market 
forces have had a large impact.  Zhejiang Province's Yiwu City is located in China’s 
southeast-central region.  It is a small city by Chinese standards, with a registered 
local population at the end of 2004 of 688,327 (Yiwu City Department of Statistics 
2005:89). The number of non-locals in Yiwu, individuals living in the city on a 
permanent or semi-permanent basis, surpasses this figure, however, itself numbering 
about one million persons.  Included in this population is a set of approximately 
8,000 foreign residents, primarily from places like Egypt, Pakistan, Afghanistan, 
India, Russia, Korea and various countries in Africa.  Early on during the reform 
period, Yiwu’s top leaders were encouraging market oriented change, and both locals 
and non-locals took advantage of this situation to develop the area into a center of 
local commerce.  Today, Yiwu is not just a center for local trade, but an international 
commercial center as well.  It is the largest small commodities market (items like 
costume jewelry, umbrellas, socks, office supplies, handicrafts, etc.) in not only China, 
but also the world.  In addition, Yiwu has also emerged as a focus of production, with 
around 30% of the items sold in its markets produced locally.   
Jiangyin City, located in Jiangsu Province, is an interior port city bordering the 
Yangtze River, about a two-hour drive northwest of Shanghai.  It is also a 
comparatively small city with a population of about one million.  Post reform 
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development in Jiangyin initially took place in line with the Sunan Business Model, 
which stressed socialist commercial forms, as embodied by in town and village 
enterprise (TVEs), a type of business run collectively by area towns and villages.  A 
number of Jiangyin TVEs became famous nationally and were held up as examples for 
other businesses to emulate.  TVE’s have since undergone privatization and today 
Jiangyin is now better known in China for its extremely high density of stock 
exchange listed corporations, with 18 such listed companies.  This number is quite 
impressive given that Jiangyin is only a county-level city and the number of Jiangyin 
listed companies is more than the total number of such companies found in many 
Chinese provinces.  The concentration of capital in the Jiangyin area is, as a result of 
such listed firms, quite high, and the typical scale of businesses tends to be skewed 
towards larger firms.  Today, Jiangyin serves as a center of small machine, fabric and 
textile production.  A number of its companies act as suppliers to Wal-Mart, though 
few have been actually Wal-Mart certified.   
 
RESULTS 
 
WAL-MART’S SUPPLYING STRUCTURE IN CHINA 
Based on interview results, it appears that even though many companies in the two 
locations serve as suppliers to Wal-Mart the great majority of these companies are not 
ones that have gone through the certification process.  This is due to Wal-Mart’s use 
of trading-company intermediaries for the purchase of a high percentage of its goods.18  
The impression of those companies supplying goods to Wal-Mart is that Wal-Mart’s 
purchasing operations are rather complex.  While buying needs are determined at the 
                                                
18 Interview with Jiangyin City Party official conducted in Jiangyin on April 6, 2006. 
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head office, their implementation occurs locally.  Coordination seems to be a 
problem.  Though coordination is perhaps a problem, Wal-Mart’s understanding of 
the Chinese manufacturing price structure seems to be exceptional.  Many 
interviewees expressed admiration for the company in its ability to determine the costs 
of China based manufacturing, with one interviewee stating that Wal-Mart’s “ability 
to garner information in China is first class.”19   
 
AGENCY AS A MECHANISM FOR CHANGE: THE ROLE OF WAL-MART 
Wal-Mart’s U.S. website emphasizes the company’s workplace standards program 
stating that a key goal of this program is to “make it an effective tool for improving 
conditions for workers in our suppliers’ factories that make products sold in our 
stores.”20  It stresses the company’s strong commitment to real progress in standard 
implementation.  This importance is further stressed in its “2005 Report on Ethical 
Sourcing.”21  This report claims that 100% of all Wal-Mart purchased merchandise is 
audited to make sure that merchandise producers comply with Wal-Mart’s ethical 
standards.22 It does not indicate at what point such auditing occurs, however.  The 
report also points out that Wal-Mart trained over 11,000 suppliers and members of 
factory management with regard to the ethical standards held in esteem by the 
company.  These training sessions took place in half-day group conferences, during 
which information on appropriate business practices was disseminated to 
participants.23  The report claims that due to the company’s efforts, “working 
conditions in the factories we have audited have improved.”24  Throughout its 
                                                
19 Interview (Supplier Interview 1) conducted with executive of Yiwu, Wal-Mart certified supplier on 
April 10, 2006. 
20 See: http://walmartstores.com/GlobalwMStoresWeb/navigate.do?catg=336&contId=5624. 
21 A pdf version of this report, the “2005 Report on Ethical Sourcing,” can be downloaded at: 
http://walmartstores.com/GlobalWM StoresWeb/navigate.do?catg=336. 
22 “2005 Report on Ethical Sourcing,” p. 8. 
23 “2005 Report on Ethical Sourcing,” p. 12. 
24 “Report on Ethical Sourcing,” P. 13. 
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publications, the company professes that as a direct result of its commitment to ethical 
standards, working conditions and the treatment of workers within the overseas 
factories producing Wal-Mart products have improved significantly.  Wal-Mart also 
infers that, from the perspective of overseas’ producers, selection as a Wal-Mart 
partner is a status that is greatly sought after, and, as a result, Wal-Mart has great 
influence on the manner in which business is conducted in foreign venues.  The 
perspective obtained from the conducted interviews, however, is somewhat different.  
The following comments were quite typical among the various interviews conducted:   
  
By obtaining a Wal-Mart contract, we can make sure that our 
production continues.  We don't make that much from each individual 
piece, but we can make some on the size of the contract…If we 
satisfied all of the Wal-Mart demands we'd go out of business, and my 
sense is that Wal-Mart is not particularly concerned about China's 
social situation anyways.  They're interested in low prices.25   
 
A particularly surprising finding from the interviews, however, was that the 
desire to be a supplier to Wal-Mart is not of the importance that one might assume.  
In fact, many companies are satisfied to carry out their commercial activities without 
any interaction with Wal-Mart.  The reason for this is because Wal-Mart puts too 
much of a focus on prices. 
Thus, even though Wal-Mart is a huge purchaser of goods from China, its 
influence as an agent for positive change in the nation is less than one might expect.  
While it and the other big buying firms have certainly had positive influence on the 
                                                
25 Interview (Supplier Interview 7) conducted with executive of Jiangyin certified Wal-Mart supplier 
on June 6, 2006. 
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way business is conducted in China, it appears that this impact has not been the sole, 
or perhaps even the primary, factor in determining the state of workplace standards in 
the country.  Instead, other even more significant influences are present.  To 
determine what these influences might be, the paper turns to an examination of one 
feature of the business standard configuration—the nature of employee-employer 
relations in China, at least as found in Yiwu. 
 
THE NATURE OF EMPLOYEE-EMPLOYER RELATIONS IN CHINA 
To gauge the state of employer-employee relations in China, interviews of 50 non-
local factory and service workers were carried out in Yiwu.  40 of these interviews 
were conducted in various areas of the city but centered particularly in different Yiwu 
industrial zones.  The author spent multiple evenings canvassing these areas 
attempting to interview workers after they had gotten off work.  Each of these 
interviews was conducted in Chinese and used a standard set of questions.  Of the 
people approached, the interview acceptance rate was about 80%. 
In addition to the 40 interviews referred to above, ten additional interviews also 
took place at the Yiwu Labour Market, a place at which workers converge to look for 
work.  Workers coming to the market are ones seeking short-term work, and are 
overwhelmingly hired by smaller firms.  These interviews were conducted to get a 
better perspective of conditions at such smaller scale companies.  Because the density 
of workers at the market is high, use of the interview questions referred to above was 
not possible, as it would have attracted too much attention.  In turn, a condensed set 
of interview questions was used.  As above, all interviews were conducted in 
Chinese.   
An especially interesting finding coming out of the interviews was that, among 
those interviewees working in larger-scale production companies and in service firms 
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of all sizes, there was little sense of alienation present, and, for the most part, the 
workers believed themselves to be well treated.  Feelings of exploitation were not 
generally evident.  Many workers in such firms expressed positive feelings about 
their bosses, all of whom were Yiwu locals.  A typical comment was:  “our boss is 
nice to us.”26  These remarks were noteworthy because almost none of the 
interviewed individuals indicated that they had formed friendships with Yiwu locals, 
and many, complained about the behavior and mannerisms of the locals.  There 
seemed to be a point of discontinuity between the two perspectives.   
The opinions of those employed by smaller production firms (<100 employees) 
differed, however.  Individuals working in such firms often expressed higher levels 
of discontent towards their firms and firm bosses.  As was the case above, these 
workers also indicated their general dislike of Yiwu residents.  Many such 
interviewees complained about being paid late or receiving less in pay than was 
appropriate, several expressed strong feelings of unhappiness regarding their work and 
living conditions, and believed Yiwu to be a place too oriented towards business and 
materialism.   
 
DO OTHER MECHANISMS PROMOTING WORKPLACE STANDARDS EXIST? 
Based on the findings above, it appears that the impacts of the big foreign buyers on 
local business activities in China, at least in terms of their influence on the codes of 
corporate practices relied upon by local Chinese firm-owners, have been limited in 
their effects.  What then has restricted business owners from seeking profits at all 
costs, and exploiting their workers to no end?  How is China’s situation different 
from that found in the United States during its early industrialization phase of the late 
                                                
26 Interview (Interview #3) with 39 year old, female, Henan sock inspection worker conducted in 
Yiwu’s Chengxibei District on May 30, 2006 
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19th and early 20th centuries?  Poor working conditions and the abuse of workers 
during this period were common, as depicted by Upton Sinclair in his book, The 
Jungle.  What factors have been present in Yiwu to catalyze forms of workplace 
standards, and limit the conditions found previously in Chicago from unfolding in this 
city? 
The first thing one has to realize in discussing the Chinese situation is that China 
is a big country, with much diversity.  The situations found in Yiwu and Jiangyin are 
not necessarily the same as those found in other parts of the nation.  For example, the 
developmental situation of China’s Guangdong Province seems to be different.  This 
can be derived from the quote relating to Dongguan above, and was also frequently 
expressed in other discussions.  Another difference between the two situations is that 
many workers in Yiwu have aligned themselves into mutually supporting groups, 
based mainly on place of origin.  If a certain company tries to exploit a group 
member, workers often take action.  For example, an interviewed worker from 
Jiangxi related that: 
 
If somebody tries to cheat us out of money we band together to make 
sure this doesn’t happen.  There are thousands of people here from our 
province and everyone has a cell phone.  If we need to we can get 
together a thousand people within a couple of hours.  A few of us will 
probably get detained in jail for a few days, but they can’t throw us all 
in jail.  There’s power in numbers.27 
 
 
                                                
27 June 20, 2006 Yiwu interview with Jiangxi production worker . 
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MARKETS AS A MECHANISM FOR CHANGE 
One primary reason such scenarios are possible is that Yiwu’s situation is unlike that 
found in the histories of many other places, where a shortage of jobs existed and 
severe worker exploitation occurred, such as historical Manchester, England and 
Chicago (Engels 1971; Engels 1972). In contemporary Yiwu, however, there is a 
shortage of good workers.  Business expansion and growing opportunities throughout 
China mean that workers can be more selective in their employment choices.  And, if 
nothing appealing emerges, the workers can always return to their land at home.  
While “good” jobs are potentially hard to find, employment paying a life-sustaining 
wage is plentiful, particularly for young, able-bodied workers.  Networks of relations 
make workers knowledgeable about market conditions and the standards set by 
different companies, and expectations regarding workplace conditions among workers 
are increasing. 
Business owners thus must improve conditions at their factories or risk the 
possibility of not finding and retaining needed workers.  Several company heads 
pointed to this factor as the primary impetus for improved workplace standards.  In 
one sense a kind of bargaining process is taking place, with both sides seeking 
strategic advantage.  According to the head of one locally-based Yiwu firm: 
 
We have to keep improving our conditions or else we can’t attract workers.  
Workers are very knowledgeable about market conditions and use it to 
their advantage.  They play off the plusses of other companies against 
us.28 
 
                                                
28 Interview with Yiwu-based owner of greeting card manufacturing and distributing business, 
conducted in Futian Market on October 30, 2006. 
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AUTHORITY AS A MECHANISM OF CHANGE: IMAGE MAINTENANCE  
Another reason for workplace standards improvement relates to considerations of 
status and related authority mechanisms. As mentioned, Yiwu was recently cited to be 
akin to a “model” community.  The Zhejiang Provincial Government in early 2006 
issued Document 34.  This document, circulated to government offices throughout 
the province, encouraged officials of other Zhejiang communities to “study” the Yiwu 
experience.  Yiwu’s reputation is not limited to Zhejiang, however, and leaders of 
other cities throughout China frequently visit the city to learn more about its 
conditions.29  When visiting Yiwu these officials are taken to selected local firms to 
see first hand the successes of the Yiwu experience.  Such firms are expected to set 
the tone for business conditions in the city, as well as to make efforts at presenting a 
favorable impression regarding Yiwu to visiting dignitaries.  This impression 
includes aspects relating to how workers are treated, giving rise to isomorphic 
tendencies among area companies. 
In addition, worker expectations meld with the demands of authority to 
determine acceptable workplace standards.  There is a cognizance among Yiwu 
workers as to the limits of acceptable employer behavior and workplace demands.  
For the most part, Yiwu workers have a very high tolerance level and can accept 
conditions that workers in many other countries might not be able to tolerate.  Many 
work seven days a week for 12-15 hours per day doing boring, repetitive tasks.  In 
carrying out their assigned responsibilities, they possess a very accepting attitude and 
are tolerant of their life fates.  A very representative approach is the following: 
 
I’m resolved to my fate.  I’m now 27 and after working here I’ll 
probably just go back to my home and be a farmer.  Without any 
                                                
29 Officials from Yiwu also visit other cities, so comparisons are ongoing. 
 250 
relations (guanxi), I can’t expect anything else.  Everything here 
depends on one’s background.30 
 
On the surface, workers seem to be very docile and easily managed.  But, 
though this appears to be the case superficially, in actuality there are definite limits to 
what workers will accept, with unambiguous expectations held dear regarding 
treatment by employers.  If these expectations are breached severely, social unrest is 
the result.  But because the promotions of government officials are based on their 
ability to maintain social harmony, such officials take great care to make sure that 
worker reactions remain within tolerable ranges.  Their greatest fear is that unrest 
will erupt and come to the attention of higher officials, thus impacting their future 
career prospects.  If workers react strongly to their mistreatment, the government, 
with a focus on the maintenance of social stability (and the promotion of official 
careers), will intercede. 
Still, on an ongoing basis, instances arise in which government reactions lag and 
ranges of tolerance are breached.  Workers, in response to situations they come to see 
as unbearable, resort to severe and violent actions.  The attitudes of locals to such 
actions are surprisingly supportive, however.  For example, in November 2006 an 
individual in Qingkou, a rural community of Yiwu, who was supposedly being ill-
treated by local government officials “snapped” and took revenge, killing three 
officials and injuring many more.  But the response to his action among Yiwu 
residents was very sympathetic.  They also indicated their hopes that the offense will 
serve as a warning to officials to be more careful in their handling of future events.  
This it will most certainly do. 
 
                                                
30 October 29, 2006 interview with Yiwu hotel worker. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This essay has examined the manner by which new workplace standards arise in 
the context of market transition.  A key question examined has been the degree to 
which large foreign buyers have impacted the emergence in China of corporate codes 
of practice.  Given the powerful positions of foreign buyers with regard to their 
potential ability to influence the economic circumstances of the firms from which they 
purchase products, a hypothesis was made that the buyers are impacting workplace 
standard construction.  It was found that the influence of the big buyer examined, 
Wal-Mart, has been less than it has the potential to be.   
The paper then considered other alternatives.  Though “it is rarely 
acknowledged that markets often display a considerable self-governance capacity” 
(Franco 2001:201), it is just such a capacity that this paper found to be of primary 
importance:  the principal influence involved in corporate codes of practice 
construction in Yiwu was the market, itself.  Another factor of relevance was found 
to be the influence of political authority.  Under markets, the nature of this influence 
has changed.  Rather than pegging the actions of company managers to some stated 
form of ideological standard, as was the case under planned systems, owners are 
instead expected to frame workplace standards according to an emerging corporate 
hierarchy, wherein the standards of Yiwu’s leading firms are expected to be at least as 
good as if not better than the corporate codes of practice of firms in other 
commercially prominent places in the country.  In turn, the firms also become the 
standards by which other firms pattern themselves.  In addition, the actions of Yiwu-
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situated workers have also play a role in corporate codes of practice definition.  
While the demands of Yiwu bosses on their workers is high, as are the tolerance levels 
of the workers in meeting these expectations, the workers ongoingly refer to a set of 
internally defined norms as to what is considered proper treatment of them by their 
employers.  If the demarcations assigned as limits to this treatment are exceeded, the 
workers take action, relying on strength in numbers to remedy the situation.  The 
potential for social unrest emerges.  A polity unwilling to come under negative 
scrutiny does all it can to resolve the situation, and often acts in support of the 
workers, simply for the sake of maintaining social stability. 
In turn, in Yiwu, processes of workplace standard construction are ongoing.  
Various elements relating to agency, economic structure, individual action, and 
authority are all parts of the occurring transformations.  Resulting changes are, in 
light of the often dire pronouncements made regarding China’s future, ones that seem 
to be leading to actual betterment of worker conditions.  Cooperation between 
workers and management is emerging, and the whip of the market has been avoided 
(Burawoy 1983:590).  While difficulties and problems remain, there certainly exists 
hope for continued improvement. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
The essays in this volume reflect four things.  First, they all show that market 
forms depend on the institutional foundations upon which they are built.  Second, 
they depict the importance of identity as an institutional and social construct.  Third, 
they clearly demonstrate that particular individuals, amongst all those contained in the 
masses, can have an inordinate influence on developmental outcomes.  Fourth, and 
finally, they reveal the importance of the market as a determiner of how development 
will proceed.  The various papers reveal these lessons from the context of the 
transition of China from a dependence on an allocation system based on planning to 
one predicated on markets (Nee 1996).  The focus of the works here is not so much 
on the effects or outcomes of market transition as it is on the processes by which such 
a transition occurred.   
 
THE IMPORTANCE OF INSTITUTIONS 
In contrast to the approaches of many scholars, a standing assumption made in the 
essays here is that market emergence is not just a natural, positivistic process, 
predicated simply on forces of supply and demand.  The works here also assert that 
the outcomes of market transition are also not the same for all societies; rather, each 
market has its own methods of transition and resulting effects.  One cannot just 
simply flip a switch in any particular nation and suppose that a standard market 
framework will be the result, leading to a situation whereby the market characters of 
all nations are similar to those found everywhere else.  Instead, the contention here is 
that the nature of a nation’s market economy is largely determined by the institutional 
contexts, both past and present, of the nation in which market transition occurs and a 
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market system arises.  Thus, in order to fully understand the economic processes 
found in a particular nation (regardless of what allocation system is involved), 
emphasis needs to be directed to that nation’s historical and social situations.  In the 
market case, this is because even though market systems are all social forms (Pólos, 
Hannan, and Carroll 2002), and encompass certain similarities that characterize the 
form in its entirety, each market system is still also unique, because each nation 
possesses its own historical and social backgrounds.  To fully understand and 
describe a particular market, then, one must spend time and effort not only to 
understand the contemporary form of that market, but also to research and 
comprehend the market’s past.  As Douglass North has said, “History matters” 
(North 1990:vii), and the assertion here is that, with respect to markets and their 
emergence, it really does.  One reason for this is because history helps to determine 
the nature of existing institutions, or the rules of the game for any society.   
The importance of institutions was apparent throughout the essays within this 
volume, but was most particularly so in the first chapter, entitled “China’s Markets:  
An Institutionally Founded Overview.”  Here, it was obvious that China’s market 
situation is distinctive from that of other places, particularly the United States.  It was 
also obvious that much of this distinctiveness can be tied to the institutional 
foundations upon which China’s markets developed.  These foundations developed 
over time, establishing the institutional patterns that link contemporary China with the 
China of the past (especially with respect to markets).  Issues of path dependence 
were observable throughout the various essays, indicating the importance of history to 
developmental forms. 
 
THE ROLE OF IDENTITY 
History also matters because it is tied to the notion of identity, a specific kind of 
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institution.  Like other institutions, identities are social constructions (Eisenstadt 
1998), and develop over time.  Sets of actors, grouped into networks of relations, 
develop shared understandings, which influence how a selected set of actors perceives 
itself and also how others perceive the actors.  The sum of these perceptions 
determines the identities of the actor set, and these identities influence resulting 
behavior, actions, and outcomes of involved participants.  Identity is a useful concept 
because we can apply it to show how certain entities, all a part of the same form, can 
among them still exhibit degrees of heterogeneity.  For example, even though both 
China and the U.S. are market economies, their identities differ, and this influences the 
manner by which the two nation’s markets operate, as well as the nature of the 
outcomes they produce.  Even within China, itself, identities differ, and these 
differences give rise to disparate types of structure and action.  Thus, identities, and 
the manner by which they are managed and/or manipulated, can influence resulting 
outcomes. 
This was certainly evident in the essay making up Chapter Two, “Meaning and 
the Institutionalization of Transition: An Application of Discourse Analysis to Two 
Processes of Organizational Development in China.”  Here, a comparison was made 
of two different communities in China, both impacted by similar, but changing, 
macro-institutional logics.  At the local level the identities of the two communities 
differed sharply, with one being of an individualistic nature (Wenzhou) and the other 
of a collectivistic form (Sunan).  These differences shaped institutional logics at the 
local level, and gave rise, in the each of the two communities, to distinct modes of 
action and behavior.   
The influence of identity was also clear in other volume chapters as well, 
especially in Chapter Three, “Extending Linkages Between Organizational Analysis 
and Social Structure:  A Case Study of the Celebrity Construction of a Chinese 
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Marketplace.”  This chapter showed how, through the manipulation of identity, 
entities possess the ability to distinguish themselves from their competitors, thus 
providing themselves with competitive advantage.  Achieving such results, however, 
requires skill, hard work, and determination, all of which were on ample display in the 
actions of Yiwu’s promoters.    
 
THE IMPORTANCE OF SELECTED INDIVIDUALS IN ENACTING CHANGE 
The essays also highlighted the role that a small group of actors or even one actor may 
have in promoting change.  Such roles generally occur in the guise of 
entrepreneurship, a process that “essentially consists in doing things that are not 
generally done in the ordinary course of business routine” (Schumpeter 1951:250).  
That is, entrepreneurship involves some aspect of creating newness.  The literature 
has assumed that there are differing ways by which actors pursue entrepreneurship, 
and these are framed in terms of their involved actors.  One type is a category 
composed of individuals simply referred to as entrepreneurs, or those distinguished by 
their involvement in the utilization of existing business opportunities through the 
founding of new firms (Baron 2008:328).  A second is a type where the focus is on 
institutional entrepreneurs, or those who “have an interest in particular institutional 
arrangements and who leverage resources to create new institutions or to transform 
existing ones” (Maguire, Hardy, and Lawrence 2004:657).   
But, it is not just entrepreneurs who are important in the enactment of change.  
Also of importance is the field of existing opportunities actors face, and how actors go 
about discovering and utilizing the opportunities that are around them (Shane and 
Venkataraman 2000:218).  To a large degree, the context of action helps to define 
these opportunities, and a focus on context has been a key area of emphasis within 
sociological analysis on entrepreneurship (Ireland and Webb 2007:912).  One focus 
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missing from sociological work on entrepreneurship, however, has been 
“examinations of the effects that entrepreneurial behaviors have on the overarching 
social context” (Ireland and Webb 2007:913), and thus this was intentionally in the 
work here. 
Chapter Four, entitled, “The Role Institutional Entrepreneurship and Leadership 
in Stimulating Normative Change:  A Case of Public Organizational Innovation in 
China,” examined the impact that a specific individual can have on an organization, in 
turn influencing a larger organizational field.  That is, the social context of action 
may be changed through the actions of one person.  But the chapter also implied that 
such outcomes are in no way given ones.  Instead, they depend on the individuals 
involved, existing power frameworks, in-place institutions, and relevant needs.  In 
other words, entrepreneurship, the potential for change, and the contexts involved are 
all important factors in determining what changes will occur.  
 
THE POWER OF THE MARKET, ITSELF 
The final lesson that may be drawn from the essays here is that the market, itself, 
influences the nature of action and the manner by which structures arise and function.  
Market incentives, predicated on profit, motivate actors to act in particular ways, and 
though these incentives and their consequences depend upon how actors perceive 
them, and thus are contingent on existing institutional frameworks, nevertheless they 
are important and must be considered.  This perspective came through in the essay of 
the fifth chapter, “The Emergence of Privately Defined Corporate Codes of Practice in 
China: An Empirical Study into the Processes of Workplace Standard 
Institutionalization,” where it was found that the primary motivating force 
encouraging firm owners to improve the standards facing workers within the owners’ 
firms was not pressure coming from large international buyers, but rather the forces of 
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the market, which in a competitive environment, pressured owners to keep up with or 
better the standards existing within their industries so as to attract the labor talent they 
required.   
 
SOME FINAL WORDS 
In addition to the research presented in this volume, there is much, much more that 
remains to be done if I hope to present a full overview of the processes of market 
development in China.  Actually, I have already undertaken efforts in this regard.  
One topic about which I have already collected data, but that remains to be completed, 
is the subject of how market forms have diffused throughout China.  Places like 
Guangdong, Fujian, Zhejiang, Shanghai and Jiangsu were those that first benefited 
from the impacts of market reforms, yet gradually the lessons learned from these 
places are spreading to other parts of the nation.  How this is occurring is another 
subject about which I plan to write. 
Another that remains to be investigated is the internationalization of China’s 
markets.  How this process took place to the degree it has still remains underexplored 
and thus needs to be further understood.  This is something I plan to do. 
Lastly, regardless of how much we come to understand of the past this 
knowledge will never be enough.  This is because change is ongoing, and the job of 
the researcher is never done.  With regard to the study here, it has been my honor to 
try and help others to come to understand markets and China better.  This is because 
these are topics to which I have become quite endeared, and thus, I look forward to 
continuing to pursue such work in the future.   
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